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Five years after September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks and the U.S. 
response—now called the global war on terrorism—have changed 
the world, and the terrorist enterprise that we know as al-Qaeda has 
changed with it. The current status of al-Qaeda’s network remains 
unclear, but it is certain that it and other terrorist groups continue to 
threaten the lives and well-being of Americans, at home and abroad, 
and the security of our friends and allies. This continuing danger leads 
to ongoing U.S. and international eﬀorts to monitor, disrupt, and dis-
mantle terrorist groups before they can cause large-scale destruction to 
our people or our interests. 
The objective of this RAND Corporation study, undertaken 
as part of a project entitled “Beyond al-Qaeda: Countering Future 
Terrorist and Other Nontraditional Threats to U.S. Security,” is to 
understand the shape of future threats to the United States and U.S. 
security interests from terrorist and other extremist organizations. We 
do this through analyses that draw together the various threat strands 
that are informing current U.S. thinking in the war on terror. The 
study looks speciﬁcally at four sources of threats: 
1. Al-Qaeda. We examine how al-Qaeda has changed since 
September 11, the loss of its operating base in Afghanistan, and 
the death or capture of key operatives; and we assess what forms 
the al-Qaeda threat to the United States and U.S. interests takes 
now and might take in the future.
iii
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2. Terrorist groups that may not be formally part of al-Qaeda but 
that have assimilated al-Qaeda’s worldview and concept of mass-
casualty terrorist attacks. This, we believe, is where the center of 
gravity of the current global terrorist threat lies. 
3. Violent Islamist and non-Islamist terrorist and insurgent groups 
and other nontraditional threats with no known links to al-
Qaeda. These groups threaten U.S. regional interests, friends, 
and allies.
4. The nexus between terrorism and organized crime. In each case, 
we examine how the presence of these threats aﬀects U.S. secu-
rity interests, and we identify distinct strategies that the United 
States and the U.S. Air Force may take to neutralize or mitigate 
each of these threats.
The results of the study are reported in two volumes. This book 
is the ﬁrst of the two; the second, by Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Kim 
Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin 
A. O’Brien, and William Rosenau, is entitled Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, 
The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe.
This research builds on previous RAND Project AIR FORCE 
work on counterterrorism, notably the following:
Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Peter Chalk, Christine Fair, 
Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser, and David Thaler, The 
Muslim World After 9/11, MG-246-AF, 2004
Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with 
Europe, NATO, and the European Union, MR-1746-AF, 2003
Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An 
Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing 
World, MR-1782-AF, 2004 
Lynn Davis, Steven Hosmer, Sara Daly, and Karl Mueller, The 
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: A Planning Framework to Facilitate 
Timely Policy Adjustments, DB-426-AF, 2004  
David Ochmanek, Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups 
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Research for this project was completed in September 2004. This  book 
should be of value to the national security community and to inter-
ested members of the general public, especially those with an interest 
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Defeating the global jihadist movement—which we deﬁne as al-Qaeda 
and the universe of jihadist groups that are associated with or inspired 
by al-Qaeda—is the most pressing security challenge facing the United 
States today. The global jihadist movement can be distinguished from 
traditional or local jihads, which are armed campaigns conducted by 
Islamist groups against local adversaries with usually limited aims as 
well as geographic scope, in that it targets the United States and its 
allies across the globe and pursues broad geopolitical aims.
Although the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has had some 
notable successes—such as the destruction of al-Qaeda’s sanctuary 
in Afghanistan, the elimination of many of the group’s leaders, and 
the growing resolve of many countries to take action against al-Qaeda 
and its associates—no informed observers believe that al-Qaeda will 
be eliminated anytime soon. Indeed, in some respects al-Qaeda has 
metastasized into an even more formidable adversary, dispersed across 
the world, largely self-sustaining, and constantly adopting new and 
innovative terrorism tactics. Despite intense government countermea-
sures, it seems able to mount devastating operations from the air, land, 
and sea, such as the USS Cole operation in October 2000, the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, the Madrid railway bombing in March 2004, 
the Sinai resort bombings of October 2004, and the London bomb-
ings of July 2005. The United States itself continues to be threatened 
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by large-scale attacks. Countering al-Qaeda is thus likely to preoc-
cupy U.S. national security institutions for at least the remainder of 
the decade, and probably longer. 
Although al-Qaeda clearly still exists, as we have seen with the 
recent discovery of detailed surveillance reports of a multitude of 
targets in the United States, the group has been substantially trans-
formed. Since September 11, al-Qaeda has gone through several 
phases: from a well-structured terrorist organization with headquarters 
in Afghanistan, to the hunted remnants of bin Laden’s inner circle 
during and after Operation Enduring Freedom, to a disaggregated and 
atomized enterprise with reduced command and control but a contin-
ued capability to operate. Moreover, al-Qaeda still serves as the source 
of motivation and inspiration for regional terrorist groups that are not 
formally aﬃliated with it but that share its ideology of global jihad and 
its concept of operations.
Strategy
Al-Qaeda’s strategy ﬂows logically from its ideology. To outsiders, 
those within the network may appear irrational—motivated by insane 
hatreds, grossly unrealistic in their goals, and willing to kill innocent 
men, women, and children to achieve their ends. In reality, al-Qaeda, 
like other terrorist groups, acts in a largely rational manner in the sense 
that it weighs ends and means, considers alternative approaches, and 
calculates costs and beneﬁts. Although the movement may emphasize 
ﬂawed precepts, it makes logical assumptions on the basis of these pre-
cepts.1 Among the central strategic priorities of al-Qaeda, mobilizing 
Muslims for a global jihad against the West and toppling “apostate” 
regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, remain para-
mount objectives. 
Other objectives include creating an Islamic government accord-
ing to its own ultra-orthodox interpretation of Hanbali Sunni Islam 
and isolating the majority of Sunni Muslims who follow other schools 
of Islam, not to mention the Shi’ites. For al-Qaeda and the groups 
that share its ideology, governments in the Middle East primarily exist 
1 For more on al-Qaeda as a rational actor, see Doran (2002). 
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because of U.S. support; their destruction thus is contingent on remov-
ing that support. Al-Qaeda has sought to achieve this objective by pres-
suring the United States to withdraw from the Middle East through 
the perpetration of increasingly costly acts of terror. Al-Qaeda antici-
pated U.S. retaliation and hoped that this retaliation could be pre-
sented in the Muslim world as a war against Islam that would advance 
its propaganda and recruitment eﬀorts. (See pp. 23–33.)
Ideology
Ideology is central to understanding and prevailing over al-Qaeda and 
the phenomenon of global jihad. On a purely material level, terrorist 
organizations are almost always outmatched by the government forces 
that they oppose. If a terrorist group is to survive, it must at the very 
least have the ability to replace fallen converts with fresh recruits. To 
a certain extent, the execution of successful operations helps to serve 
this purpose, both by building morale within the group and by dem-
onstrating to potential converts that the organization is operationally 
dynamic.2 But terrorist attacks, while necessary, are not suﬃcient to 
sustain a movement operating against a determined adversary. Militant 
extremists also require the revolutionary “software” that helps convince 
militants—whose underground “lifestyle” characteristically tends to be 
marked by physical danger, isolation from loved ones, and psychologi-
cal stress—that their mission is worth the sacriﬁces. 
At its core, al-Qaeda’s ideology is profoundly internationalist, 
attempting to contextualize local conﬂicts as part of a broader global 
struggle against “apostasy” and “the inﬁdel.” In essence, al-Qaeda’s 
ideology is a version of the ideology that a previous RAND study has 
described as “neo-fundamentalism” or “radical fundamentalism,” i.e., 
an extremist Islamic fundamentalist set of beliefs that borrows many 
of the characteristics of European fascism and Marxism-Leninism,3 or 
2 Crenshaw (1981), p. 387. 
3 See Rabasa et al. (2004). 
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“jihadist-salaﬁsm,” described by Gilles Kepel as “respect for the sacred 
texts in their most literal form [combined with] an absolute commit-
ment to jihad.”4
Although neither Osama bin Laden nor any other members of 
his inner circle have articulated a comprehensive vision of the future, 
bin Laden’s pronouncements emphasize certain themes and a selective 
interpretation of Islamic law, history, and precedent: There is a war 
of civilizations in which “Jews and Crusaders” are seeking to destroy 
Islam; armed jihad is the individual obligation of every Muslim; ter-
rorism and other asymmetric strategies are appropriate for defeating 
even the strongest powers; Islam is under siege by Christians, Jews, 
secularists, and globalization; and the economy of the United States is 
its vulnerable “center of gravity.” These themes are circulated widely via 
the Internet; in books, cassette tapes, and pamphlets; and, most notori-
ously, through videotapes in which bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
(sometimes described as bin Laden’s deputy) expound on various sub-
jects. What makes al-Qaeda’s propaganda distinctive is the relentlessly 
global nature of its dissemination and the quality of its production. 
As a result of this media strategy, al-Qaeda’s messages have penetrated 
deeply into Muslim communities around the world, preying on those 
Muslims who have a sense of helplessness both in the Arab world and 
in the Western Muslim diaspora. Al Qaeda appears to have had an 
impact by oﬀering a sense of empowerment to those uninitiated in 
Islamic texts and history. (See pp. 7–22.)
Operational and Tactical Evolution
Ever since the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, al-
Qaeda has continuously altered and expanded its target set, making 
organizational modiﬁcations that have resulted in signiﬁcant changes 
in the way it conducts operations. Although the network has opted to 
stick closely to what has worked in the past, such as multiple suicide 
bombings, the manner and means for carrying out those strikes have 
evolved. The use of planes as suicide bombs in the September 11 attacks 
and the small boat packed with explosives that devastated the USS Cole 
4 Kepel (2002), p. 220. 
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are two of the best examples of al-Qaeda innovation. However, there 
have been many other instances of operational shift. These include 
switching from hard to soft targets and from mass casualties to smaller, 
more frequent attacks; increased focus on economic targets; greater eﬃ-
ciency in the utilization of loose networks and increased recruitment of 
U.S. and European nationals to evade detection; and moves to create 
new types of safe haven to maintain critical skills, such as conducting 
terrorist training in private homes. Each of these modiﬁcations, and 
the circumstances surrounding them, is discussed in more detail in this 
book. (See pp. 34–55, 63–70.)
Al-Qaeda’s eﬀorts to acquire unconventional weapons—chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons—present incal-
culable dangers to the United States and other potential targets. Bin 
Laden’s eﬀort to acquire CBRN weapons began while he was living in 
Sudan in 1991–1996 and continued after he relocated to Afghanistan 
in 1996. Bin Laden  reportedly received advice from Pakistani nuclear 
scientists.5 However, there is no evidence that he succeeded in fabricat-
ing a biological or chemical weapon, let alone a nuclear or radiological 
weapon, despite operating under near-ideal conditions under Taliban 
protection in Afghanistan. Again, this is not to say that bin Laden or 
the broader jihadist movement do not remain committed to acquir-
ing CBRN devices. Al-Qaeda’s continued interest in CBRN was con-
ﬁrmed in January 2003 in London, when police discovered precursor 
agents for producing ricin, a highly toxic poison, during the arrest of 
North African terrorists associated with al-Qaeda. (See pp. 44–47.)
Al-Qaeda’s Finances
Al-Qaeda has also modiﬁed the way it moves funds around the globe. 
Before September 11, many ﬁnancial institutions were believed to have 
helped transfer millions of dollars of al-Qaeda’s money, wittingly or 
otherwise. However, given greater scrutiny over any such transactions 
now and other policies designed to prevent legal transmission of terror-
5 Anonymous (pseudonym of former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer) (2002), p. 188; Peter 
Baker, “Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions,” 
The Washington Post, March 3, 2002.
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ist funds, terrorists are increasingly using the informal hawala transac-
tion system6 and “mules”—couriers who physically carry large quanti-
ties of cash, gemstones, or other valuables to various parts of the globe. 
There is also evidence that al-Qaeda can and may be willing to expand 
even further into the criminal world to raise money. These ﬁnancial 
dynamics are beginning to shape terrorist activity. Given the weaken-
ing of al-Qaeda command and control, local al-Qaeda jihadist groups 
may now ﬁnd themselves both compelled to raise funds locally and 
possibly encouraged to make operational decisions on their own. (See 
pp. 57–62.)
The “al-Qaeda Nebula”
Al-Qaeda’s evolution from a structured terrorist organization into an 
ideology-based movement presents a complex counterterrorism chal-
lenge. The U.S. success in eliminating a substantial part of the pre-
9/11 al-Qaeda leadership has greatly reduced the functional ability of 
al-Qaeda’s leadership core, but it clearly has not brought about the end 
of the al-Qaeda phenomenon. It created a more disaggregated entity 
that is more diﬃcult to predict and preempt. The emergence of numer-
ous like-minded local organizations that strike at soft targets with 
deadly force—what this study calls the “al-Qaeda nebula”—presents 
a substantial new set of challenges for counterterrorism planners and 
requires a major departure from the strategy that has been pursued 
against al-Qaeda. (See pp. 73–78.)
Jihadist groups in this category exhibit a dual nature: They are 
preoccupied with both local and regional jihads. They thus have a threat 
potential that goes beyond their immediate tactical environment. The 
hybrid ideological and operational nature of these organizations stems 
6 Hawala means “transfer” or “trust.” It refers to an ancient system of money transfer that 
existed in South Asia before the advent of Western banking. Customers entrust money 
to hawala bankers or operators (hawaladars), who facilitate money movement worldwide 
through personal connections, sometimes using legitimate bank accounts but leaving a min-
imal paper trail.
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from their interaction with the international jihadist movement as 
currently constituted under the existing umbrella of al-Qaeda’s global 
network.
The scope and dimensions of the al-Qaeda nebula are both broad 
and complex. Ties among these groups run the gamut from logistical 
and ﬁnancial support to combined operations and joint strategy meet-
ings. Frequently, these relationships are the product of contacts that 
were established in the crucible of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan 
and later consolidated in training camps set up in territories under the 
control of the Taliban.
Some of these organizations have been fully integrated into al-
Qaeda (for example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, or EIJ) or appear to 
be moving in that direction (for example, the Algerian Salaﬁst Group 
for Preaching and Combat or GSPC). A few organizations have clearly 
fallen into the category of “active and willing supporters,” ready to act 
at al-Qaeda’s behest when asked to do so. This has been particularly 
evident in North Africa, in the Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan, in 
al-Itihaad in the Horn of Africa, and arguably in the al-Zarqawi net-
work in Iraq. Most groups, however, seem to give precedence to local 
agendas. In these instances, decisions to work with outside jihadists 
are largely pragmatic in nature and undertaken in the expectation that 
foreign cooperation will be instrumental in furthering the “struggle at 
home.” Indeed, when the expected (local) utility of the outside relation-
ship begins to dissipate, some groups appear to question the wisdom of 
maintaining the al-Qaeda link. This is true even of networks that are 
thought to share an intimate organizational relationship with al-Qaeda 
such as a faction within Southeast Asia’s Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). 
The major groups in this “al-Qaeda nebula” and their degree of 
association with al-Qaeda, based on twelve key criteria, are shown in 
Table S.1. The values are as follows: (0) not established; (1) possible; 
(2) probable; (3) conﬁrmed; and (4) conﬁrmed and continuing. These 
values are based on the analysts’ evaluation of the groups.
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Table S.1
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Conclusions and Recommendations
No one tool is likely to be decisive against al-Qaeda. An eﬀective strat-
egy for countering and defeating the global jihadist movement will 
necessarily employ a complex mixture of military, intelligence, ﬁnan-
cial, political, legal (including the enactment of appropriate legisla-
tion), and even social instruments. This strategy should also include 
the use of techniques of political warfare that the United States and 
its allies successfully applied to wage a largely successful campaign 
against Marxism-Leninism—like al-Qaeda, a global revolutionary 
creed that served as an intellectual, political, and emotional foun-
dation of a worldwide revolutionary movement.7 (See pp. 159–171.)
Western policymakers might usefully draw on this now-forgotten 
corpus of Cold War knowledge and experience to develop a strategic 
informational warfare campaign against al-Qaeda. As a ﬁrst step, poli-
cymakers should consider ways of attacking al-Qaeda’s ideology. From 
the analysis in this book, it is clear that ideology is the center of gravity 
of the global jihadist phenomenon. Therefore, it is important to watch 
the rate of dissemination or retreat of the global jihadist ideology. If 
the ideology continues to spread and gain greater acceptance in the 
Muslim world, it will produce more terrorists to replenish the ranks 
of al-Qaeda and related groups. If the ideology is countered and dis-
credited, al-Qaeda and its universe will wither and die. It is important 
for Muslim allies to highlight that the Islamic state envisioned by al-
Qaeda would exclude the diverse streams of Islam. In the world of bin 
Laden and al-Zawahiri, there is no room for Shi’ites, and within Sunni 
Islam there is no place for mainstream interpretations of the religion.
A related factor is the extent and strength of the links between 
the global and local jihads. The clusters within the “al-Qaeda nebula” 
show the spread of the jihadist mindset throughout the Muslim world. 
The global jihadist movement gains strength to the extent that it can 
co-opt local struggles. If it cannot, the global movement loses coher-
ence and focus. 
7 For more on the strategic communications campaign of the Cold War era, see Lord 
(2004), pp. 220–221; Hixon (1997); Lucas (1999).
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It follows that a comprehensive U.S. strategy needs to move 
beyond the boundaries of conventional counterterrorism theory and 
practice and address these ideological and political factors. Broadly, 
the strategy has four prongs: First, attack the ideological underpin-
nings of global jihadism. Second, seek to sever the links—ideologi-
cal and otherwise—between the groups in the clusters of the ter-
rorist nebula and the global jihad. Third, deny sanctuaries. Fourth, 
strengthen the capabilities of frontline states and moderate civil 
society groups to counter local jihadist threats in order to deny al-
Qaeda alternative sanctuaries and over time reduce the “clusters” 
that compose the global jihadist movement. (See pp. 160–161.)
Attack the Ideology
The war on terror at its most fundamental level goes to the war of 
ideas. The goal here is to delegitimize jihadist ideology and the use of 
terrorism and to deny extremists the high ground of Islamic politico-
religious discourse, which has been adroitly exploited by al-Qaeda to 
further the appeal of its own radical and absolutist rhetoric. As we 
have outlined in another RAND study, prevailing in the war of ideas 
requires empowering moderate Muslims to counter the inﬂuence of 
the radicals.8
Although ideology is inherently diﬃcult to attack by outsiders, the 
ideological approach has weaknesses that are susceptible to exploitation. 
Some analysts note that the jihadist movement is sensitive to religious 
ideology to the point of vulnerability. Combatants are replaceable, but 
theologically trained sheikhs are not. The death or recantation of sev-
eral Saudi sheikhs who had provided religious justiﬁcation for jihadist 
attacks may have weakened the movement ideologically.9 However, the 
al-Qaeda ideology has always had a pronounced Egyptian bent, so the 
inﬂuence of Saudi sheikhs might not have been central to al-Qaeda’s 
ideological struggle. In any event, if this assessment of the centrality 
8 That document, Rabasa et al. (2004), describes a strategy to empower Muslim 
moderates.
9 Stephen Ulph, presentation at Jamestown Foundation panel discussion, “The Iraqi 
Insurgency and al-Qaeda,” Washington, D.C., October 7, 2004; and Ulph (2004b).
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of ideology is correct, then decapitation strategies should be expanded 
from operational leaders to ideologues. Not infrequently, these ideo-
logues are asked to provide sanction for terrorist operations and are 
therefore a key part of the terrorist decisionmaking process. Preventing 
al-Qaeda’s ideological mentors from continuing to provide theological 
justiﬁcation for terrorism could expedite the movement’s ideological 
deterioration. Prosecution of “spiritual leaders” such as Abu Hamza 
al-Masri in the United Kingdom and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in Indonesia 
and the deportation proceedings in the United Kingdom against the 
Jordanian-Palestinian cleric Abu Qatada, regarded as al-Qaeda’s spiri-
tual leader in Europe, are cases in point.10
Break the Links Between the Global and Local Jihads
The second prong of the strategy is to break the links between the 
global and local jihadist groups. The international nature of al-Qaeda 
is both a source of strength and a potential weakness. Al-Qaeda’s abil-
ity to persuade local groups to link their struggles with a broader, 
pan-Islamist campaign is arguably the organization’s signal achieve-
ment. Thus, unlike the terrorist groups of the 1970s, al-Qaeda has not 
been hindered by geographical constraints that limit the scope of its 
operations. 
However, internationalization brings costs as well as beneﬁts. As 
demonstrated by the evolution of the international communist move-
ment during the previous century, contradictions inevitably arise 
between the global vision promulgated by a movement’s theoreticians 
and the national agendas that many local cadres naturally pursue.11
Exploiting this friction could be part of an eﬀective Western coun-
terstrategy. For example, overt and covert information operations in 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Africa, and other areas of major ter-
rorist activity might highlight the inapplicability of al-Qaeda’s vision to 
10 According to the 2001 Spanish indictment of the Madrid al-Qaeda cell, Abu Qatada was 
appointed as the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salaﬁst 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and the Tunisian Combatant Group. See Juzgado 
Central de Instrucción No. 005, Madrid, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 0000035/2001E.
11 Rich (2003), p. 47. 
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regional and local conditions. In non-Arab Muslim countries such as 
Pakistan, the Arab nature of al-Qaeda’s hard core could be stressed, as 
could al-Qaeda’s preoccupation with “apostate” regimes in the Middle 
East. Such an approach could complement parallel political warfare 
themes that highlight the materialist, neo-fascist, and the upper- and 
middle-class character of al-Qaeda’s hard core—in other words, the 
fundamentally “alien” nature of men like bin Laden and al-Zawahiri.
Achieving this goal hinges on decreasing the utility of the rela-
tionship with al-Qaeda for the local groups. A number of local Muslim 
rebel movements that had maintained some relationship with al-Qaeda 
and its aﬃliates before September 11—for instance, the Philippines’ 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front—have distanced themselves from 
bin Laden to avoid being drawn into the wrong side of the war on 
terrorism. 
To accelerate this trend, the United States will need to tailor the 
speciﬁc components of its counterterrorism policy to ensure that they 
are relevant to extant and emerging patterns of local and regional ter-
rorism. This requires tracking closely the ideological and operational 
trajectory of the groups that constitute the “al-Qaeda nebula” in order 
to target weaknesses in their current conﬁguration. For instance, in the 
wake of the arrest of key operatives over the past two years, Southeast 
Asia’s Jemaah Islamiyah has become factionalized along an interna-
tional/Indonesian divide: One leadership faction remains committed 
to the al-Qaeda vision of global jihad; another faction seems to be 
more focused on a local Indonesian agenda, including political activ-
ity through its Indonesian front organization, the Majlis Mujahideen 
Indonesia (MMI). Therefore, a U.S. and allied strategy to counter JI 
must target the group’s political and terrorist dimensions. Similarly, 
addressing group ties that are predicated on logistical support (as they 
are in Kashmir) will require a policy mix that is somewhat diﬀerent 
from those involving joint planning sessions and coordinated attacks 
(as in the case of the North African groups). Mapping and gauging 
the organizational parameters of terrorist connections will be equally 
important in prioritizing threats to U.S. interests.
Finally, the United States will need to be more proactive in its 
thinking and accept the idea that the problem of countering terrorism 
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is akin to what Bruce Hoﬀman has referred to as a time series of pho-
tographs: “. . . the image captured on ﬁlm today is not the same as yes-
terday nor will it be the same tomorrow.”12 A myriad of factors brought 
on by future world events could conceivably have a direct, or indirect 
but yet signiﬁcant, impact on al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates—neither of 
which are likely to be consigned to the annals of history anytime soon. 
Accordingly, policies will need to be constantly assessed, reassessed, 
and modiﬁed to take account of potential surprises that could emerge 
over the near to medium term. (See pp. 161–163.)
Deny Sanctuaries
As discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this book, al-Qaeda’s sanctu-
ary in Afghanistan allowed the group’s leaders to concentrate all their 
eﬀorts on growing their organization and planning their operations. 
Securing that safe haven substantially increased al-Qaeda’s ﬁnancial 
requirements but lowered its overall need for covertness, eased com-
mand and control, enabled extensive training and planning, and gen-
erally allowed it to operate at a far lower marginal cost per attack. 
The loss of its sanctuary has reduced the eﬃciency of the organization, 
made training of cadres more diﬃcult and laborious, and raised the 
marginal costs of operations. 
Sanctuaries are areas and physical facilities where terrorists can 
conduct training, network and plan operations, but they can also be 
deﬁned in other ways—as ﬁnancial, cyber, and propaganda nodes, for 
instance. Al-Qaeda has perfected the use of information technology 
(IT), particularly the Internet, as a terrorist tool, and has made use of 
the mass media to spread its propaganda. Part of what makes al-Qaeda 
and its aﬃliates such a diﬃcult challenge is that they are able to “hide 
in plain view.” Jihadist groups in Western Europe are embedded in the 
broader Muslim communities and have used the services and infra-
structure available on the continent for propaganda, indoctrination, 
recruitment, and operations on the scale of the March 2004 Madrid 
terrorist attack. Preventing the reconstitution of a sanctuary anywhere 
in the Muslim world is therefore a critical requirement of U.S. coun-
12 Hoﬀman (2003a), p. 16.
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terterrorist strategy. This requires proactive security cooperation with 
and support of countries under assault by al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates. 
(See pp. 163–164.)
Strengthen the Capabilities of Frontline States to Confront Local 
Jihadist Threats
Aside from the campaign against al-Qaeda, the global war on terror 
can be viewed as the sum of many wars on terror fought in local and 
regional theaters across the world. These local wars have to be fought 
and won by the local governments and security forces with the United 
States in a supporting role. Those governments have the most at stake, 
as well as the local knowledge, access to the population and, hopefully, 
political legitimacy, to carry these conﬂicts to a successful conclusion.
The United States could help friendly countries achieve their coun-
terterrorism objectives by training and equipping local counterterrorist 
police and military units and intelligence services. As a general princi-
ple, counterterrorism operations are most eﬀective when carried out by 
indigenous forces, with U.S. forces remaining in the background and 
providing support as necessary. Although the types of assistance pro-
vided would depend on the speciﬁc circumstances of individual coun-
tries, military assistance should focus on providing small-unit training 
and mobility while intelligence assistance could focus on data collec-
tion and analytical capabilities.
Encouraging cooperative regional arrangements can reduce the 
U.S. footprint in counterterrorism eﬀorts. For instance, in the con-
text of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional 
countries have agreed to establish a regionwide intelligence network, 
taken steps to block terrorist funds and tighten border controls, and 
established a regional counterterrorism center in Kuala Lumpur. 
Similar cooperative arrangements should be encouraged in other parts 
of the world.
Since many terrorist groups operate in ungoverned areas, the 
capabilities of governments with imperfect control over their territo-
ries should be strengthened to enable them to assert authority over 
areas that are currently outside government control. Terrorists also take 
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advantage of porous and poorly monitored borders to move personnel, 
equipment, and funds, so governments’ ability to monitor and control 
their borders should be strengthened.
For the U.S. military, the main implication of the above is that 
increasingly, U.S. military forces may have to interact with respective 
police, intelligence, and security services, as well as military forces, 
creating potentially a new set of requirements in political-military 
relationship and interoperability issues. For the U.S. Air Force, new 
types of missions may require fusion not only with Army components, 
but also with the security forces of the cooperating country. (See pp. 
164–165.)
Implications for the U.S. Air Force
Air and space power have important roles to play in countering al-
Qaeda and the jihadist groups that form its nebula. Most of these mis-
sions are familiar, but the relative mix required for eﬀective prosecu-
tion of a campaign against terrorists is quite diﬀerent from what the Air 
Force is used to providing in more conventional military operations. In 
Afghanistan, air and space power, combined with Special Operations 
Forces (SOF), was the key to joint and coalition military operations. 
Future battleﬁelds most likely will be discontinuous, with shadowy 
hostile forces organized in small, unlinked groups. Eliminating these 
forces will require integration of air and ground forces on a scale greater 
than today.13 (See pp. 166–171.)
SOF, especially Air Force Special Operations Command 
(AFSOC), once considered peripheral to the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF’s) 
main mission, are now central to antiterrorism missions, which often 
require “quiet operations” with a relatively low proﬁle. These are par-
ticularly important in countries where overt U.S. military operations 
against terrorist groups might be politically diﬃcult for cooperating 
governments.14 On the operational side, Air Force Special Operations 
Forces have the capability to pinpoint and track small groups and indi-
viduals, capture them, and search for critical intelligence. These capa-
13 “Air and Space Power” (2004), p. 95.
14 Tirpak and Grier (2004), pp. 70, 75.
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bilities are of paramount importance in a murky war against small, 
elusive groups of enemies who move back and forth over borders.15
But just as important is their training functions. Air Force Special 
Operations Forces teach critical skills in night ﬂying, air evacuation, 
and air assault to air forces of cooperating countries. However, there is 
only a single squadron, 6 SOS at Hurlburt Field, Florida, to carry out 
this crucial training function. Not only is this squadron too small to 
meet the requirements of the global war on terrorism, but throughout 
its existence it has had diﬃculties obtaining even the air-frames neces-
sary to perform its mission.16
Air-delivered ﬁrepower has been used successfully in counterter-
rorist operations in a variety of contexts. The continued evolution of 
precision munitions has enabled air power to be used to target spe-
ciﬁc individuals and small groups—by Israel in the West Bank and 
Gaza (see Part 2) and by the U.S. against targets associated with the 
al-Zarqawi network in Fallujah, Iraq, in Yemen, and elsewhere. USAF 
and U.S. Navy (USN) jets provided the bulk of U.S. combat power in 
the war in Afghanistan and proved instrumental in bringing down the 
Taliban regime and eliminating al-Qaeda’s largest and most important 
sanctuary. 
It is likely that air power will continue to be called upon to pro-
vide lethal punch to U.S. and allied eﬀorts to root out and destroy 
terrorists and their supporting infrastructure. Modern air forces have 
the advantage of being able to reach terrorist and insurgent targets in 
inhospitable or inaccessible terrain while simultaneously being rela-
tively invulnerable to the kinds of defenses that are likely to be found 
in jihadist arsenals. 
An important combat role for U.S. air forces is to work closely 
with non-U.S. ground forces in locating and striking terrorist targets. 
As was the case in Afghanistan, this could mean developing an “on the 
ﬂy” partnership with troops of a very diﬀerent level of sophistication. 
In some cases, these ground units may be leavened with U.S. Special 
Forces or advisors, but it should be anticipated that, from time to time, 
15 Hebert (2005), p. 32.
16 This point was made by one of the reviewers of this report, Dr. Thomas Marks.
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USAF and USN pilots will ﬁnd themselves supporting soldiers who 
have little or no U.S. training and scant knowledge of how to eﬀec-
tively employ air power. In such cases, the USAF will need to have 
available air-to-ground control elements that can be rapidly integrated 
into friendly ground force formations. In addition to their training 
in managing air support, these airmen will also beneﬁt from having 
appropriate language skills and some cultural knowledge. 
Air transport can be the key to counterterrorist or counterin-
surgency operations in countries with widely dispersed populations 
and poor land transportation infrastructure—conditions that deﬁne 
almost all areas where terrorists and insurgents operate. Only by being 
able to bring forces rapidly to the scene can governments neutralize 
the terrorists’ operational and tactical advantages and quell religious 
and ethnic clashes before they ﬂare into full-scale communal conﬂict. 
Yet, many of the countries confronting terrorist and insurgent move-
ments—Indonesia and Colombia come to mind—have woefully inad-
equate air transport capabilities. Rebuilding the air transport capabili-
ties of countries at risk should be a priority in U.S. counterterrorism 
policy and security assistance programs. In addition, the U.S. Air 
Force—the world’s premier practitioner of air mobility—will probably 
ﬁnd itself called upon to directly provide transportation under some 
circumstances.
Providing training to the armed forces of friendly countries threat-
ened by jihadist terror groups or insurgents will be another important 
job for the U.S. military, including the Air Force. It seems likely that 
these training missions could be numerous and potentially prolonged. 
Further, given that they will often be conducted in locations where the 
threat to U.S. personnel is quite high, they will impose force protec-
tion burdens. Finally, the fundamentally political nature of the battle 
against jihadist groups means that in some cases the training objectives 
will revolve at least as much around inculcating appropriate norms of 
behavior, such as respect for human rights and civilian lives and prop-
erty, as transmitting expertise in operational and tactical skills.
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None of these activities would appear to call for major changes 
in USAF force structure or posture.17 The same may not be true of the 
ﬁnal task that we want to emphasize: providing timely, accurate, and 
actionable information to commanders and operators at all levels. Air 
and space platforms have shown themselves to be vital components 
of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture 
for the war on terrorism. Cross-border operations between neighbors 
will be crucial in the decades to come. However, it is equally true that 
the campaign against al-Qaeda and other jihadist terrorists and insur-
gents has been hindered by shortcomings in existing systems, organiza-
tions, and processes. Improvement is needed, and the USAF will likely 
be called upon to make important contributions.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have emerged as very useful 
tools for surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and, at times, strik-
ing terrorist targets. As al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups continue 
to decentralize and disperse, the demand for the kinds of capabilities 
oﬀered by platforms such as the USAF’s Predator and Global Hawk 
UAVs seems almost certain to multiply. If, in the future, the United 
States may wish to maintain sustained 24-hour multiple-source sur-
veillance over multiple—and widely separated—swaths of inhospitable 
terrain, it is not clear that the Air Force plans to make suﬃcient invest-
ment in UAVs. Certainly, space-based systems and manned aircraft 
will play important roles, but UAVs oﬀer both greater eﬀectiveness over 
satellites and less risk than manned platforms, making them highly 
appealing to future commanders. The USAF should assess the likely 
demand for UAVs and size its future force accordingly.
The intelligence demands of countering jihadist terrorism will 
also be a human capital issue, not just for the USAF but for every 
agency, civilian and military, on the front line of that battle. All of 
the strategies laid out here for checkmating terrorist groups—waging 
political warfare, attacking radical Islamist ideology, breaking the 
17 The one exception might be the proposed procurement of some number of a tactical 
transport aircraft better suited than the existing ﬂeet for operations in and out of smaller, 
less-developed airstrips. As this is written, there is some controversy surrounding how many 
aircraft to buy, if any, and whether the Army or Air Force should operate them.
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linkages between local and global groups, and so on—depend vitally 
on U.S. and allied decisionmakers having an accurate image of how 
these organizations are structured and staﬀed and how they relate to 
each other. Further, since terrorist and insurgent groups are dynamic 
entities and the relationships among individuals and organizations are 
ﬂuid, this picture will need to be continuously reassessed and updated. 
Properly trained personnel will be critical to success. Analysts will need 
a deep understanding of the region they are observing—its language, 
geography, history, and culture—to be able to interpret rapidly and 
accurately what they are seeing and hearing. They will also need to be 
tightly networked with one another, and perhaps with their counter-
parts in other countries as well, so that important information about 
new or evolving relationships in the threat space do not disappear in 
the gaps between institutional stovepipes. Developing and sustaining 
an adequate number and variety of these specialized intelligence pro-
fessionals, as well as creating the technical and bureaucratic infrastruc-
tures to support them, will be a challenge not just for the Air Force but 
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Defeating the global jihadist movement—which we deﬁne as al-Qaeda 
and the universe of jihadist groups that are associated with or inspired 
by al-Qaeda—is the most pressing security challenge facing the United 
States today. The global jihadist movement can be distinguished from 
traditional or local jihads, which are armed campaigns conducted by 
Islamist groups against local adversaries with usually limited aims and 
geographic scope, in that it targets the United States and its allies across 
the globe and pursues broad geopolitical aims.
Although the U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda and the global 
jihadist movement campaign has had some notable successes, such as the 
destruction of al-Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, the elimination of 
many of the group’s leaders, and the growing resolve of many countries 
to take action against al-Qaeda and its associates, no informed observ-
ers believe that al-Qaeda will be eliminated anytime soon. Indeed, in 
some respects al-Qaeda has metastasized into an even more formidable 
adversary—dispersed across the global South, Western Europe, and 
North America, largely self-sustaining, and despite intense government 
countermeasures, able to mount devastating operations, such as the 
railway bombing that killed nearly 200 people in Madrid on March 
11, 2004, and the London bombings of July 7, 2005. The United States 
itself continues to be threatened by large-scale attacks, as suggested 
by heightened security alerts and reports of plans to attack ﬁnancial 
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targets in New York and Washington.1 Countering al-Qaeda is thus 
likely to preoccupy U.S. national security institutions for at least the 
remainder of the decade, and perhaps longer. 
To help planners anticipate the movement’s evolution, anticipate 
future methods of terrorist operation, and develop an eﬀective counter-
strategy, this study explores some of the most salient aspects associated 
with terrorist phenomena across the world and their implications for 
the security of the United States and its friends and allies. The global 
terrorist threat represented by al-Qaeda and its associated groups is 
the subject of this volume. It should be noted, however, that this study 
is not intended to be comprehensive. Journalists, analysts, politicians, 
and scholars have written or uttered literally millions of words on inter-
national terrorism, particularly since the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
and it is impossible for a single monograph to capture the entire essence 
of these assessments, much less deﬁnitively map the full complexity of 
an entity that has developed over a 20-year period into the world’s ﬁrst 
truly global terrorist movement.
Roadmap to the Book
The results of the study are reported in two volumes: The subject of the 
ﬁrst is al-Qaeda and what we refer to as the “al-Qaeda nebula,” an eco-
system of terrorist groups around the world that have internalized the al-
Qaeda worldview and its methodology of mass-casualty terrorist attacks. 
The second volume (Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the 
Terrorist Universe)2 deals with terrorist phenomena outside the al-Qaeda 
ideological orbit: Islamic and non-Islamic terrorist and insurgent groups 
with local agendas and the more diﬀuse threat posed by violent anti-
globalization movements. We include them in this study because 
1 In August 2004, antiterror raids in Pakistan yielded computer disks and other informa-
tion sources suggesting that terrorists linked to al-Qaeda had carried out extensive surveil-
lance of the World Bank headquarters in Washington, the New York Stock Exchange, and 
the Citigroup Center in New York. Dan Eggen and John Mintz, “Alerts Issued for District, 
N.Y.,” The Washington Post, August 2, 2004. 
2 Rabasa et al. (2005).
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although most of these groups do not threaten the United States 
directly, they threaten U.S. interests and the stability of friends and 
allies. Indeed, some of these groups—such as Lebanese Hezbollah—
could under certain conditions evolve into global threats. In our analy-
sis of these groups, therefore, we look for indicators of their future 
evolution. In the second volume, we also analyze the nexus between 
terrorism, insurgency, and crime. This is a critical aspect of the whole 
problem of international terrorism because in many cases terrorist 
groups cannot sustain themselves and survive without the income and 
resources that they derive from criminal activity. Although terrorism 
and organized crime are diﬀerent phenomena, the important fact is 
that terrorist and criminal networks overlap and cooperate in some 
enterprises. The phenomenon of the synergy of terrorism and orga-
nized crime is growing because similar conditions give rise to both and 
because terrorists and organized criminals use similar approaches to 
promote their operations.
This volume traces the evolution of al-Qaeda and maps out the 
contours of the terrorist nebula. Chapters One through Five consider 
ﬁve broad themes:
al-Qaeda’s ideology
al-Qaeda’s strategy, structure, and evolving operational dynamic
al-Qaeda’s ﬁnances
al-Qaeda’s planning cycle
al-Qaeda’s relationship with groups within its ideological orbit, 
and the threat posed by these latter entities.
Violence is al-Qaeda’s raison d’être. Unlike Hezbollah or Hamas, 
which have a territorial focus, a mass base, and a political platform, 
and which cultivate support through the provision of social services, al-
Qaeda is a purely ideological and terrorist group that attracts adherents 
by means of its violent anti-Western agenda and its elite status at the 
apex of the global jihadist movement. 
Al-Qaeda’s ideology is what binds together the group’s increas-
ingly atomized network. In this part of the study we discuss the impli-
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enon of global terrorism. We also consider the interrelated issues of 
al-Qaeda’s strategy, structure, and operational evolution—before and 
after September 11—and how they have shaped the network’s over-
all attack proﬁle and operational tempo. These topics include al-
Qaeda’s use of new sanctuaries and the emerging role of urban train-
ing grounds; the group’s interest in chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, and man-portable air defense systems 
(MANPADS); the use of converts; the changes in al-Qaeda’s ﬁnances to 
more covert ways of raising and transferring funds and to an increased 
reliance on criminal activity; and its role in the ongoing insurgency in 
Iraq. The section concludes with an examination of those entities that 
have been fully co-opted into the inner circle of Osama bin Laden’s 
group and that are generally considered to be an integral component of 
his broader jihadist movement.
Chapters Six through Eleven examine the contours of the al-
Qaeda nebula, the far larger category of terrorist systems that, while 
not institutionally part of al-Qaeda, have already established contacts 
with bin Laden’s network or have assimilated its ideology and method-
ology. Like the astronomical phenomenon, this nebula is a cloud-like 
mass that upon examination reveals itself to be made up of many dis-
tinct components. These groups will be subdivided into regional clus-
ters and discussed in terms of (1) their historical links to al-Qaeda; 
(2) the extent to which their relationship with al-Qaeda has aﬀected 
their overall operational agendas and attack tempos; and (3) how those 
groups are likely to evolve over the short to medium term. 
Finally, some words about terminology are in order. What is 
known as al-Qaeda (typically translated from Arabic as “the base”) 
has in fact always assumed a variety of diﬀerent forms. In this book, 
al-Qaeda will be used to describe three distinct facets of a single phe-
nomenon. First, in its pre–September 11 form, al-Qaeda refers to the 
terrorist entity that coalesced around Osama bin Laden in Sudan and 
Afghanistan in the mid to late 1990s. Second, in the post–September 
11 environment, al-Qaeda is the label applied to the remnants of bin 
Laden’s inner circle, which at the time of this writing (August 2004) 
is reportedly in hiding in the remote Pakistani tribal areas along the 
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Afghan border. Finally, al-Qaeda is used to refer to the broader, glob-
ally dispersed terrorist “nebula” that continues to receive ideological 
inspiration from bin Laden and his inner circle. 
Although we will continue to use the al-Qaeda label in the con-
text of this broader movement, a term that we believe more accurately 
describes the Islamic extremist threat facing the United States today is 
the global jihadist movement, as deﬁned above. Although al-Qaeda in 
its post-9/11 incarnation clearly still exists, as we have seen with the 
discovery of detailed surveillance reports of a multitude of targets in 
the United States, the threat has extended beyond this smaller, albeit 
highly lethal group. To put the matter succinctly, “[e]ver since its fame 
began to spread through the embittered Muslim world, al-Qaeda has 
been at once an organisation of Islamic extremists and an ideology of 
Islamic extremism.”3
Despite the evolution of this broader movement, the United States 
and other countries engaged in the war on terrorism have continued to 
refer to the perpetrators carrying out terrorist attacks against their inter-
ests as “al-Qaeda,” when in fact it is unclear to what degree al-Qaeda 
(deﬁned in this context as the remnants of bin Laden’s inner circle) has 
had command and control over terrorist operations since September 
11. More likely, as we have seen with the attacks in Bali in October 
2002, in Morocco in May 2003, and in Spain in March 2004, these 
operations are actually conducted by a combination of local jihadists 
who received al-Qaeda training and may retain some ties to al-Qaeda 
leadership, and other jihadists who have no organizational ties to al-
Qaeda at all, but share its apocalyptic vision. 
3 “Plots, Alarms and Arrests,” The Economist, August 14, 2004.

7CHAPTER TWO
Al-Qaeda’s Ideology and Propaganda
Ideology
Although it is a shopworn phrase, “know your enemy” remains the 
cornerstone of any sound security policy. Ideology is central to this 
understanding and is, thus, an essential component of any strategy 
designed to counter al-Qaeda, the West’s principal terrorist threat. To 
most Americans and other Westerners, explaining terrorist motivation 
in terms of ideological and other nonmaterial inﬂuences seems per-
plexing, for as Carnes Lord has observed, “[We] tend to assume that 
concrete interests such as economic well-being, personal freedom, and 
security of life and limb are the critical determinants of political behav-
ior everywhere.”1
For their part, journalists have tended to personalize this move-
ment by emphasizing the central role of its nominal leader, Osama bin 
Laden. However, as the Saudi renegade himself concluded after his 
escape from Tora Bora in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, 
God willing, the end of America is imminent. Its end is not depen-
dent on the survival of this slave to God. Regardless if Usama is 
killed or survives, the awakening has started.2
To be sure, bin Laden’s iconic status among radical Islamists as 
a U.S. nemesis, as well as his leadership of the global jihad against 
1 Lord (1989), p. 22. 
2 “‘Full Text’ of Usama Bin Ladin Recorded Statement Aired by Al-Jazirah TV, 27 
Dec[ember],” Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], December 27, 2001. 
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the United States, has had a powerful mobilizing eﬀect among cer-
tain Islamic sectors. That said, the ideas articulated by bin Laden and 
Ayman al-Zawahiri and echoed across the extremist fringes of the 
Muslim world have arguably played the greater role in sustaining the 
international jihadist campaign, not least by helping to transform a ter-
rorist nucleus into a far broader, indeed global, insurgency.3
The fact that ideology is so central to al-Qaeda should not be 
surprising. On a purely material level, terrorist organizations are 
almost always outmatched by the government forces that they oppose. 
Relative to the former, the incumbent typically possesses overwhelm-
ing ﬁrepower, superior human and technical resources, and far greater 
ﬁnancial reserves. Faced with such crushing odds, particularly at the 
beginning of an armed struggle when groups tend to be at their weak-
est, terrorists must continuously strive to bolster themselves and the 
motivation of their members. Indeed if a movement is to survive, it 
must at the very least have the ability to replace fallen converts with 
fresh recruits. To a certain extent, the execution of successful oper-
ations helps serve this purpose, both by building morale within the 
group and by demonstrating to potential converts that the organiza-
tion is operationally dynamic.4
But terrorist attacks, while necessary, are not suﬃcient to sus-
tain a movement operating against a determined adversary. Militant 
extremists also require what J. Bowyer Bell has termed “the dream.”5
The term refers to the revolutionary “software” that helps convince 
militants—whose underground “lifestyle” characteristically tends to 
be marked by physical danger, isolation from loved ones, and psycho-
logical stress—that they are uniquely righteous, that their mission is 
just, and that they are at history’s vanguard. 
A simple faith in the cause is enough to sustain some terrorists. 
Others, however, require a more formal articulation of beliefs and objec-
tives that have the power to explain the past, rationalize the present, 
and elucidate the future; in short, they need an ideology. For violent 
3 Rich (2003), p. 46.
4 Crenshaw (1981), p. 387. 
5 Bell (1998), p. 12. 
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underground organizations, ideology can serve other purposes as well. 
Writing about left-wing terrorism in Italy, but in a manner equally rel-
evant to a discussion of al-Qaeda, Donatella della Porta has observed 
that ideology “oﬀered ways of reducing the psychological cost of par-
ticipation in terrorist organizations” by dehumanizing political adver-
saries, who were portrayed as “pigs” and “tools of the capitalist system,” 
and thus worthy of the severest, most violent sanctions.6 This world-
view, della Porta observes, was “founded on an absolute opposition 
‘friend-enemy.’ The victims were therefore considered not as human 
beings made of ﬂesh and blood, but as symbols.”7
These features are readily apparent in the al-Qaeda worldview. At 
its core, al-Qaeda’s ideology is profoundly internationalist, attempt-
ing to contextualize local conﬂicts as part of a broader global struggle 
against apostasy (as deﬁned by bin Laden and his circle). This worldview 
has been variously described as “ultra-conservative” and “millenarian,”8
“Wahhabi,”9 “pan-Islamic” and “apocalyptic,”10 “conspiratorial,”11 “neo-
fundamentalist,”12 “counter-hegemonic,”13 and as “profoundly hostile” 
to the West.”14 However, in its essence, al-Qaeda’s ideology is a ver-
sion of “jihadist-salaﬁsm,” an extremist Islamic paradigm described by 
Gilles Kepel as “respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form 
[combined with] an absolute commitment to jihad.”15
6 Della Porta (2001), p. 149. 
7 Della Porta (2001), p. 149. For a discussion of the role of ideology in insurgent move-
ments, see Scott (1979), pp. 97–134.
8 Jason Burke, “9/11 Two Years On,” Observer (London), September 7, 2003, p. 21.
9 Azzam (2003), p. 3.
10 Cook (2003), p. 34.
11 Zeidan (2001). 
12 “The Political Imagination of Islam: Conversation with Olivier Roy,” Institute of 
Historical Studies, University of California, Berkeley, April 16, 2002, http://globetrotter.
Berkeley.edu/people2/Roy/roy-con1.html (as of February 16, 2006).
13 Khan (2003), p. 418.
14 U.S. Institute of Peace (2003), p. 3.
15 Kepel (2002), p. 220. 
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While inherently radical and Islamic in its orientation, much of 
al-Qaeda’s doctrine is a syncretic creation that embraces and integrates 
elements drawn from Western revolutionary socialism and European 
nihilist antecedents.16 The notion that “the world can be transformed 
by terror is not a peculiarly Islamic aberration,” as John Gray has 
observed: 
From the Jacobins through . . . the Baader-Meinhof gang, the 
modern West has spawned ideologies and movements that sanc-
tion the use of terror to make a better world. Even the Nazis . . . 
believed that they were creating a new and superior type of human 
being. However horrible their utopian vision, all these movements 
believed they could create a future better than anything that had 
existed in the past by the systematic use of violence. Al-Qa’ida 
has more in common with these modern Western experiments in 
terror than it does with anything in Islamic traditions.17
In particular, this jihadist framework shares many of the features 
of Marxism-Leninism, which is somewhat ironic given the hatred 
bin Laden and his ideologists profess for communism. The similarity 
between the two outlooks is apparent in a number of respects, includ-
ing the emphasis on universalistic claims; the focus on an internation-
alism; a conspiratorial habit of mind; the desire for a radically new 
political, social, and economic order; and, most fundamentally, the 
belief that the world is sharply divided into two opposing camps. 
These parallels stem, in large part, from the educational back-
ground of many of al-Qaeda’s most violent extremists who, far from 
being the products of religious institutions, actually originated from 
secular educational institutions. Coming into contact with Marxists-
Leninists, they took the revolutionary notions of those scholars as the 
basis of their ideological doctrine, which—while explicitly Manichean 
in interpretation and conception—is deﬁned according to speciﬁc 
16 Gray (2003), p. 79; and Matthew Price, “Re-Clash of Civilizations,” Boston Globe,
February 15, 2004, p. D4. 
17 John Gray, “Living with Bin Laden,” The Independent (London), May 18, 2003, p. 25. 
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Quranic principles.18 In this manner, al-Qaeda depicts the world in 
terms of a stark and ultimately irreconcilable dichotomy—not between 
communism and capitalism but between the forces of Islamist belief 
and non-belief, with bin Laden himself taking on the functional 
Leninist role as the leader of the international (jihadist) revolutionary 
vanguard. 
This notion has clear origins in the writings of Sayyid Qutb 
(1906–1966), whose doctrines have exerted a major inﬂuence on al-
Qaeda’s Egyptian hard core. Qutb, a key intellectual ﬁgure in the 
Muslim Brotherhood who was hanged by Egyptian dictator Gamal 
Abdel Nasser in 1966, provided the theoretical underpinnings for 
“violent Muslim resistance to regimes that claim to be Muslim, but 
whose implementation of Islamic precepts is judged to be imperfect.”19
During the 1960s, Qutb postulated that the world was engulfed in 
jahiliyya, that is, the state of sin, ignorance, and moral darkness that 
had characterized society before the arrival of the Prophet. Echoing 
Lenin, Qutb called for the creation of a violent revolutionary vanguard 
to wage jihad and bring about Islam’s restoration.20 In Qutb’s utopian 
vision—to be brought into being through the crucible of revolutionary 
violence—egoism, exploitation of man by man, petty class hierarchies, 
and other supposed ills of liberal democracy would be eliminated.21
“This was Leninism in Islamist dress,” as Ladan Boroumand and Roya 
Boroumand correctly concluded.22
18 Roy (1994), p. 3. 
19 Robert Irwin, “Is This the Man Who Inspired Bin Laden?” The Guardian (London), 
November 1, 2001, p. 8. 
20 Qutb (n.d.), p. 62.
21 Qutb (n.d.), p. 62. 
22 Boroumand and Boroumand (2002), p. 8. 
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Themes
Neither bin Laden nor any other members of his inner hard core have 
articulated a comprehensive vision of the future.23 In this, al-Qaeda is 
not alone among terrorist and insurgent groups. During the 1970s and 
1980s, leaders of the Communist Party of Peru–Shining Path (Sendero 
Luminoso) spoke frequently of their program for fostering a “world 
proletarian revolution” but said little about what they would do once 
they seized power. Such “unprogrammatic simplicity”24 can be useful 
for any extremist political movement because a vague vision of the 
future is likely to attract a broader audience, alienate fewer potential 
recruits, and mitigate the possibility of being proven wrong. That said, 
a number of prominent themes have emerged in the pronouncements 
by bin Laden and his circle, and these have remained largely consistent 
over time. 
Although bin Laden, al-Zawahiri (his reputed second in com-
mand), and others alternate the content of their messages from time 
to time—for example, emphasizing the Palestinian cause, or the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq—the central, underlying themes have remained con-
stant and are likely to continue to form an integral part of al-Qaeda’s 
ideological repertoire in the future. Al-Qaeda’s themes resonate with 
millions of people across the Muslim world who are seeking coherent, 
uniﬁed explanations for the suﬀering of their coreligionists in areas of 
conﬂict around the world as well as a strategy for personal and political 
transformation. Prominent themes include the following:
The oppressive regimes that persecute Muslims, such as Egypt, 
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Since the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the “Crusaders” have 
worked to prevent true believers from establishing an Islamic 
state.25
More broadly, Christendom, together with world Jewry, is seeking 
to destroy Islam;26 indeed, a Manichean “clash of civilizations” is 
under way.27
The United States has created “an ocean of oppression, injustice, 
slaughter and plunder” (in bin Laden’s words) and has thus mer-
ited responses such as the 9/11 attacks.28
America’s allies will pay a heavy price in blood and treasure for 
their role in their attacks on the Muslim nation. As al-Qaeda 
warned after the October 2002 bombing of a French oil tanker 
over the coast of Yemen, Washington’s partners “will not remain 
forever safe from Allah’s hand of revenge.”29
Guerrilla warfare and other “asymmetric” strategies are powerful 
tools for defeating even the largest and most sophisticated armed 
forces, as demonstrated in Afghanistan against the Soviet army 
and in Vietnam against the U.S. military.30
The economy is the U.S. center of gravity and is acutely vulner-
able. “The New York and Washington attacks [on 9/11], con-
25 See, for example, “A New Bin Laden Speech,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 539, 
July 18, 2003, http://www.memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP53903 (as of 
February 16, 2006).
26 See, for example, Salah Najm, “Usamah Bin-Ladin, the Destruction of the Base,” al-
Jazirah, June 10, 1999, FBIS.
27 “Full Text of Interview Held with al-Qa’ida Leader Usama Bin Ladin on 21 Oct 2001,” 
Jihad Online News Network, January 21, 2003, FBIS.
28 “Azzam Exclusive: Letter from Usamah Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin to the American 
People,” Waaqiah (Internet), October 26, 2002, FBIS. 
29 “Al-Qa’ida’s Statement Congratulates Yemenis on the Bombing of the French Tanker Oﬀ 
Yemen’s Coast,” Al-Quds al Arabi (London), October 16, 2002, FBIS. 
30 “Bin Laden’s Sermon for the Feast of the Sacriﬁce,” Middle East Media Research Institute 
[MEMRI], Special Dispatch Series No. 476, March 5, 2003, http://www.memri.org/bin/
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trary to all theoretical predictions, showed the extent of the fra-
gility of the American economy,” concludes one pro–al-Qaeda 
commentator.31
Contributing in some way to violent, defensive jihad is the solemn 
obligation of every Muslim.32
These themes are circulated widely via the Internet, in books and pam-
phlets, and most notoriously, through videotapes in which bin Laden 
and al-Zawahiri expound on various ideological, political, and topical 
subjects. 
Some analysts have charged that the message propagated by bin 
Laden and other extremists is a political nullity that oﬀers no real solu-
tions to the urgent problems of the Muslim masses, such as poor hous-
ing, unemployment, and the lack of educational opportunities.33 This 
is true insofar as it goes—as mentioned above, the al-Qaeda ideology 
is unprogrammatic in nature—but it misses a larger point. Like other 
millenarian programs, the network’s doctrinal agenda focuses not on 
the present, the here and now, but on the future. To be sure, that vision 
is somewhat hazy and ill deﬁned, but it oﬀers a promise and an escape 
from the petty concerns of everyday struggles, no matter how pressing 
life’s ordinary problems might ﬁrst appear. 
Propaganda
As suggested in the preceding section, the worldview articulated by 
bin Laden and his circle, for all its archaic trappings, is in reality a 
curiously modern formation that has borrowed heavily from twenti-
eth-century Western traditions, including both fascism and commu-
nism.34 Writing about the European adherents of this ideology, Oliver 
31 Abu-’Ubayd al-Qurashi, “A Lesson of War,” Al-Ansar (Internet), December 19, 2002, 
FBIS. 
32 Anonymous (2004), p. 7. 
33 See, for example, Doran (2002).
34 This point is made in Berman (2003).
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Roy concludes correctly that “[h]owever ‘old time’ their theology may 
sound to Westerners, and whatever they may think of themselves, radi-
cal Euro-Islamists are clearly more a post-modern phenomenon than a 
pre-modern one.”35
Nowhere is al-Qaeda’s postmodern character more apparent than 
in its use of propaganda. Propaganda has of course been a feature of 
most if not all modern terrorist and insurgent campaigns, which have 
included the use of posters, books and pamphlets, radio, and more 
recently, television. Militants have also sought to arouse the conscious-
ness of the masses by carrying out “propaganda by the deed,” that is, 
violent acts that in their brutality or audaciousness are intended to 
demonstrate the movement’s intensity and might.36
Al-Qaeda employs all of these techniques. But al-Qaeda’s propa-
ganda is particularly distinctive in the relentlessly global nature of its 
dissemination, which has been made possible by the canny use of elec-
tronic media, most notably the Internet. As a result of this media strat-
egy, al-Qaeda’s messages have penetrated deeply into Muslim commu-
nities around the world. Indeed, only the most advanced of modern 
states equal al-Qaeda’s capability to spread sophisticated propaganda 
quickly and globally.
Bin Laden’s ﬁrst communiqué was an open letter in 1995 to 
the king of Saudi Arabia, followed by a declaration of war against the 
United States. These provocative statements were reinforced by a series 
of high-proﬁle interviews with Western and Arab journalists from 
1997 to 2001, in which bin Laden explained his call to war and praised 
terrorist operations in Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania. After the 
September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda made use of video- and audiotaped 
messages to praise various terrorist attacks and warn of greater vio-
lence to come. Finally, al-Qaeda issued training materials, such as the 
Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, the 2001 training video, and more-
recent manuscripts, such as In the Shadow of the Lance, which serve the 
dual purpose of instructing terrorists and spreading al-Qaeda’s world-
view and justiﬁcation for violence. Therefore, al-Qaeda has not relied 
35 Roy (2003), p. 71. 
36 Laqueur (1987), pp. 48–49. 
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on just one form of propaganda, such as interviews or written state-
ments. These various forms have most likely allowed al-Qaeda to reach 
more people. This is particularly true given the mixture of written and 
audiovisual messages, which has allowed al-Qaeda’s propaganda to 
transcend both technology and literacy barriers. 
Al-Qaeda has also used rhetoric as a means of communicating 
its propaganda to various audiences. Bin Laden’s earliest propaganda 
came in the form of proclamations written in formal, scholarly prose. 
This is particularly true of his 1995 “Open Letter” to King Fahd, his 
Declaration of War, and his 1998 fatwa.37 In these statements, the lan-
guage is similar to that of historic letters and proclamations issued at 
critical junctures in Islam’s history. In fact, bin Laden makes use of 
these historic statements, drawing on avatars of radical Islam, such as 
Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, to reinforce his 
argument.38 Later statements, particularly following September 11, 
have become less formal in language and more contemporary, citing 
recent attacks and their successes as grounds for continuing the inter-
national jihad. This further suggests that bin Laden’s initial proclama-
tions were unique in form, message, and rhetoric, signaling his belief in 
their importance as historical statements in Islam’s history. 
Bin Laden’s careful use of language helps ensure that his mes-
sages resonate among Arabic-speaking audiences. It reinforces the 
image he seeks to portray as a defender of Islamic interests, a pious man 
untainted by the spiritual bankruptcy that plagues the Muslim world.39
Commenting on a November 2002 communiqué from bin Laden, a 
sympathetic Islamic “expert” interviewed in al-Jazeera described the 
communication as a 
wise, calm, and rational message, in which he explains his griev-
ances. He explains them to the whole world with extreme fairness 
to the eﬀect that he is not a man of aggression, but through his 
37 A fatwa is a pronouncement or opinion on a question of Islamic law by a qualiﬁed reli-
gious scholar.
38 See, for example, bin Laden’s “Open Letter to King Fahd,” 1995. These conclusions are 
drawn from English translation of Arabic texts, not from the original texts themselves.
39 Anonymous (2004), p. 120. 
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approach, he is defending this nation. . . . [H]e is telling the entire 
nation: Since the United States has thus far failed to arrest or kill 
me . . . then the nation . . . can resist this US arrogance.40
Al-Qaeda has made excellent use of various methods of spread-
ing its propaganda, again not relying on just one medium to circulate 
its message. First and foremost, al-Qaeda has been heralded as the ter-
rorist group that revolutionized its operations by successfully utilizing 
information technologies (IT), particularly the Internet. As noted by 
the SITE Institute, which tracks jihadist forums, members of jihad-
ist forums inform one another of the latest technological trends and 
means for exchanging information.  A posting in one of these forums 
in March 2006 described a free and clandestine means of sending text 
messages using a cellular phone. Short Message Service (SMS) was 
used to organize ﬂash mobs to protest the caricatures of the Prophet 
Muhammad.41 Another forum produced a guide for Internet safety 
and anonymity. The guide advised on ways to circumvent procedures 
used by governments to identify users.42 The high level of sophistica-
tion achieved by cyberjihadists is illustrated by the manual issued by 
an al-Qaeda mouthpiece, the Global Islamic Media Front, which pro-
vided a highly technical and detailed guide for creating Internet prox-
ies. The eleven-page guide uses a combination of images and analogies 
to instruct the users in utilizing proxy servers and even creating their 
own private proxies to ensure anonymity. The guide describes a variety 
of Internet protocols, web applications, and language scripts as steps to 
40 “Al-Jazirah Interviews Islamic ‘Expert’ Al-Siba’i on Bin Ladin’s Recent Message,” al-
Jazirah, November 12, 2002, FBIS. 
41 SITE Institute, “Jihadist Forum Messages Concerning Another Medium for Information 
Exchange,” http://www.siteinstitute.com (as of March 23, 2006).
42 SITE Institute, “A Guide for Internet Safety and Anonymity Posted to Jihadist Forums,” 
http://www.siteinstitute.com (as of March 24, 2006). 
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creating a private proxy.43 The jihadist Internet even has job advertise- 
ments. A Global Islamic Media Front posting in October 2005 adver-
tised open positions for “electronic mujahideen.”44
Al-Qaeda is certainly not unique in using the Internet. Today, 
virtually every major terrorist or insurgent group maintains a sophis-
ticated Web site. However, al-Qaeda is unique in two respects. First, 
there is the sheer size of its Internet presence. Cyberspace, according to 
one account, is now home to some 4,000 Web sites that serve as virtual 
environments for waging jihad.45 Second, al-Qaeda is remarkable in 
the scope of activities it conducts in this medium. One study describes 
al-Qaeda’s use of this medium as “cyberplanning,” the combination 
of mobilization, communication, fundraising, and planning attacks 
through the Internet.46 Gabriel Weimann argues that al-Qaeda’s par-
ticular strength is in its ability to use IT as a means of attacking its 
enemies: “Al Qaeda combines multimedia propaganda and advanced 
communications technologies to create a very sophisticated form 
of psychological warfare.”47 Weimann further notes that al-Qaeda 
uses the Internet not only to spread its messages but also as a source 
through which sympathizers “can access pre-recorded videotapes and 
audiotapes, CD-ROMs, DVDs, photographs and announcements.”48
Stephen Schwartz argues that al-Qaeda has made exceptional use of 
the Internet as a recruitment tool.49 These diﬀerent analyses reveal that 
al-Qaeda is unique not merely in its use of the Internet but, rather, in 
43 SITE Institute, “A Highly Technical and Detailed Guide for Creating Internet Proxies by 
the Global Islamic Media Front,” http://www.siteinstitute.com (as of March 31, 2006).
44 SITE Institute, “The Global Islamic Media Front Advertises Open Positions for Electronic 
Mujahideen,” http://www.siteinstitute.com (as of October 7, 2005). 
45 SITE Institute, “Radical Islamists Use Internet to Spread Jihad,” http://www.siteinsti-
tute.org (as of June 2, 2005).
46 Thomas (2003), pp. 112–123.
47 Weimann (2004a, 2004b). 
48 Weimann (2004a), p. 5.
49 Stephen Schwartz, “The Islamic Terrorism Club,” The Weekly Standard, November 10, 
2003.
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the multiplicity of ways in which it works through this medium to 
strengthen its organization by making its ideology, strategy, and tactics 
more widely available to potential recruits. 
Al-Qaeda has also spread its propaganda through the production 
of videos. The Global Islamic Media Front stated in an Internet posting, 
“because destroying a Crusader’s vehicle without publishing a tape of 
the operation gives the enemy the chance to deny it . . . the enemy cares 
less if one of its vehicles has exploded . . . but worries about the infor-
mation and the psychological eﬀect of the operation and this is what 
happened.”50 In October 2003, a series of videotapes were released that 
contained testimonies of the suicide bombers in the May 2003 Riyadh 
terrorist attacks.51 The videos bear the insignia of Sabah Productions 
(Cloud Productions); they include multiple cameras and show signs of 
considerable editing, suggesting signiﬁcant production capabilities.52
Al-Qaeda has also used more traditional means, such as the cre-
ation of manifestos, tracts, and other written materials. The group also 
published a training manual that oﬀers tips on deception and various 
terrorist tactics. Both the training manual and the Encyclopedia of the 
Afghan Jihad have turned up in numerous places around the globe, 
including the United Kingdom and the Philippines.53 These written 
forms of propaganda have not only spread al-Qaeda’s worldview but 
have also oﬀered practical advice on engaging the enemy in battle.
Finally, al-Qaeda has made excellent use of the media to spread 
its propaganda. Al-Qaeda has its own media sources including Nida’ul 
Islam (“The Call of Islam”), a magazine published in Australia, which has 
printed many of bin Laden’s statements throughout the past decade.54
Al-Qaeda operatives have more recently launched the biweekly Voice of 
50 SITE Institute, “The Role of Jihadist Forums in Support of the People on the Battleﬁeld—
Part Two,” http://www.siteinstitute.com (as of March 10, 2006). 
51 Jason Burke, “Bin Laden Urges Terror Blitz,” The Observer, October 19, 2003.
52 Mansﬁeld (2004).
53 U.S. Department of Justice (2004).
54 Gerecht (2002), p. 3.
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Jihad magazine that deals particularly with the justiﬁcation for waging 
war in the Arab peninsula, and Al-Battar Training Camp, a magazine 
that focuses speciﬁcally on tactics.55
In addition to its own media sources, al-Qaeda has made use of 
the international media to spread its propaganda. This includes Arab 
media such as the satellite stations al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. But it also 
includes Western media sources, particularly CNN, the BBC, ABC 
news, MSNBC, and other major news networks that have broadcast 
al-Qaeda’s audio and videotapes—particularly those claiming to be of 
bin Laden—along with other materials such as its training videos. It is 
perhaps no accident, therefore, that when CNN reporter Peter Arnett 
asked bin Laden in his 1997 interview what his future plans were, bin 
Laden answered: “You’ll see them and hear about them in the media, 
God willing.”56
Although diﬃcult to measure, the persistence of al-Qaeda’s pro-
paganda over the past nine years suggests that it is aﬀecting its various 
audiences in a way that its leadership sees as useful. First, bin Laden 
himself has praised the eﬀects of his own statements on encouraging 
Muslim supporters to rise up and join in the global jihad. For example, 
in a January 1999 interview, ﬁve months after the August 1998 U.S. 
embassy attacks in Africa, bin Laden did not take credit for organizing 
the attacks but, rather, claimed that they were instigated by his 1998 
fatwa, in which he called on Muslims to attack Americans wherever 
they could.57
Al-Qaeda’s propaganda, coupled with its actions, also appears to 
have shaped international public opinion. The most obvious example of 
this is the eﬀect of the March 2004 bombings in Madrid. The Spanish 
government was one of the staunchest supporters of the U.S. decision 
55 “Al-Qa’ida’s ‘Voice of Jihad’ Magazine: Issue No. 9,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series 
No. 650, January 27, 2004, http://www.memri.org (as of May 28, 2004); “The Al-Battar 
Training Camp: The First Issue of Al-Qa’ida’s Online Military Magazine,” MEMRI, Special 
Dispatch Series No. 637, January 6, 2004, http://www.memri.org (as of May 28, 2004). 
56 “Al-Qa’ida’s ‘Voice of Jihad’ Magazine”; “The Al-Battar Training Camp.”
57 “Exclusive Interview: Conversation with Terror,” Time, January 11, 1999, http://www.
time.com/time/asia/news/interview/0,9754,174550,00.html (as of April 3, 2006).
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to go to war against Saddam Hussein, despite the fact that the Spanish 
population did not generally support military action in Iraq.58 The par-
liamentary election, held just a few days after the Madrid bombings, 
ushered in a Socialist government that withdrew Spain from the U.S.-
led Iraq coalition.59 Although al-Qaeda did not directly inﬂuence the 
outcome of the election—voters turned out the Popular Party govern-
ment in large part because of the widespread belief that the government 
had deceived the public about who was responsible for the attack—the 
bombings nevertheless redounded to al-Qaeda’s advantage. For much 
of the international public not attuned to the complexities of Spanish 
politics, al-Qaeda seemed to have demonstrated the ability to remove 
major European political leaders from power.60
Al-Qaeda propaganda also appears to have successfully inﬂuenced 
journalists. As previously mentioned, Weimann notes that al-Qaeda’s 
Web sites have become a consistent source of information for foreign 
journalists. This suggests that journalists take these sites and their 
information seriously—including explanations for current strikes and 
claims of future attacks—as sources for their reports. Thus al-Qaeda’s 
propaganda has inﬂuenced media perceptions on its intentions, capa-
bilities, and future trajectories.
Al-Qaeda’s propaganda also appears to have had an eﬀect as psy-
chological warfare against its enemies, particularly the United States. 
Al-Qaeda threats released since September 11, made mainly through al-
Jazeera, have received immediate attention in the international media. 
These statements—together with other factors—have helped inﬂuence 
decisions to raise the terror alert, on occasion, and have continually sent 
ripples of fear throughout the U.S. population. Weimann notes that 
these statements have succeeded in creating what he calls “an impres-
sive scare campaign.”61 Thus, al-Qaeda’s propaganda appears to have 
58 John Vinocur, “Some in Europe See Spain’s Turnabout as Al Qaeda Victory,” International 
Herald Tribune, March 17, 2004.
59 Vinocur, “Some in Europe . . .”; Erin Ailworth, “Former Leader Visits L.A.,” Los Angeles 
Times, May 15, 2004.
60 Nesser (2004), pp. 71–75.
61 Weimann (2004a), p. 5.
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had the intended eﬀects on its various audiences: It has inspired sup-
porters, changed public opinion, inﬂuenced the international media, 
and instilled fear in its enemies.
23
CHAPTER THREE
Strategy, Structure, and Operational Evolution
Strategy
Al-Qaeda’s strategy ﬂows logically from its ideology. To outsiders, 
those within the network may appear irrational—motivated by insane 
hatreds, grossly unrealistic in their goals, and willing to kill innocent 
men, women, and children to achieve their ends. In reality, al-Qaeda, 
like other terrorist groups, acts in a rational manner in the sense that 
it weighs ends and means, considers alternative approaches, and cal-
culates costs and beneﬁts.1 Its leaders may miscalculate from time to 
time, but this is a characteristic that it shares with even the wisest 
political ﬁgures. 
Consider for example the attacks of September 11, 2001. On one 
level, the attacks were a mistake, since they led directly to Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the elimination of al-Qaeda’s Afghan redoubt, and 
the destruction of the group’s network of training camps. Yet the leader-
ship appears to have anticipated the American response and calculated 
that any expected losses were outweighed by the beneﬁts. Prominent 
among these were the damages the relatively low-cost attacks caused to 
the U.S. economy. In a videotape aired in November 2004, bin Laden 
concluded that the 9/11 strikes, estimated to cost $500,000, resulted 
1 For more on al-Qaeda as a rational actor, see Doran (2002). 
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in more than $500 billion in damages to the American economy, 
“[m]eaning that every dollar of al-Qaida defeated a million dollars by 
the permission of Allah, besides the loss of a huge number of jobs.”2
With this decisionmaking context in mind and taking into 
account its broad ideological tenets, what are al-Qaeda’s central stra-
tegic priorities? Toppling the “apostate” regimes of the Middle East, 
particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, remains a paramount 
objective.3 For al-Qaeda, these governments primarily exist because of 
U.S. underpinning; their destruction thus is contingent on destroying 
this support. In the fashion of many earlier terrorist organizations, such 
as the National Liberation Front (FLN), whose anti-colonial campaign 
succeeded in driving the French from Algeria, al-Qaeda has sought 
to achieve this objective by pressuring the United States to withdraw 
from the Middle East through the perpetration of increasingly costly 
(to the United States) acts of violence. High-proﬁle attacks in Kenya 
and Tanzania (1998), the Gulf of Aden (2000), and New York (2001) 
have all been integral to this endeavor.4 As bin Laden explains: “Our 
method thus far in this battle has been to continue to pile up more 
American corpses onto their unjust government until we break the 
arrogance of the United States, crush its pride, and trample its dignity 
in the mud of defeat.”5
Somewhat ironically given its purportedly transcendental and 
spiritual purpose, al-Qaeda’s analysis of its anti-U.S. pressure cam-
paign has also included a strongly materialist cast. Bin Laden and the 
other members of the group’s hard core have long stressed America’s 
supposed economic vulnerabilities. For example, in October 2003, bin 
2 “Al-Jazirah Site Posts ‘Full Transcript’ of Bin Ladin’s Message,” November 1, 2004, 
FBIS. 
3 Azzam (2003), p. 3.
4 The perpetrators of the car bombing of the U.S.-Saudi National Guard training oﬃce in 
November 1995 admitted having derived inspiration from bin Laden, although bin Laden’s 
role in the attack remains unclear. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (2004), p. 60.
5 Muhammad Salah, “‘World Islamic Front’ Threatens New Operations Against 
Americans,” Al-Hayah (London), August 19, 1998, FBIS. 
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Laden announced with obvious relish that the attacks on the World 
Trade Center had cost the American economy more than a trillion dol-
lars, and went on to thank God for the size of the U.S. budget deﬁcit, 
which had topped $450 billion.6
Prudence dictates that U.S. national security planners assume al-
Qaeda will continue its attempts to deliver a devastating attack (or 
attacks) against American assets—both at home and abroad and pos-
sibly with chemical, biological, radiological, or (more improbably) 
nuclear devices. Nothing suggests that the hard core has changed its 
views since December 2003, when bin Laden vowed to continue to 
pursue Americans “in their own backyard.”7 Indeed, as then Director 
of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet told Congress in February 
2004, 
[al-Qa’ida] detainees consistently talk about the importance the 
group still attaches to striking the main enemy: The United States. 
Across the operational spectrum—air, maritime, special weap-
ons—we have time and again uncovered plots that are chilling.8
More broadly and in line with the general aim of punishing and 
destroying “nonbelievers,” al-Qaeda and associated groups are likely 
to mount smaller-scale attacks against soft targets. The network may, 
in fact, be forced to give precedence to this strategic tenet (as opposed 
to high-impact Western targets) given the operational constraints of 
the post–September 11 environment.9 Intelligence services, police, the 
armed forces, political leaders, and even ordinary citizens throughout 
the West have all, arguably, become far more vigilant, which has exac-
erbated the challenges associated with terrorist recruitment, ﬁnancing, 
6 See “Al-Jazirah Carries Bin Ladin’s Audio Messages to Iraqis, Americans,” October 18, 
2003, FBIS.
7 “Al-Jazirah Airs al-Zawahiri Recording on 2nd Anniversary of ‘Tora Bora Battle,’” Al-
Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, December 19, 2003, FBIS.
8 George C. Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global 
Context,” February 24, 2004, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_aﬀairs/speeches/2004/dci_
speech_02142004.html (as of February 16, 2006).
9 Cronin (2003), p. 1. 
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communication, surveillance, and counterintelligence. In short, while 
hitting prestigious targets will remain the “ideal,” operational consid-
erations could well dictate a switch to more modest and easier attacks. 
Either way, al-Qaeda will continue to act, to maintain organiza-
tional cohesion as well as to sustain and expand the movement. “To 
act is their sole necessity,” notes one French observer.10 For al-Qaeda, 
terrorism is purposeful, instrumental, and intended to serve a variety 
of political, ideological, and organizational objectives. Violent actions 
keep the network and its doctrinal program in the news, help to build 
morale among cadres, and through the propaganda of the deed dem-
onstrate that the group is functionally active and formidable. All of 
these facets contribute to bin Laden’s long-term objective of mobiliz-
ing Muslims for the promised global jihad against the West.11 Hence, 
although clearly weakened by the U.S.-led global campaign against 
terrorism, al-Qaeda has nonetheless devoted resources to maintain-
ing a visible operational tempo, attacking targets ranging from tourist 
resorts (Indonesia, Kenya) to residential compounds (Saudi Arabia) to 
relatively undefended foreign consulates, places of worship, and banks 
(Turkey). 
Structure
Like the term “terrorism” itself, “al-Qaeda” is a contested concept. 
For some analysts, the group is more a worldview or ideology than an 
organization.12 To the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for 
instance, al Qaeda is a terrorist organization with a clear-cut struc-
10 Didier Francois, “On al-Qa’ida’s Trail,” Liberation (Paris), September 9, 2003, pp. ii–xi. 
11 Hoﬀman (2003b), p. 437; Jason Burke, “9/11 Two Years On,” Observer (London), 
September 7, 2003, p. 21.
12 See, for example, Raufer (2003), pp. 391–398; and “Symposium: Diagnosing Al Qaeda,” 
Front Page Magazine, August 18, 2003, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.
asp?ID=9416 (as of February 16, 2006). 
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ture, hierarchy, and command-and-control mechanisms.13 By contrast, 
other observers highlight the organization’s transformation over time, 
stressing how it morphed from a centralized entity in Afghanistan in 
the 1990s to a scattered global network in the aftermath of Operation 
Enduring Freedom.14
Al-Qaeda’s Structure Before September 11 
Al-Qaeda was founded in the late 1980s, although the exact year is 
debated.15 Jason Burke notes that the word “al-Qaeda” has several 
meanings: It can be translated as “the base” or “the foundation” (the 
common understanding of the word), but it also can mean a “precept, 
rule, principle, maxim, formula, model or pattern.” Burke argues that 
the latter deﬁnition better ﬁts the origins of what we now call al-Qaeda, 
particularly as it was employed during the 1980s, when the term was 
used to describe a mode of jihadist action against occupying Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan. Burke further notes that bin Laden had formed 
a small group of jihadists that had pledged their loyalty to him in the 
1980s, but that there is disagreement over whether this group called 
itself al-Qaeda or not.16 It was from this small group around bin Laden 
that al-Qaeda evolved into the loosely knit structure that reached its 
zenith prior to September 11.
Several scholars argue that al-Qaeda truly began to take shape 
while bin Laden was in Sudan during the early and mid-1990s, where 
he was strongly inﬂuenced by the country’s nominal leader, Hassan 
13 “Congressional Statement of J. T. Caruso, Acting Assisting Director, Counter Terrorism 
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on Al-Qaeda International,” December 18, 2001, 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress (as of July 11, 2002). Jason Burke sees this characterization as 
a product of the FBI’s organizational culture, which he argues has traditionally focused on 
pursuing well-deﬁned criminal entities with known members who can be prosecuted in a 
court of law. See Burke (2003), p. 11. 
14 See, for example, Gunaratna (2002a), pp. 72–73; Benjamin and Simon (2002), p. 167.
15 Gunaratna (2002a), p. 75, cites a 1989 meeting in Khost as the birth of the al-Qaeda 
we now know. However, in a recent communication, Gunaratna reveals that al-Qaeda was 
cofounded by Dr. Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden in September 1988 (Gunaratna 
review, July 2005).
16 Burke (2003), pp. 7–9.
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al-Turabi. A radical Islamist whose followers seized control of Sudan 
in a coup d’état in 1989, al-Turabi had as one of his major goals the 
creation of worldwide Islamic movements. To this end, he estab-
lished several organizations, including the Islamist International and 
the Popular [Islamist] International in 1991—which aimed to unify 
Sunni Islam and various jihadist movements around the globe—and 
the Armed Islamic Movement/International Legion of Islam, which 
is the militant arm of these organizations.17 In 1994, bin Laden and 
al-Turabi cofounded the Advice and Reform Committee, headquar-
tered in London, with the speciﬁc purpose of criticizing the Saudi royal 
family for allowing U.S. troops to be based on Saudi soil.18
However, in the view of most analysts, al-Qaeda’s structure only 
cohered after bin Laden’s return to Afghanistan in 1996, following his 
deportation from Sudan. Under the rule of the Taliban, this desolate 
country oﬀered the ﬁrst real opportunity to build a solid terrorist enter-
prise with a strong degree of organizational coherence. In Afghanistan, 
bin Laden found the right combination of anarchy, instability, and 
antipathy toward the West and its values to construct a network that, 
according to Gunaratna, 
comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist 
cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, and 
other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for 
oﬀensive actions and other responsibilities.19
Central to al-Qaeda’s pre-9/11 structure was the so-called hard 
core—a dozen or so inner members surrounded by an outer circle of 
roughly 100 highly motivated loyalists drawn from around the Muslim 
17 Bodansky (2001), pp. 32–35.
18 Anonymous (2002), p. 145; Burke (2003), pp. 157–158, calls it “The Advice and 
Reformation Committee” and claims that its primary purpose was to improve the image 
of bin Laden and al-Turabi and counter Saudi propaganda in the worldwide Muslim 
community.
19 Gunaratna (2002a), p. 73, cites an al-Qaeda training manual as his source of informa-
tion. For more on the organizational structure of al-Qaeda, see Indictment of United States of 
America v. Zacarias Moussaoui, December 2001, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindict-
ment.htm (as of December 12, 2003).
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world and committed to the jihadist agenda.20 Directing this hard core 
was a complex leadership structure comprising four layers. At the top 
was bin Laden, who appointed an “immediate deputy” or “emir,” Abu 
Ayoub al-Iraqi.21 Below this was the shura majlis, or consultative com-
mittee, made up of veterans from the Soviet-Afghan war who had sworn 
a pledge of allegiance, or bayat, to bin Laden in 1989. These loyalists 
included al-Zawahiri and the operations specialist Mohammed Atef.22
Below the shura majlis were four operational committees, according to 
Gunaratna: “military, ﬁnance and business, fatwas and Islamic study, 
and media and publicity.”23
Al-Qaeda’s Structure After September 11 
The global war on terrorism began with a military operation against 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that aimed to destroy its authority 
and the sanctuary it had provided to al-Qaeda. Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) achieved both these objectives, toppling the Taliban 
in a matter of weeks and scattering the core of bin Laden’s group, par-
ticularly following the 18-day battle for Tora Bora. 
Terrorism analysts are in general agreement that OEF was instru-
mental in severely weakening al-Qaeda’s command and control struc-
ture.24 Some observers, however, go further, arguing the campaign 
actually destroyed the organization’s structural coherence. According 
to Burke, “the nearest thing to al-Qaeda, as popularly understood, 
existed for a short period, between 1996 and 2001. Its base had been 
Afghanistan and what I had seen in Tora Bora were the ﬁnal scenes of 
its destruction.”25
20 Burke (2003), p. 13.
21 Abu Ayoub is now identiﬁed as Mamdouth Salim, alias Abu Hajir al Iraqi, arrested in 
Germany and incarcerated in the United States (Gunaratna review, July 2005).
22 Gunaratna (2002a,) pp. 75–76.
23 Gunaratna (2002a), pp. 77–78. In addition to this leadership structure, al-Qaeda retained 
a separate guerrilla force—the 055 Brigade—which during the group’s tenure in Afghanistan 
was primarily used to assist the Taliban in its struggle against the Northern Alliance.
24 See, for example, Gunaratna (2002a), p. 73.
25 Burke (2003), p. 5.
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A central tenet of the global campaign against terrorism has been 
to disrupt al-Qaeda’s operational tempo and coherence by destroying its 
core leadership.26 To a substantial extent, this campaign has succeeded 
in killing or capturing many of the group’s most senior leaders:
Mohammed Atef, al-Qaeda’s operations chief, who was killed in 
a November 2002 U.S. air raid in Kabul27
Ramzi bin al-Shib, the reputed recruiter and ﬁnancier of the 
September 11 attacks (and alleged “20th hijacker”), who was cap-
tured in Pakistan on September 11, 200228
Abu Zubaydah, who is believed to have replaced Atef in the net-
work and who was caught in Pakistan in March 200229
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, al-Qaeda’s alleged point man on the 
Arabian Peninsula and main planner for maritime attacks (includ-
ing the 2000 strike on the USS Cole), who was detained in the 
United Arab Emirates in November 200230
Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, who was arrested in Pakistan in 
March 200331
Riduan Isamuddin (also known as “Hambali”), bin Laden’s main 
point of contact in Southeast Asia (and the accused mastermind
26 For a complete list of the FBI’s most wanted, see http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/
terrorists/fugitives.htm (as of February 2, 2004).
27 See http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/fugitives.htm. Atef is cited as the most senior 
al-Qaeda operative to have so far been taken out of commission.
28 “News Conference Regarding Zacarias Moussaoui,” Department of Justice Conference 
Center, December 11, 2001.
29 Don Van Natta, Jr., “Al Qaeda Hobbled by Latest Arrest, US Says,” The New York Times,
March 3, 2003.
30 Philip Shenon, “US Says Capture of Al Qaeda Leader May Provide Clues to Thwarting 
Terror Attacks,” The New York Times, November 23, 2002.
31 Peter Finn, “Al Qaeda Deputies Harbored by Iran,” The Washington Post, August 28, 
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of the Bali 2002 bombings), who was seized by Thai security 
forces just outside Bangkok in August 2003.32
How have these arrests aﬀected al-Qaeda? Most scholars agree 
that the elimination of some of the network’s key ﬁgures has been 
important in reducing the organization’s overall operational capabili-
ties. However, several commentators point out that a number of promi-
nent leaders remain at large—including, most obviously, bin Laden 
and al-Zawahiri; Saif al-Adil, the Egyptian reputed as the head of al-
Qaeda’s security committee; Saad bin Laden, one of Osama’s sons; and 
Mahfouz Ould Walid (also known as Abu Hafs the Mauritanian), a 
reputed operations planner.33 They also point out that many of the 
Egyptians brought into al-Qaeda by al-Zawahiri—who in many ways 
constitute the logistical backbone of the network—have yet to be 
detained.34 The signiﬁcance of bin Laden’s and al-Zawahari’s contin-
ued presence in al-Qaeda has been an issue of debate. Several scholars 
have emphatically noted that, while these two individuals were impor-
tant leaders in the creation of the network, the centrality of their oper-
ational leadership post–September 11 has become increasingly ques-
tionable.35 For these commentators, the primary role of bin Laden and 
al-Zawahiri after the onset of the global war on terrorism has been that 
of a source of inspiration through their statements to the press and via 
their propagandizing on the Internet. As Burke notes, while they have 
32 Maria Ressa, Atika Shubert, Amy Chew, “Asia’s Most Wanted in U.S. Hands,” CNN.
com, August 15, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/08/15/
hambali.capture/ (as of February 15, 2006).
33 Saif, Saad bin Laden, and Walid are all alleged to be in Iran. See “Al Qaeda Deputies 
Harbored by Iran,” The Washington Post, August 28, 2002; and “US Says Iran Harbors al 
Qaeda ‘Associate,’” The Washington Times, June 10, 2003.
34 Hoﬀman (2003a), p. 8; “Al-Qaeda: Organization or Ideology?” On Point, November 25, 
2003, http://www.wbur.org (as of December 13, 2003).
35 For example, in a Front Page Magazine interview, ﬁve RAND researchers—Bruce 
Hoﬀman, Brian Jenkins, John Parachini, William Rosenau, and Gregory Treverton—all 
agreed that al-Qaeda would survive the loss of bin Laden. See Jamie Glazov, “Symposium: 
Diagnosing Al Qaeda,” Front Page Magazine, August 18, 2003, http://www.frontpagemag.
com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=9416 (as of February 15, 2006).
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served as the ideology and motivation for jihadist terrorism, they have 
exerted only marginal direct inﬂuence in the actual mechanics of sub-
sequent attacks.36
Other commentators take a somewhat less sanguine view, noting 
that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have released scores of statements since 
September 11 calling for Muslims around the world to rise up and 
attack Americans, British, and other Europeans whenever possible and 
to challenge their own corrupt and impious governments. According 
to these analysts, the mere fact that such exhortations to violence con-
tinue to be made—and, more seriously, continue to be acted upon—
must of necessity be a major cause for concern.37
On a broader level, targeting the leadership may have had perverse 
consequences. Michael Kenney, drawing on the example of Colombian 
drug cartels, cautions that the strategy of taking out the known top 
layer of an organization can have the unintended consequence of trans-
forming the enterprise into an entity with no central leadership but the 
continued capacity to operate. Stated diﬀerently, destroying the leader-
ship may not necessarily kill an organization and could, in fact, create a 
new, disaggregated one that is more diﬃcult to predict and preempt.38
Since 9/11, al-Qaeda’s inner circle appears to have been playing a 
steadily diminishing role in planning, ﬁnancing, and supporting ter-
rorist strikes. Burke’s analysis is worth quoting at length: 
The ﬁrst major attack after the 2001 war came in October 2002 
in Bali where more than 200 people died in a suicide attack on 
a nightclub. Investigations showed this strike was the work of 
36 “Al-Qaeda: Organization or Ideology?” interviews with Steven Simon, Jason Burke, 
and Josh Meyer, On Point, November 25, 2003, http://www.wbur.org (as of December 13, 
2003).
37 For example, bin Laden’s November 12, 2002, statement proclaims:  “Why did your gov-
ernments ally themselves with America to attack us in Afghanistan, and I cite in particular 
Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany and Australia?” Center for Studies on New 
Religions, http://www.cesnur.org/2002/laden_nov.htm (as of February 2, 2004).
38 Kenney (2003), pp. 187–206. Kenney notes that the U.S. war on drugs succeeded in 
taking out the top leadership of the Colombian drug cartel but that inﬂows of cocaine 
remained unchanged. Gunaratna believes that the Istanbul bombings were the work of al-
Qaeda and not of an associated group (Gunaratna, review, July 2005).
Strategy, Structure, and Operational Evolution    33
a group tangentially connected to bin Laden but acting semi-
independently. Some of the funding and strategic direction for 
the bombing may have come from the central core but little else. 
The next major attacks—at Casablanca, Riyadh, Mombassa 
and Istanbul—revealed steadily diminishing amounts of central 
direction. Finally, in Madrid . . . this process reached its logical 
conclusion. The attack, the most murderous so far, was the work 
of local militants who had been inﬂuenced by ideas of the global 
strand of Islamist militancy but had no contact with men like bin 
Laden at all.39
The July 2005 attacks in London would appear to fall within this 
pattern. Although the suicide bombers may have received, or attempted 
to receive, training from al-Qaeda-aﬃliated groups in Pakistan, these 
individuals had no apparent connections with al-Qaeda’s inner circle, 
ﬁnancial or otherwise. 
Thus, while it appears that the decapitation strategy has succeeded 
in greatly reducing the functional ability of al-Qaeda’s leadership core, 
it clearly has not brought about the end of the al-Qaeda phenomenon. 
Rather, dozens of like-minded local organizations have come to the 
fore, hitting more-vulnerable targets with deadly force. Discerning the 
capabilities and modus operandi of these smaller, less known groups 
will present a substantial new set of challenges for counterterrorism 
planners. Indeed, if Burke is correct in suggesting that new groups are 
emerging—aﬃliates that have had no training or ﬁnancing from the 
pre–September 11 al-Qaeda—then ﬁghting this threat will require a 
major departure from the decapitation strategy. More important will 
be a sustained and aggressive campaign of counterpropaganda aimed 
at discrediting the jihadist call and, thereby, dissuading local groups 
from taking up arms and attacking foreign and domestic targets. 
39 Jason Burke, “The New Matrix of Terror,” India Today, July 25, 2005, LexisNexis, August 
31, 2005. 
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Operational Evolution
Because the United States can often force a change in al-Qaeda’s tac-
tics as a result of the success of its counterterrorist operations against 
the network, it is critical that policymakers identify in advance how 
their actions may aﬀect the movement’s overall operational dynamic 
and tempo. For example, to have ongoing success against a particular 
terrorist cell, it is crucial to understand the impact of this loss on the 
overall group or on its operational planning cycle if the cell is disman-
tled, and to anticipate how the network may recover. It is important 
to keep in mind that the outcome may be unexpected or may result 
in a changed modality more destructive to U.S. interests, something 
Washington obviously wants to avoid. 
To accurately evaluate how al-Qaeda’s tactics and targets have 
changed over time, it is ﬁrst important to distinguish al-Qaeda and 
groups that have an organizational aﬃliation with it from those that 
are only loosely connected to the network or simply share its worldview 
(those entities will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Six through 
Eleven of this volume). Terrorist groups such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
(EIJ) and the Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which 
have an integral and recognized link to al-Qaeda, are more likely to 
exhibit a common set of targets and tactics, whereas groups that have a 
less concrete relationship tend to incorporate methods and techniques 
that al-Qaeda does not commonly use. The working hypothesis of the 
present study is that the latter alliances both strengthen and weaken 
the network. Although informal ties with other terrorist groups pro-
vide al-Qaeda with operational and tactical ﬂexibility, the inner core 
of the movement tends to have less control over how these operations 
are conducted.
For example, al-Qaeda’s frequent use of sophisticated suicide 
attacks largely reﬂects the inﬂuence of the EIJ, a fully co-opted group 
whose own use of martyrdom was developed and reﬁned in Egypt 
during the 1990s. Undoubtedly, it was the EIJ’s operational experience 
that allowed al-Qaeda to emerge on the stage of world politics so suc-
cessfully in 1998 with the simultaneous attacks on the U.S. embassies 
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. By contrast, the Abu Sayyaf Group 
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(ASG) in the Philippines, a group established with bin Laden’s support, 
has specialized in the use of kidnapping, extortion, assassination, and 
small-scale urban bombings—which, although justiﬁed in the name 
of the international jihadist movement,40 essentially reﬂect the group’s 
own operational capabilities and choices. This style of terrorism has 
tended to be amateurish in execution (with the arguable exception of 
the string of foreign abductions that took place in 2000), and it is 
debatable what real value these activities have had for al-Qaeda’s over-
all functional, organizational, and ideological priorities.41
With these distinctions in mind, it is therefore useful to take a 
close look at how al-Qaeda has altered its operational strategy since 
the 1998 East Africa bombings—bin Laden’s ﬁrst large-scale attack 
against the United States—to better project how assault methods may 
be shifted over time.
After the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 
the United States and its allies dismantled at least ﬁve al-Qaeda cells 
around the world, a signiﬁcant setback for the organization. Although 
bin Laden likely anticipated counterterrorist actions in the wake of 
these attacks, he apparently did not readily appreciate how quickly 
Washington, in conjunction with other international intelligence ser-
vices, would be able to unravel the plot, understand who was behind 
it, and shut down the networks associated with its planning and execu-
tion.42 The al-Qaeda networks involved in planning the East Africa 
attacks were uncovered more quickly than the terrorists anticipated, 
for several reasons. 
First, documents were found in possession of the EIJ operatives 
involved in planning the thwarted attack against U.S. interests in 
Albania that revealed their contacts with other members of their net-
work in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Azerbaijan. Second, 
al-Qaeda did not anticipate that the Albania attack would be thwarted, 
40 See, for instance, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” U.S. Department of State (2002b), http://www.
state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/ (as of February 16, 2006); “Abu Sayyaf and Its Links to 
Bin Laden,” CNN.com, September 2001; and Hookaway (2004). 
41 Abu Sayyaf Group; “Abu Sayyaf and Its Links to Bin Laden.”
42 Anonymous (2002), p. 221.
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and the EIJ operatives had not been careful to hide operational and 
contact information. EIJ operatives in each location were found with 
numbers and names of other operatives in their personal possession, 
leading intelligence and police oﬃcials to uncover and arrest their col-
leagues. Finally, oﬃcials gained information from EIJ militants through 
interrogation.43 Since that time, al-Qaeda has altered and expanded its 
target set, making organizational modiﬁcations that have resulted in 
signiﬁcant changes to the way it conducts operations. 
Al-Qaeda has opted to stick closely to what has worked in the 
past, such as multiple suicide bombings, but the manner and means for 
carrying out these strikes have deﬁnitely changed. The use of planes as 
suicide bombs in the September 11 attacks and the small boat packed 
with explosives that devastated the USS Cole are two of the best exam-
ples of al-Qaeda innovation in this direction. However, there have been 
a number of other instances of operational shift: a switch from hard 
to soft targets and from mass casualty to smaller, but more frequent 
attacks; an increased focus on the economic impact of the attacks; 
greater eﬃciency in the utilization of loose networks and recruitment 
of U.S. and European nationals to evade detection; and moves to create 
new types of safe haven to maintain critical skills, such as conducting 
terrorist training in private homes. Each of these modiﬁcations, and 
the circumstances surrounding them, will be discussed in more detail 
below.
Hard Versus Soft Targets
In 1996 when bin Laden ﬁrst announced his fatwa against the United 
States, al-Qaeda focused most of its energy on attacking hard targets, 
such as embassies and military installations. These facilities are not 
only the most diﬃcult to penetrate but also represented the focal point 
of U.S. power and inﬂuence abroad. Al-Qaeda hoped that if its opera-
tives could successfully hit and destroy such venues, it would force 
the United States out of the various countries it was “occupying” and 
43 Muhammad Salah, “A Record of Jihad Years from ‘Ayn Shams to Tirana. Oﬃcial in 
Charge of Jihad’s Station in Albania: I Traded in Yemen and Learned Forgery in Sudan,” Al-
Wasat, FBIS FTS19990303001107, March 1, 1999.
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compel it to curtail its support for “apostate” regimes. In so doing, al-
Qaeda would necessarily transmit a message of power that could be 
used to build morale and attract new recruits.
Following the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, al-Qaeda 
moved to incorporate attacks against soft targets on a more concerted 
basis, both to produce a higher civilian body count and to provide 
greater operational latitude for carrying out more frequent attacks. 
While assaults were still mounted against hard strategic targets, such 
as the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, a broader portfo-
lio of strike options was becoming evident. This was ﬁrst seen in the 
thwarted plot to attack the U.S. embassy in Albania; documents subse-
quently recovered by security forces showed that al-Qaeda had singled 
out several other vulnerable targets in the event that the primary mis-
sion should prove too diﬃcult, including mounting an assault against 
an American housing complex in Tirana.44 This change in tactics was 
further highlighted in the planned millennium bombings of American 
and Israeli tourist venues in Jordan in December 2000.45
September 11 involved attacks on both soft and hard targets, and 
it represents the most sophisticated and deadly attack conducted by 
any terrorist organization to date. Al-Qaeda began planning at least 
two years in advance of the strikes, reﬂecting a time frame similar to 
that which characterized the East African operation. Suicide terrorism 
was, again, the preferred weapon; however, the delivery mechanism 
changed dramatically from the traditional explosive-packed car/truck 
to the use of hijacked commercial jet airliners. The soft and hard tar-
gets al-Qaeda chose for the attacks—the World Trade Center (WTC) 
and the Pentagon—represented the pinnacles of U.S. economic and 
military power. Moreover, the numbers of people killed in these 
assaults well exceeded al-Qaeda’s expectations (especially in the case 
of the WTC), more than fulﬁlling its desired goal of inﬂicting mass 
44 “Jordan Indicts Members of Terrorist Cell,” International Policy Institute for 
Counterterrorism, March 29, 2000, http://www.ict.org.il/ (as of February 21, 2006). 
45 “Jordan Indicts . . . .” 
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casualties (which, as noted above, could be interpreted as a miscalcula-
tion given the robust nature of the Bush administration’s subsequent 
response).
Since September 11, al-Qaeda and entities aﬃliated in some way 
with the network have focused primarily on attacking soft targets. Both 
2002 and 2003 saw a rise in such attacks, with assaults ranging from 
nightclubs in Indonesia to a synagogue in Tunisia. In choosing such a 
course of action, al-Qaeda appears to be hoping that it can project an 
image of omnipresence. However, it could also reﬂect a growing weak-
ness in the network, which—suﬀering from a concerted counterterror-
ism onslaught by the United States and its allies—no longer has the 
means or capabilities to conduct more sophisticated, strategic assaults 
on hard targets.
Mass-Casualty Versus Smaller, More Frequent Attacks
Although inﬂicting mass casualties remains a primary goal of al-Qaeda, 
the group has had to alter its operational strategy since September 
11 to focus on conducting smaller, more frequent attacks. There are 
two main reasons for this change. First, the loss of a secure base in 
Afghanistan and the subsequent arrest of both senior and mid-level 
commanders have denuded the group of the necessary logistical and 
functional assets needed to plan an operation on the scale of 9/11. 
Second, because it can no longer exhibit clear command and control 
over its attack—again, a consequence of the aforementioned loss of 
haven and leadership—al-Qaeda has been forced to increasingly rely 
on other terrorist groups who are in some way connected to the net-
work to conduct its attacks. Although the parameters of those aﬃliate 
strikes have not approached those of the high-proﬁle assaults seen in 
Washington and New York, they have acted as a de facto force multi-
plier in the sense that they have been regularly perpetrated on a truly 
global scale. During 2003, for instance, al-Qaeda was “credited” with 
a plethora of suicide attacks in various parts of the world, including 
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Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Turkey.46 Not only did 
these acts of terrorism ensure that the group continued to be viewed as 
both vibrant and relevant, they also helped to underscore an image of 
the network as being able to strike at will around the globe.
Focus on Economic Impact
Al-Qaeda has additionally incorporated attacks against U.S. installa-
tions or infrastructure that are likely to have some kind of economic 
eﬀect on its overall target set. The group ﬁrst realized the potential 
of this form of terrorism in the wake of September 11. Although the 
WTC and Pentagon were primarily chosen for their symbolic status 
as the seat of American commercial and military power, the ﬁnan-
cial damage wrought by the two strikes was enormous (especially in 
the former case), aﬀecting New York businesses, the airline industry, 
tourism, and indirectly contributing to a national—and, arguably, 
global—recession.47
Al-Qaeda’s continued plans to use jets as ﬂying bombs further 
underscores the movement to maximize the economic consequences 
of an attack. Although the choice of this particular modus ope-
randi undoubtedly reﬂects its past use as a successful form of mass-
destruction terrorism, there is good reason to believe that it also 
reﬂects the perception that such operations will result in further set-
backs to commercial aviation and tourism. Indeed, in December 
46 Chris Plante, “US Suspects al-Qa’ida in Morocco Bombings,” CNN.com, May 18, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/05/17/al.qaeda.morocco/ (as of February 16, 
2006); “Saudi Bombing Deaths Rise,” BBC News, May 13, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/middle_east/3022473.stm (as of February 16, 2006); Maria Ressa, “Fears of New 
Suicide Terrorism Squad,” CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/south-
east/08/11/alqaeda.blast/ (as of February 16, 2006); “Warning of More Attacks in Turkey,” 
CNN.com, November 20, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/11/20/
turkey.blast/ (as of February 16, 2006). 
47 Gilmore Commission (2002), pp. 9–10.
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2003, a number of ﬂights from Europe to the United States were 
canceled precisely because of reported attempts by al-Qaeda to 
hijack the planes during the traditionally busy holiday season.48
Efﬁcient Use of Loose Networks
As previously noted, counterterrorist actions by the United States and 
its allies are responsible, at least in part, for al-Qaeda’s increased reli-
ance on loose networks of operatives to conduct operations. Arrests of 
senior leaders and the loss of its Afghan haven have forced the group 
not only to turn to other established terrorist aﬃliates to conduct 
attacks but also to operate in a more decentralized, cellular fashion.49
After the East Africa attacks, al-Qaeda ﬁrst began to shift its focus 
toward using clandestine networks, largely for pragmatic and opera-
tional reasons. However, the group still maintained relative command 
and control over its operations, tending to rely on jihadists brought 
into al-Qaeda as sworn members rather than contracting with particu-
lar individuals for speciﬁc attacks. Cadres were required to prove their 
depth of knowledge of the Koran and their commitment to Islam and 
al-Qaeda’s ideology. Each also took an oath of loyalty to bin Laden and 
went through a sustained program of terrorist training.
Without the infrastructure in place to recruit dedicated mem-
bers and because it is no longer in the group’s best interest to have an 
easily identiﬁable core of operatives, al-Qaeda has necessarily had to 
alter its strategy. Accordingly, the preferred approach today is to have 
cells composed of newly recruited operatives who come together for a 
speciﬁc operation and then disperse after it is over. Operating in this 
manner, al-Qaeda has sought to compensate for the loss of its bases in 
Afghanistan (which availed more direct, long-term, face-to-face con-
48 “Flights Canceled over Terrorist Fears,” The Seattle Times, December 25, 2003, http://
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001823220_planes25.html (as of February 
16, 2006); “Flights Canceled Amid New Worries About al-Qaeda,” USAToday.com, January 
30, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-01-30-terror-threats-airlines_
x.htm (as of February 16, 2006). 
49 Gilmore Commission (2002), pp. 12–13. 
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tact between members), while at the same time increasing the diﬃculty 
of quickly identifying individuals involved in particular attacks and 
anticipating their role in the overall planning process.
New Sanctuaries
With the loss of its leadership and training infrastructure in Afghani-
stan, al-Qaeda has had to ﬁnd alternative safe havens to continue to 
plan operations and train new recruits. In the post-9/11 era, the group 
is unlikely to ﬁnd another environment as conducive to its needs as the 
one it enjoyed under the Taliban. Indeed, an important objective of 
the United States and its allies was to discourage other potential state 
sponsors from oﬀering territorial sanctuary to terrorist groups such as 
al-Qaeda, a policy that has already prompted some former renegade 
states—notably Libya and Sudan—to distance themselves from terror-
ist groups.
Since the loss of its extensive training complex in Afghanistan, 
al-Qaeda and its oﬀspring have had to invent new ways of teaching 
their operational tradecraft to the next generation of jihadists. In 
Afghanistan, al-Qaeda—under the patronage of the Taliban—was 
able to train thousands of new recruits from a variety of backgrounds 
in both guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics ranging from small arms 
training to counterinterrogation techniques with relative impunity. The 
creation of the 11-volume Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, acquired by 
U.S. intelligence in 1999, was designed to serve as a step-by-step do-
it-yourself guide for the up-and-coming terrorist to augment what he 
learned in the Afghan training camps, and to educate those who could 
not make it to the camps. This publication has served as the primary 
text for training new recruits in an era when training camps are harder 
to set up. It includes sections on how to blow up a plane and threaten 
with a knife and has been widely circulated on the Internet. Also on 
the Internet are online courses oﬀered by Islamist Web sites on how to 
build explosive devices.50
These texts and other “virtual” ways of learning about how to wage 
jihad are crucial for supporting the growing number of urban training 
50 Stern (2003).
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grounds that have emerged since the loss of Afghanistan. Urban train-
ing grounds are deﬁned as operational spaces in urban areas, such as 
private homes or warehouses, where new recruits can engage in the full 
spectrum of terrorist training, ranging from ideological indoctrination 
to target selection and how to conduct surveillance. As discussed in 
the section on al-Qaeda propaganda, a new Internet magazine called 
Al-Battar Training Camp purports to help prospective terrorists get up 
to speed quickly in the comfort and anonymity of their own homes.51
The brainchild of the former al-Qaeda leader in Saudi Arabia, Yusuf al-
Ayiri (former bodyguard of bin Laden who was killed by Saudi forces 
in 2003), Al-Battar appears to be published bimonthly. In the maga-
zine’s ﬁrst issue, the author says, 
Because many of Islam’s young people do not yet know how to 
bear arms . . . and because the agents of the Cross are hobbling 
the Muslims and preventing them from planning [jihad] . . . your 
brothers the Mujahideen in the Arabian peninsula have decided 
to publish this booklet to serve the Mujahid brother in his place 
of isolation, and he will do the exercises and act according to the 
military knowledge included within it. 
The magazine contains articles on such topics as how to properly 
operate a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and how to orchestrate a 
kidnapping.52
In addition to starting this magazine intended to reach thou-
sands of new recruits via the Internet and give them a way to train 
in the post–September 11 era, al-Ayiri also began establishing a net-
work of covert training camps at farms and in private homes around 
51 “Al-Qaeda Oﬀers Do-It-Yourself Terror Training,” WorldNetDaily, January 5, 2004, 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=36459 (as of February 16, 
2006).
52 “Al Battar Magazine Issue No. 10,” SITE Institute, May 24, 2004; “Al Battar Magazine 
Issue No. 13,” SITE Institute, July 23, 2004, http://www.siteinstitute.org/terroristpublica-
tions.html (as of February 16, 2006).
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Saudi Arabia.53 A group called “Al-Qaeda’s Military Committee in 
Saudi Arabia” released a communiqué in December 2003 announcing 
the existence of these camps by saying, “One of [Yusuf al-Ayiri’s] last 
blessed deeds was to establish several training camps in [Saudi Arabia] 
which several of the hero mujahadeen have come from.”54
Besides the network in Saudi Arabia, other training “camps” have 
been established in urban areas in France and the United Kingdom 
(UK). A number of North African extremists aﬃliated with al-Qaeda 
were arrested in France and the UK since 9/11 and were suspected of 
manufacturing chemicals for use in future terrorist attacks. In January 
2003, British authorities arrested six men suspected of producing ricin, 
a highly toxic substance, in their north London apartment. In the 
apartment the authorities found ricin precursor agents and processing 
equipment. According to British forensic analysts, the material present 
in the apartment tested positive for ricin.55
One French-born al-Qaeda terrorist of Algerian descent, Menad 
Benchellali, was arrested in December 2002 for manufacturing ricin 
in his apartment in Lyon. Police found a laboratory equipped to pro-
duce biological and chemical agents in a bedroom that doubled as a 
sewing room by day. According to French police reports, Benchellali, 
known in al-Qaeda circles as “the chemist,” would lock himself in the 
room and work through the night to experiment with new biological 
and chemical recipes. Based on leads developed in the Benchellali case, 
British authorities raided the apartments of a number of Algerian ter-
rorists in 2003 and also found ingredients for manufacturing ricin.56
The wave of terrorism in Morocco, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, and elsewhere shows that al-Qaeda’s “second generation” is still 
53 Evan Kohlmann, “A Saudi Home: Al Qaeda in the Kingdom,” National Review Online,
February 9, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/kohlmann200402090859.asp 
(as of February 16, 2006). 
54 Kohlmann, “A Saudi Home . . . .” 
55 Jeﬀrey M. Bale, Anjali Bhattacharjee, Eric Croddy, and Richard Pilch, “Ricin Found in 
London: An al-Qa` ida Connection?” Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), January 
23, 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/ricin.htm (as of February 16, 2006).
56 Joby Warrick, “Al Qaeda: Death in a Jar,” Hamilton Spectator, May 8, 2004, p. F08.
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able to conduct eﬀective attacks despite the loss of training bases in 
Afghanistan. These attacks may not be as spectacular as those executed 
on September 11, but they are more frequent and give the impression 
that al-Qaeda can strike anywhere at any time. Training is vital to 
maintaining the quality of al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks—which in turn 
is essential to maintaining the credibility of the global jihadist move-
ment and attracting new recruits—and thus far, al-Qaeda has shown 
an ability to sustain the integrity of that training through the prolifera-
tion of virtual jihad and the diﬀusion of urban training centers.
Unconventional Weapons
Bin Laden has made no secret of his interest in acquiring CBRN weap-
ons, but he does not seem to have been successful in translating intent 
into execution. Of course, the level of diﬃculty in acquiring uncon-
ventional weapons of diﬀerent kinds is not the same, with the devel-
opment of a nuclear weapon at the most diﬃcult end of the spectrum 
and probably beyond al-Qaeda’s current capabilities. The technology 
for the development of a nuclear device is available in the open litera-
ture, but a terrorist group seeking to develop such a device would face 
formidable logistical and technical challenges—including obtaining at 
least 50 kilograms of enriched uranium and developing a usable device 
without tests that could be detected.57 Given the diﬃculties in devel-
oping a nuclear device, the most likely course would be to attempt 
to build a radiological weapon, possibly using materials diverted from 
stockpiles in the former Soviet Union, or to purchase a ready-made 
weapon.
Following Pakistan’s detonation of a nuclear device in 1998, bin 
Laden declared that other Muslim nations “should not be lax in pos-
sessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.”58 Bin Laden has 
used two arguments to justify the possession and use of these uncon-
ventional devices. First, bin Laden is a believer in their deterrent value. 
57 “Nuclear Capabilities May Elude Terrorists, Experts Say,” The Washington Post, December 
29, 2004.
58 “Bin-Laden Congratulates Pakistan on Its Possession of Nuclear Weapons,” Al-Quds al-
’Arabi (London), June 1, 1998, FBIS. 
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As he told an interviewer in 1999, “It would be a sin for Muslims not 
to try and possess the weapons that would prevent the inﬁdels from 
inﬂicting harm on Muslims.”59 Second, since bin Laden claims that 
“the United States is the biggest mischief maker, terrorist, and rogue 
in the world . . . and it is the duty of every Muslim to struggle for its 
annihilation,”60 CBRN weapons, with their potential to cause mass 
casualties, serve as ideal instruments.
Theological justiﬁcation was provided by a Saudi cleric named 
Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd. According to Anonymous (the pseudonym 
of Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit), in May 
2003 al-Fahd issued a fatwa entitled “A Treatise on the Legal Status of 
Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Inﬁdels” that addressed 
theological problems raised by the use of CBRN weapons. Al-Fahd 
argued that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have no special 
standing as proscribed weapons under Islamic laws. Moreover, Muslims 
may retaliate proportionately for attacks on them. Since, according to 
al-Fahd, “some brothers have totaled the number of Muslims killed 
directly or indirectly by [American] weapons and come up with a 
ﬁgure of nearly 10 million,” it was permissible for Muslims to inﬂict an 
equivalent number of casualties in an attack on Americans.61
Bin Laden’s CBRN acquisition eﬀort began while he was living 
in Sudan during 1991–1996. His intimate relationship with the 
Nationalist Islamic Front (NIF), Sudan’s ruling clique, gained him 
entrée to the NIF’s Military Industrial Corporation, a potential source 
of CBRN expertise, equipment, and materials.62 During this period, 
bin Laden also began a protracted and apparently fruitless campaign 
59 Rahimulla Yusufzai, “Conversation with Terror,” Time (Canada), January 11, 1999, 
p. 14. 
60 “Interview with Osama Bin Laden Reported,” Al-Akhbar (Islamabad), March 31, 1998, 
FBIS. 
61 Anonymous (2004), pp. 155–156. Al-Fahd further justiﬁed large-scale civilian casual-
ties if they were the result of an attack meant to defeat the enemy and not aimed at killing 
civilians. He also deemed the killing of Muslims in such attacks permissible, if there was no 
alternative. 
62 Anonymous (2002), p. 186. 
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to acquire material for building a nuclear device.63 After his reloca-
tion to Afghanistan in 1996, bin Laden received advice from Pakistani 
nuclear scientists, most notably Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a 
38-year veteran of Pakistan’s civil nuclear program.64 At a laboratory in 
Darunta, bin Laden’s followers developed a crude form of cyanide gas, 
which they tested on a dog in December 1999, recording the event on 
videotape. After the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, technical 
manuals found in Khost, Kabul, and other areas conﬁrmed al-Qaeda’s 
deep interest in CBRN weapons.65
Press accounts also indicate that during this period bin Laden 
attempted to purchase nuclear weapons from sources within the former 
Soviet Union. These reports allege that bin Laden’s agents sought 
atomic demolition munitions (so-called “suitcase nukes”) and, more 
fancifully, that with the help of organized crime ﬁgures in Russia and 
Chechnya, obtained nuclear warheads from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and 
Russia.66 Although some analysts conclude that some of these claims 
have the “ring of plausibility,”67 there is no publicly available evidence 
to conﬁrm that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist entity has fabricated, 
purchased, or stolen a nuclear device. Indeed, no U.S. or allied govern-
ment oﬃcial has ever stated publicly that terrorists have succeeded in 
acquiring a nuclear device or other sophisticated weapon. 
Although some analysts, journalists, and public oﬃcials claim 
fancifully that some of these weapons can be “built in a basement,” the 
evidence suggests that creating devices capable of causing mass casual-
ties requires substantial expertise, time, and money.68 Aum Shinrikyo, 
63 See, for example, United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden et al., particularly pp. 
357–366. 
64 Anonymous (2002), p. 188; Baker, “Pakistani Scientist . . . ,” p. A01. 
65 Burke (2003), p. 187; Mike Boettcher and Ingrid Arnesen, “Al Qaeda Documents Outline 
Serious Weapon Program,” January 25, 2002, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2002/
US/01/24/inv.al.qaeda.documents (as of February 27, 2006).
66 “Al Qaeda Network May Have Transported Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons 
to the United States,” The Frontier Post (Peshawar), November 20, 2001, FBIS. 
67 Anonymous (2002), p. 192. 
68 Parachini (2003), pp. 37–48.
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the religious cult responsible for the sarin nerve agent attack on the 
Tokyo subway in March 1995, was able to fashion a crude chemical 
weapon, but failed to fabricate a biological device, despite substantial 
amounts of money, a pool of scientiﬁc and engineering talent, and a 
secure operating environment free from government surveillance.69 Al-
Qaeda seems to have encountered similar challenges even in near-ideal 
conditions under the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although bin Laden 
enjoyed complete security, ﬁnancial resources, and access to expertise, 
there is no evidence that he succeeded in fabricating a biological or 
chemical weapon, let alone a nuclear device.70
Again, this is not to say that bin Laden or the broader jihadist 
movement he spearheaded does not remain committed to acquiring 
CBRN devices, despite the hurdles involved. Terrorists, according to 
the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, are “doing 
everything they can” to obtain materials to build CBRN.71 In congres-
sional testimony in February 2004, George C. Tenet, then director 
of central intelligence, announced an “increase in the threat of more 
sophisticated CBRN” and highlighted al-Qaeda’s continued quest for 
chemical weapons, anthrax, and nuclear devices.72 Al-Qaeda’s contin-
ued interest in CBRN was conﬁrmed by the January 2003 ricin ﬁnds 
in London.73
69 Rosenau (2001).
70 For more on al-Qaeda’s eﬀorts to acquire a nuclear device, see Daly, Parachini, and 
Rosenau (2005).
71 Quoted in Steven Gutkin, “U.S. Terror Expert Warns of Dirty Bomb,” Associated Press, 
February 8, 2004. 
72 George C. Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat: Testimony of Director of Central Intelli-
gence George C. Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” Febru-
ary 24, 2004, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_aﬀairs/speeches/2004/dci_speech_02142004.
html (as of April 3, 2006). 
73 John Steele and Philip Johnson, “Ricin Terror Flat Was Rented for Asylum Seekers,” 
Daily Telegraph (London), January 9, 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?
xml=%2Fnews%2F2003%2F01%2F09%2Fnrici09.xml (as of February 16, 2006).
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MANPADS Acquisition
Al-Qaeda remains resolute in its desire to continue to attack American 
commercial aircraft both inside the United States and abroad. The use 
of commercial airliners in the September 11 attacks underscored for 
al-Qaeda that American airliners are vulnerable both to a hostile take-
over and to ﬁnancial ruin in the wake of a terrorist attack, although 
increased security measures have made it increasingly diﬃcult for ter-
rorists to bring weaponry on board and to gain access to the cockpit. 
In short, September 11 taught al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates that attack-
ing U.S. airliners directly or using them in a terrorist operation is an 
eﬀective way of killing many of Americans and inﬂicting signiﬁcant 
economic damage on the United States. 
MANPADS remain an attractive tool for al-Qaeda and its aﬃli-
ates to use in their operations. In fact, al-Qaeda has used MANPADS 
twice since 9/11, but both attempts to hit the intended target failed. In 
May 2002, al-Qaeda operatives tried to shoot down a U.S. military air-
craft in Saudi Arabia using a shoulder-ﬁred missile, but it either did not 
ﬁre or misﬁred.74 In November 2002, al-Qaeda terrorists launched two 
shoulder-ﬁred SA-7 Strela-2Ms at an Israeli charter aircraft in Mombasa, 
Kenya, missing the target probably because the plane was already out 
of range for the missiles to lock onto the airplane’s engines.75
In February 2003, British military forces surrounded Heathrow 
Airport for three days over concerns that jihadist militants were going 
to shoot down an aircraft there using MANPADS.76 According to 
British counterterrorist authorities,77 initial reports appeared to indi-
cate that the jihadists had succeeded in importing via Dover or another 
port on the English Channel as many as nine SA-7 Strela surface-to-air 
74 “FBI Warns Portable Missiles a Threat,” CNN.com, May 31, 2002, http://www.cnn.
com/2002/US/05/31/terror.threat/ (as of February 16, 2006).
75 Kuhn (2003).
76 An extensive discussion of this threat can be found at “SAMs—The Unresolved Air 
Security Threat,” http://www.thetravelinsider.info/2002/1206.htm (as of February 16, 
2006).
77 O’Brien’s interviews with senior UK counterterrorist oﬃcials, London, May 2004 and 
September 2005.
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missile (SAM) launchers, but subsequent investigations and interviews 
determined that this information was false, although there had been 
suﬃcient intelligence-led concerns surrounding such a plot to merit the 
strong reaction at Heathrow. Six men were arrested at the time as a pre-
cautionary measure but were subsequently released without charge. It 
remains unclear whether this possible attack was the one Khaled Sheikh 
Mohammad reported that bin Laden had ordered against Heathrow 
soon after 9/11 to “punish Tony Blair . . . his principal enemy.” Khaled 
Sheikh Mohammad reportedly told his interrogators that he gave an 
al-Qaeda team money to undertake surveillance of Heathrow, “assess-
ing its weak points and ﬁnding locations from which planes might be 
shot down.” The actual Heathrow operation would have taken place 
more than a year after this directive was allegedly issued by bin Laden. 
Khaled Sheikh Mohammad claimed that the operation he knew of 
“never advanced beyond surveillance” and blamed communications 
interruptions following the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban.78
The proliferation of MANPADS throughout the world—there 
are reportedly 150,000 in circulation—makes it more likely that an 
increasing number of terrorist groups and individuals will take pos-
session of these weapons and incorporate them into their attack plan-
ning.79 Some estimates indicate that at least 100 Stinger missiles are 
still circulating in Afghanistan and thousands are missing in Iraq that 
terrorists could obtain and smuggle out of the country for use in a 
planned attack.80 For the terrorists, the only drawback to the use of 
these weapons—as demonstrated by the examples above—is that the 
older models are not always reliable. In fact, recent estimates show that 
78 Christina Lamb, “Al-Qaeda Leader Says: Heathrow Our Target,” Sunday Times (London) 
March 28, 2004.
79 As of August 2003, 27 terrorist groups reportedly possessed MANPADS. Fred Bayles, 
“Threat Is ‘No Longer Theoretical,’” USA Today, August 13, 2003.
80 “JTIC Exclusive: Proliferation of MANPADS and the Threat to Civil Aviation,” Jane’s 
Terrorism and Insurgency Center, August 13, 2003, http://www.janes.com/security
international_security/news/jtic/jtic030813_1_n.shtml (as of April 3, 2006). 
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the Strela-2 in particular has a low probability of kill.81 Al-Qaeda is an 
organization that places a high value on carrying out successful opera-
tions. Failed attacks only undercut its mission and can even result in 
declining recruitment and a perception that it is a weakened and inef-
fective organization. 
The good news is that until now an assumption can be made 
that al-Qaeda possesses only older MANPADS, since the group surely 
would have used a more eﬀective missile in its operations if it had one 
in order to ensure its success. As a result, al-Qaeda may shy away from 
using older models such as the SA-7 and the Stinger missile in the 
future. These earlier failures could also have been as a result of human 
error, but MANPADS in general are relatively easy to use and many 
terrorists trained in Afghanistan or who have fought in insurgent con-
ﬂicts are well-trained in their use.82 In fact, al-Qaeda has reportedly 
been training its members in the use of MANPADS for the last three 
years. An al-Qaeda video was recovered in 2001 that detailed how to 
assemble and use a Strela-2 system.83
However, al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates are more likely to seek out 
newer, more reliable MANPADS that have a higher success rate, such 
as the SA-18. These weapons are more expensive than their earlier coun-
terparts and can cost up to $100,000 each on the open market for the 
most advanced systems.84 Although there are fewer of these weapons 
on the black market, simply because they have not been around as long 
as their earlier counterparts, they are in circulation and have been used 
by terrorist groups that have an ongoing relationship with al-Qaeda. 
Moreover, some reports indicate the U.S. military has observed more 
sophisticated MANPADS than the SA-7 and Strela-2 in circulation 
81 Robert Wall, “Hardening Resolve,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 23–30, 
2004. 
82 The CIA had diﬃculty teaching some of the illiterate Afghan mujahideen how to operate a 
Stinger missile during the Afghan-Soviet war; “JTIC Exclusive: Proliferation of MANPADS 
and the Threat to Civil Aviation.”
83 “JTIC Exclusive.”
84 The SA-7 can cost as little as $5,000, according to Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency 
Center, 2003.
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in Iraq.85 In August 2003, FBI agents arrested a British arms dealer 
who—after praising bin Laden—tried to sell al-Qaeda an SA-18 and 
implied that it could be used against a commercial airliner.86 Chechen 
extremists have used the SA-18s to shoot down Russian helicopters and 
could theoretically sell one to al-Qaeda for the right price.87 While ter-
rorists will continue to seek out these types of weapons to use against 
U.S. and other Western airliners, researchers in the United States and 
other countries are looking for ways to harden the defenses of commer-
cial airliners against the MANPADS threat—by ﬁrst examining the 
vulnerabilities of these aircraft, focusing in on the eﬀects a MANPAD 
hit would have on engine operation and safety of ﬂight, and then apply-
ing a series of countermeasures.88
Recruitment of Western Converts
Recent converts to Islam are an increasingly attractive subset of poten-
tial recruits for al-Qaeda, particularly in Europe and the United States. 
Although the majority of Muslim converts reject the extremist world-
view, a small but growing number have been involved in terrorist attacks 
against the West. According to one source, out of 212 individuals who 
have been implicated in terrorist attacks since 1993, 18 (8.5 percent) 
were converts to Islam.89
Although U.S. converts to Islam arrested for their involvement 
with al-Qaeda, such as Jose Padilla and Adam Yahiya Gadahn, have 
received a signiﬁcant amount of press and sparked a broader discus-
sion about the nature of al-Qaeda recruitment in the United States, 
some scholars argue that European converts to Islam warrant more 
concern.90 Islam is Europe’s fastest growing religion and many experts 
note an increase in the number of converts after 9/11, although there 
85 Wall, “Hardening Resolve.”
86 Samson (2003).
87 Bayles, “Threat Is ‘No Longer Theoretical.’” 
88 Wall, “Hardening Resolve.”
89 Leiken (2004).
90 Leiken (2004). 
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are no reliable statistics to provide solid evidence of this trend.91 The 
increasing concern over the susceptibility of Europe’s converts to jihad-
ist recruitment is in part a rise in the number of “protest converts,” or 
angry, disaﬀected, rebellious youth searching for an outlet or cause. 
Members of this small group of converts are the most likely to ﬁnd 
their way into a terrorist organization like al-Qaeda that oﬀers adven-
ture, danger, and a way to prove their commitment to the cause.92 A 
senior French security oﬃcial said recently that converts were his orga-
nization’s “most critical work now.”93
For example, brothers David and Jerome Courtailler both con-
verted to Islam to escape a troubled childhood and drug addiction in 
the French countryside. Both came to Islam after befriending radical 
Muslims who had terrorist connections. Shortly after David’s conver-
sion in 1996, recruiters in his prayer group told him they were send-
ing him to Afghanistan to “study the Quran” and gave him money, 
a contact number, and a plane ticket to Pakistan. After he arrived in 
Pakistan, David was quickly taken by car to al-Qaeda’s Khaldan train-
ing camp in Khost, Afghanistan, where he trained in bomb making. 
Jerome converted to Islam under the inﬂuence of al-Qaeda member 
Djamel Beghal, who was heading a terrorist cell planning an attack 
against the U.S. embassy in Paris. David returned to England in 2000 
and was believed to be helping a terrorist cell to plan a large-scale 
bombing. He was arrested after 9/11 with a large cache of explosives. 
Jerome was also arrested shortly after 9/11 in connection with the ter-
rorist plot against the embassy in Paris. He is believed to have been 
the source of the fake Belgian passports used by the suicide bombers 
who killed Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud on 
September 10, 2001.94
91 Craig G. Smith, “Europe Fears Converts May Aid Extremism,” The New York Times, July 
19, 2004.
92 Chuck Colson, “Al Qaeda and Converts to Islam,” Townhall.com, April 28, 2004, http://
www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/chuckcolson/2004/04/28/11522.html (as of February 
17, 2006).
93 Leiken (2004).
94 Smith, “Europe Fears . . . . ”
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The example of the Courtailler brothers illustrates that the path 
from conversion to terrorism, especially for those considered “protest 
converts,” can be exceedingly short. One of the key reasons is that 
many converts—particularly those from Europe and the United 
States—know little about Islam when they are ﬁrst introduced to the 
religion and therefore are more likely to accept the perspective and 
interpretation they are taught.95 Unlike Muslim converts in South Asia 
or the Middle East, they lack the cultural context to be able to ﬁlter out 
extremist rhetoric. In addition, many converts become educated about 
Islam not only through the the individuals they meet but by surﬁng 
the Internet. The proliferation of Islamic extremist Web sites designed 
to attract new recruits—particularly protest converts like Adam Yahiya 
Gadahn—helps guide these individuals into accepting and taking on 
the extremist worldview.96
It is important to note, however, that although there are many 
ways for new converts to become exposed to radical Islam—for exam-
ple, through the Internet or through personal relationships with indi-
vidual Muslims who subscribe to the jihadist worldview—many con-
verts are self-selected for radical groups like al-Qaeda rather than being 
directly enlisted into these groups by a so-called al-Qaeda recruiter. 
According to Marc Sageman, 
The process of joining the jihad . . . is more of a bottom-up than 
a top-down activity. . . . Joining the jihad is more akin to the pro-
cess of applying to a highly selective college. Many try to get in 
but only a few succeed, and the college’s role is evaluation rather 
than marketing.97
Al-Qaeda ﬁnds converts particularly attractive because they can 
travel more easily and operate undetected by local security services, 
particularly in their countries of origin. In the past, al-Qaeda used 
95 Smith, “Europe Fears . . . . ”
96 Robert Spencer, “The New Face of Al-Qaeda,” FrontPageMagazine.com, June 1, 2004, 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=13591 (as of February 17, 
2006).
97 Sageman (2004), p. 122. 
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converts more for logistical support, but as the United States and its 
allies in the war on terror began to identify and arrest Arab and South 
Asia members of al-Qaeda, the group began using Caucasian-looking 
Europeans and, in some cases, Americans to actually execute opera-
tional plans because they were more likely to be unknown to police 
and intelligence services.98 Moreover, Europeans can travel to the 
United States without having to obtain visas.99 Former al-Qaeda opera-
tions chief, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, now in a U.S. secure facility, 
has admitted to employing both European and American converts and 
using them not only in operations but as intermediaries to protect his 
identity.100
Al-Qaeda is ﬁnding these ready-to-use converts in European and, 
to a somewhat lesser extent, American prisons. The Islamic popula-
tion in Europe’s prisons is growing; France’s prison population, for 
example, is more than 50 percent Muslim.101 Shoe bomber Richard 
Reid converted to Islam in prison and was put in contact with radical 
Muslims once he was released. The Islamic missionary organization 
Tablighi Jama’at also serves as a pathway to jihad by sending converts 
to study in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where they often make contact 
with militants. Al-Qaeda also uses recruiters to spot converts in like-
minded militant organizations and radical mosques in Europe.102 The 
Muslim Council of Britain, in an attempt to counteract this trend, 
issued a warning to 1,000 mosques to be on the lookout for individuals 
who seek to inﬁltrate mosques and turn young men into fanatics.103
Evidence that al-Qaeda is continuing to put converts in positions 
of increasing importance is illustrated by the arrest in Britain in August 
2004 of Muslim convert Esa al-Hindi (an ethnic Indian, his real name 
98 Sageman (2004), p. 122. 
99 Colson, “Al Qaeda and Converts . . . .”
100Leiken (2004); Daniel Klaidman, Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoﬀ, and Evan Thomas, 
“Al Qaeda in America: The Enemy Within,” Newsweek, June 17, 2003.
101Smith, “Europe Fears . . . . ”
102Smith, “Europe Fears . . . . ”
103Leiken (2004).
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is Dhiren Barot). Intelligence oﬃcials identiﬁed al-Hindi as a major 
al-Qaeda player who transferred operational information between 
Britain, Pakistan, and the United States. Al-Hindi was believed to have 
conducted detailed surveillance of high-value economic targets inside 
the United States in anticipation of a spectacular terrorist attack prior 
to the U.S. presidential elections in November 2004.104 Other converts 
arrested for terrorist activities include French citizen Pierre Robert, the 
mastermind of the May 2003 bombings in Casablanca, and Christian 
Ganczarski, a German involved in the 2002 attack at the Djerba syna-
gogue in Tunis.105
104“Pakistan Intelligence May Be Driving Arrests,” CNN.com, August 6, 2004, http://
www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/08/05/terror.wrap/ (as of February 17, 2006).






Resource Structures and Networks
Given the ﬁnancial war on terrorism conducted by the United States 
and the international community, al-Qaeda’s resource structures and 
networks have changed. Al-Qaeda has hardened still existing sources 
of funds, developed new sources of ﬁnancing, further diversiﬁed its 
resource base, moved an even larger amount of transactions through 
the informal hawala system, and increased its dependence on nonmon-
etary barter transactions. For example, it now goes through a much 
more sophisticated process when soliciting funds via the Internet. 
Rather than just publishing Web sites that openly solicit money and 
resources, al-Qaeda inﬁltrates legitimate charitable organizations and 
asks for money through the Web; engages in online fraud, identity 
theft, and other Internet crimes; and then uses those proceeds to fund 
their activities. 
In its fundraising, al-Qaeda uses various security measures, such 
as “anonymisers” that replace the IP address assigned by an Internet 
service provider with an “anonymiser” address that cannot be tracked.1
Additionally, illegitimate organizations posing as charities and non-
governmental organizations are reopening oﬃces—virtual or real—
after having been targeted and shut down by the United States and its 
allies.2 Simply opening an oﬃce in Pakistan, where the government 
1 Josh Lefkowitz and Lorenzo Vidino, “Joining Al Qaeda,” The Wall Street Journal, August 
29, 2003, p. 61.
2 Roth, Greenburg, and Wille (2004), pp. 119–120.
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is reluctant to crack down further on Islamic radicalism, still allows 
these “charities” to operate and provide some funds to terrorist orga-
nizations. Indeed, extremist leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, 
accused by the United States of having substantial ties to al-Qaeda, 
operates his anti-U.S. group openly in Peshawar. The back cover of the 
December 2003 magazine his organization publishes sports a full-page 
advertisement admonishing Muslims who cannot, for whatever reason, 
participate in the jihad in Iraq to give money to send to individuals 
who are ﬁghting there.3
In addition to hardening still-existing sources of income and fur-
ther diversifying terrorists’ ﬁnancial base, an additional trend in ter-
rorist fundraising is emerging—money is being raised increasingly at 
the grassroots level of support, rather than largely from wealthy donors 
and/or organizations.4 While wealthy Gulf State organizations and 
individuals still provide a substantial amount of al-Qaeda’s funding, 
this ﬁnancial support is being supplemented by larger numbers of small 
donations throughout the Muslim world. This trend parallels a longer-
term trend in terrorist ﬁnancing.5
Al-Qaeda has also modiﬁed the way it transmits funds around the 
globe. Before September 11, many ﬁnancial institutions were believed 
to have transferred millions of dollars of al-Qaeda’s money, wittingly 
or otherwise. The Bank Secrecy Act requires U.S. ﬁnancial institutions 
to ﬁle Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) on transactions above 
$10,000; however, with literally millions of such transactions occur-
ring every year, the act did little to deter the terrorists from using such 
methods. Often the transfers were made to students (as many of the 
9/11 hijackers were), which would be expected—students must pay for 
tuition and living expenses, etc. Disguising the transfers thus essentially 
3 Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi, “Militant Flourishes in Plain Sight,” The Los Angeles 
Times, January 25, 2004, p. A.1. Of note, Khalil was reportedly arrested sometime during 
summer 2004 after being linked to additional assassination attempts against Prime Minister 
Musharaf.
4 Interview with Dan Benjamin, terrorism analyst at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., February 5, 2004. 
5 Kiser (2005).
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invalidated the value of the CTRs. However, now that such transac-
tions involve greater scrutiny and other policies are in place to prevent 
legal transmission of terrorist funds, terrorists are increasingly using 
the informal hawala transaction system. Additionally, they are increas-
ingly using “mules”—couriers who physically carry large quantities of 
cash, gemstones, or other valuables to various parts of the globe.
Future Financial Prospects
Evidence suggests that al-Qaeda still can and may be willing to expand 
even further into the criminal world to raise money. The UN estimated 
the value of the global illicit drug market for 2003 at $13 billion at the 
production level, $94 billion at the wholesale level, and $322 billion at 
the retail level.6 A comparison with even the most generous estimates 
of al-Qaeda’s ﬁnancing—approximately $1 billion per year—suggests 
that terrorist ﬁnancing is simply dwarfed by drug money. While some 
evidence exists that points to al-Qaeda involvement in the poppy and 
opium trade in Afghanistan, there is no information suggesting it is 
involved in any other lucrative drug markets, such as the cocaine mar-
kets in South America or the drug markets in the Golden Triangle. 
Whether or not al-Qaeda would be able to enter these markets is a sep-
arate discussion, but it illustrates the idea that there are areas to which 
al-Qaeda could turn to supplement its income. Furthermore, al-Qaeda 
could simply adopt some of the creative money-raising schemes used 
by other Islamic terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah (see 
Chapter Seven of the companion volume on the links between terrorist 
groups and transnational criminal networks).
Clearly, there is no shortage of alternatives available to al-Qaeda. 
The organization is constrained largely by the limits of its own imagi-
nation. Many fundraising criminal activities exist to which al-Qaeda 
could turn if it wants. Moving its ﬁnance-generating activities away 
6 United Nations, Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2005, Chapter 2, 
“Estimating the Value of Illicit Drug Markets,” http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/
volume_1_ex_summary.pdf (as of April 3, 2006). Note that the retail value of drugs inter-
cepted at the U.S. border ranged between $1 billion and $2 billion annually in the 1990s.
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from a reliance on donations to criminal activity will have some con-
sequences on the group, although it is diﬃcult to forecast exactly what 
those consequences would be. Additionally, transferring wealth to vari-
ous parts of the world may prove to be a greater challenge, but coming 
up with suitable alternatives is by no means impossible.
These changes in both raising and moving funds create interest-
ing ﬁnancial dynamics. Large sums of money are more visible in both 
collection and transmission, and therefore more vulnerable. Al-Qaeda 
has responded by diﬀusing both activities—raising larger numbers of 
small donations from an increasing number of sources, while simulta-
neously moving money around in a greater variety of ways. Another 
interesting dynamic is that U.S. expertise in targeting ﬁnancial trans-
fers lies more with transfers between political borders than it does 
within them.7 In other words, the risks to terrorists when collecting 
and transferring money within a country are substantially less than 
when moving money outside a country. 
These dynamics are beginning to shape terrorist activity. Although 
there are few signs of a reduction in terrorist activity and operations 
overall (indeed, after September 11 the pace of al-Qaeda attacks has 
accelerated), the attacks are certainly diﬀerent. Rather than large, spec-
tacular, internationally orchestrated attacks, the attacks (with the excep-
tion of the Bali and Madrid bombings) have been smaller and local, 
and they appear to have greater autonomy from al-Qaeda’s center. This 
could be explained by the ﬁnancial dynamics described above. With 
more local fundraising eﬀorts and greater restraints on international 
money transfers, a “ceiling” may have been established under which 
terrorist funds may begin to pool. Local al-Qaeda aﬃliates may now 
ﬁnd themselves both ﬁnancially enabled and possibly encouraged to 
make operational decisions on their own. Collecting their own money 
but unable to forward it to the larger organization, coupled with receiv-
ing no money and little guidance from above, creates a situation in 
which local commanders will be increasingly likely to act on their own. 
At the same time, large, September 11–like attacks are less likely.
7 Interview with Chris Verbeek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 11, 2004. 
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Empirical evidence provides some support for this idea. Attacks 
in Morocco, Kenya, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Saudi 
Arabia appear to be the work of local radicals.8 They reﬂect less of the 
planning acumen, strategic vision, or sophistication than that charac-
terized by the attacks against the U.S. embassies in Africa, the attack 
on the USS Cole, or the coordinated attacks against the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon. Further, evidence suggests that many of these 
attacks were funded locally as well—suggesting that al-Qaeda’s center 
and periphery are not transmitting money in either direction.9
Another way in which ﬁnancial dynamics shape terrorist activities 
is best explained through a comparison of ﬁxed and marginal costs. 
When al-Qaeda’s leaders were welcome guests in other countries (the 
Sudan and then Afghanistan) they had easy sanctuary—but it came 
at a cost. The 9/11 Commission suggests that al-Qaeda was paying the 
Taliban approximately $20 million a year; as previously mentioned, 
bin Laden himself stated he lost nearly $150 million in the Sudan. In 
exchange for these large ﬁxed costs, al-Qaeda had sanctuary and could 
aﬀord to operate openly. In Afghanistan, terrorist training camps oper-
ated at a near hectic pace, churning out as many as 70,000 graduates 
in the space of ﬁve years. From this sanctuary, al-Qaeda’s senior leader-
ship could concentrate all its eﬀorts on growing the organization and 
planning operations. Without this sanctuary, the majority of terrorist 
attacks conducted by al-Qaeda would at least have been more diﬃcult, 
if not prohibitively so.
After paying these ﬁxed costs, al-Qaeda could then plan and con-
duct spectacular terrorist attacks, like the ones in Africa, Yemen, and 
8 Susan Schmidt and Douglas Farrah, “Al Qaeda’s New Leaders: Six Militants from Ranks 
to Fill Void,” The Washington Post, October 29, 2002, http://meadev.nic.in/ind-ter/for-med/
AlQaedaNewLeaders.htm (as of June 16, 2004). See also Jack Kelly, “Al Qaeda Smaller, 
Fragmented, but Still Deadly,” USA Today, September 9, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/world/2002-09-09-1acover_x.htm (as of 27 June 2004).
9 Schmidt and Farrah, “Al Qaeda’s New Leaders . . . .” For example, the March 11, 2004, train 
bombings in Madrid were apparently completely locally funded, largely through the rather 
autonomous cell’s sale of narcotics. See Al Goodman, “Spain: Terror Cell ‘Neutralized,’” 
CNN.com, March 14, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/04/14/spain.
terror/index.html (as of June 29, 2004).
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the United States. The ﬁgures often quoted for these attacks—$50,000 
to bomb the USS Cole, $500,000 for the September 11 attacks—
represent marginal costs. Without the sanctuary in Afghanistan, the 
marginal cost of the September 11 attacks would have been far greater 
than the half million dollars so claimed, if the attack had been possible 
at all.
The point of this discussion is that there is a synergy between 
sanctuary and ﬁnances. Sanctuary substantially increased al-Qaeda’s 
ﬁnancial requirements, but that safe haven lowered overall needs of 
covertness, eased command and control, enabled extensive training 
and planning, and generally allowed terrorist groups to operate at a far 
lower marginal cost per attack. When a terrorist organization must be 
covert, its eﬃciency decreases substantially, training cadres becomes 
more laborious, and the marginal costs of achieving the same level 
of operational capability are much higher. On the other hand, even 
though terrorist organizations may maintain marginal costs of train-
ing and operations, without sanctuary they will get a much lower-
quality cadre. To illustrate, the video released by al-Qaeda on February 
4, 2004, shows current recruits ﬁring AK-47s in someone’s backyard 
in Saudi Arabia10—far cheaper than sending someone through a three-
month training camp in Afghanistan, but also a much less eﬀective 
training regimen that is not likely to produce operators nearly as skilled 
as those trained in Afghanistan.
In sum, al-Qaeda’s ﬁnancial infrastructure has proven quite resil-
ient. There is scant evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda’s ﬁnance com-
mittee is still directing the collection and dissemination of funds. 
However, recruiting, training, and operations continue. The trade-oﬀ 
is fairly clear: The new localized nature of ﬁnancing is enough to sup-
port operations, but it is clearly not as eﬃcient as the earlier “business 
model.” While authorities have eﬀectively targeted large donors and 
obvious transmission mechanisms, successfully targeting a grassroots 
ﬁnancing system will prove more challenging.
10 Al Qaeda’s Sahab Institute for Media Production released a video entitled “Badr al-
Riyadh: The Assault on the Crusader al-Muhaya Settlement and Discovering Important 
Details,” analyzed and translated by Intel Center, Alexandria, Virginia, February 2004.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Al-Qaeda’s Operational Planning Cycle
Al-Qaeda’s operational planning cycle, deﬁned as the steps involved 
in planning and executing a terrorist attack, is constantly evolving—
much like the organization itself. As al-Qaeda morphs and changes 
organizationally to adjust to arrests and disruption of planned attacks, 
so does its operational style. Before the 9/11 attacks, when al-Qaeda 
was composed largely of a small hard core of senior and mid-level lead-
ers in Afghanistan responsible for overseeing most of the group’s terror-
ist plans, al-Qaeda favored “spectacular” attacks against primarily U.S. 
“hard” targets, such as diplomatic and military facilities abroad. These 
operations—which include the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya 
and Tanzania and the 2000 USS Cole attack—took years to plan and 
involved selecting the right recruits to execute the attack and ensuring 
that they were properly trained, indoctrinated, and sworn and trusted 
members of al-Qaeda. The cell leader responsible for the attack would 
then help the recruits to establish themselves in the community where 
the attack was to take place, making sure that they had regular jobs, 
that they “blended in,” and that their daily routine was nothing out 
of the ordinary so that they would not raise suspicion. Recruits would 
even marry local women and live “regular” lives free from terrorist 
activity—sometimes for up to two years—to solidify their place in the 
community and avoid detection by police and intelligence oﬃcials. 
Once operational planning began, the recruits would conduct 
meticulous casing and surveillance of the target set, in some cases build 
the bomb to be used in the operation, travel as necessary to obtain 
other materials for the attack and to meet with others involved in the 
planning, arrange such logistical details as obtaining the attack vehicle, 
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and do a trial run of the operation if necessary. According to the oﬃcial 
investigation into the dual bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania, al-Qaeda took ﬁve years from conception to execution 
to complete the attacks in August 1998. Bin Laden sent his trusted 
aide, Wadi al-Hage, to Kenya in 1993 to conduct initial surveillance on 
the U.S. embassy and other Western targets. Moreover, the East Africa 
investigation also revealed that the creation of surveillance reports was 
often the ﬁrst step in al-Qaeda’s operational planning cycle. Months 
and years would pass before the attack would be carried out.1
Similarly, the USS Cole plot took four years to complete. This 
“spectacular attack” diﬀered from the 1998 East Africa operation in 
that the plan was conceived in 1996 by an al-Qaeda member visiting 
Yemen, rather than by bin Laden and his senior leaders in Afghanistan. 
This al-Qaeda member noticed that American warships came in and 
out of Yemeni waters. But operational planning in this case did not 
begin until 1998, when scouts were dispatched to ﬁnd suitable war-
ships to target. In January 2000, al-Qaeda attempted an attack against 
the USS The Sullivans using a small craft similar to the one later used 
in the Cole operation. However, the boat sank before it reached its 
target and the operation went unnoticed. In October 2000, al-Qaeda 
attacked the Cole using the same methods.2
The September 11 attacks took only two years to plan once the 
attack was conceived but was based on an earlier plot. That operation 
failed after only a few short months but involved the same meticu-
lous planning.3 The September 11 plot originated in 1999 with senior 
al-Qaeda operative Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, who discussed the 
concept with bin Laden and his operational chief Mohammed Atef. 
Bin Laden and Atef revised the plan to include hitting targets such 
as the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, the White House, and the World 
1 “Badr al-Riyadh: The Assault on the Crusader al-Muhaya Settlement and Discovering 
Important Details,” analyzed and translated by Intel Center, Alexandria, Virginia, February 
2004 (Video).
2 “Badr al-Riyadh . . . .”
3 “Badr al-Riyadh . . . .”
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Trade Center.4 The hijackers were selected and sent for training in 
Afghanistan later that year, and two of the lead operatives arrived in 
the United States in 2000 and engaged in ﬂight training and other 
attack preparations. However, during the hijackers’ time in the United 
States, their actions did not raise the suspicion of the authorities. They 
blended into the American cultural landscape by dressing in Western 
attire, frequenting bars, and generally keeping to themselves.5
Although the United States was unable to prevent these particular 
attacks from occurring, it did thwart others based on lessons learned 
about al-Qaeda’s operational patterns following each attack through 
observation, intelligence gathered from arrested operatives, and docu-
ments recovered by local authorities. Several notable hallmarks of an 
al-Qaeda attack emerged in the period leading up to September 11. 
The ﬁrst was that al-Qaeda prefers to kill large numbers of Americans 
or Westerners by executing a “spectacular” attack. Because success is 
a must, detailed planning must take place. One operative arrested in 
Pakistan said that when conducting surveillance of a particular room, 
he was trained to note every detail in that room: the color of the walls, 
the dimensions, the doors, windows, etc. A second lesson was that al-
Qaeda exhibited great patience in its operational planning. Al-Qaeda 
operatives could take years to plan an attack because it was important 
to make sure every detail was in place. A third lesson was that because 
attack plans took years to unfold, al-Qaeda would proceed with mul-
tiple operations at the same time, also ensuring that, if one plot was 
disrupted by authorities, the group could simply select another target 
without compromising the work it had done or could execute another 
plan already in place. 
4 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), p. 155.
5 Mitch Lipka, “Multiple Identities of Hijack Suspects Confound FBI,” South Florida Sun-
Sentinel, September 28, 2001.
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Post-9/11 Planning Trends
The U.S.-led global war on terrorism has forced changes in the way 
al-Qaeda operates, primarily because the majority of those conducting 
terrorist attacks since September 11 are not sworn al-Qaeda members 
but rather are aﬃliated with al-Qaeda to varying degrees or simply 
share al-Qaeda’s world view and have tried to emulate its operational 
style. As a result, the trademark simultaneous vehicle bomb explosions 
against multiple U.S. or Western targets that have come to be associ-
ated with al-Qaeda are being repeated in these operations, even though 
they are not all planned by al-Qaeda’s hard core. In some cases, such 
as the May 2003 attacks against soft targets in Morocco, terrorist lead-
ers with al-Qaeda connections who trained in Afghanistan were the 
organizers. 
One major change in these “franchised” terrorist attacks is 
that the planning cycle appears to have shortened. For example, the 
October 2002 attacks in Bali, Indonesia, that killed over 200 in two 
simultaneous nightclub bombings were perpetrated by al-Qaeda aﬃli-
ate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The time frame from conception of these 
plans to execution was only eight months. Senior JI operative Hambali, 
a close associate of bin Laden, came up with the idea for the Bali opera-
tion in February 2002; and between April and October the operatives 
responsible for carrying out the attacks implemented the plans.6 One 
of the reasons for the shortened attack time frame is that after 9/11 
it has become more diﬃcult for al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates to attack 
hardened targets due to the increase in security. Therefore, the group is 
turning to softer targets that are easier to hit because they are plentiful 
and security is often not a signiﬁcant concern. Islamic extremists who 
support al-Qaeda’s worldview are also under increased scrutiny from 
police and intelligence services worldwide and, as a result, may have 
shortened their planning cycle to avoid detection and disruption of 
their operational plans.
6 “Bali Chronology, Cause and Eﬀect: Terrorism in the Asia Paciﬁc Region,” Austra-
lia Broadcasting Corporation Asia Paciﬁc, http://abcasiapaciﬁc.com/cause/network/bali_
chronology.htm (as of February 17, 2006). 
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Al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates also appear in some cases to time their 
operational plans to have a speciﬁc political impact. The Madrid train 
bombings in March 2004 appear to have been designed to disrupt the 
impending Spanish elections and force Spain to withdraw its troops 
from Iraq, according to a document retrieved from a jihadist Web 
site on the day of the attacks by the Norwegian defense think tank 
Forsvarets Forskningstitutt.7 Although al-Qaeda’s actions alone did 
not determine the outcome of the election in Spain, both the emo-
tion surrounding how the incumbent Spanish government handled 
the investigation into the attack and the unpopularity of the war in 
Iraq in Spain did inﬂuence Spanish voters. The Spanish people chose 
a Socialist government that pledged to pull all Spanish troops out of 
Iraq. Al-Qaeda believed that its tactic to inﬂuence the outcome of the 
elections was successful. 
Despite these notable changes and the overarching challenge of 
identifying the operational planning cycles of a wide range of terrorist 
aﬃliates with varying degrees of training and connections to al-Qaeda, 
information developed from the August 2004 arrests in Pakistan has 
revealed that some segments of al-Qaeda are still operating the old-
fashioned way, using long-range, detailed planning that can take years 
to execute. U.S. and Pakistani intelligence acquired a number of com-
puter disks from one of the senior al-Qaeda operatives that included 
dozens of detailed surveillance reports of multiple, economic targets 
in the United States, such as the World Bank and the New York Stock 
Exchange.8 This new intelligence provided an unprecedented look into 
how al-Qaeda operates, how detailed and speciﬁc its plans are, and 
how far in advance the group prepares. The surveillance reports were 
7 This document was prepared by the Media Committee for Victory of the Iraqi People 
and was entitled “Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers.” The document was analyzed by Haizam 
Amirah Fernández of the Real Instituto Elcano of Madrid, “¿Tiene Al Qaeda una strategia 
global?” April 20, 2004, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/materiales.asp (as of February 
17, 2006). Spanish analysts generally accept the view that the Madrid bombings had a stra-
tegic purpose that was successfully accomplished (Rabasa discussions with Spanish security 
analysts, Madrid, September 2005).
8 Salman Massood and David Rohde, “Pakistan Arrests Suspects in Bombings of U.S. 
Embassies,” The New York Times, July 29, 2004.
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reportedly prepared in 2000 and 2001, but if they are indeed tied to 
recent al-Qaeda planning in the United States, the attacks will have 
been conceived three to four years in advance, a time frame consistent 
with al-Qaeda’s operational planning cycle.9
Iraq in al-Qaeda’s Strategic Agenda
How does the insurgency in Iraq ﬁt into al-Qaeda’s strategic agenda? 
Bin Laden clearly sees the country as an important arena for confron-
tation between Islam and its supposed enemy, the United States and 
its allies. According to one pro–al-Qaeda publication, the besieged 
state is a “front that we want to utilize for ﬁghting the Americans, like 
the other fronts [of jihad].”10 With the Taliban regime removed from 
power, Iraq is viewed as a potential new Afghanistan, a rallying point 
for Islamic militants from the Middle East, North Africa, Western 
Europe, and other regions. 
The ongoing Iraqi insurgency serves al-Qaeda’s interests in four 
complementary ways. First, as a rallying point it functions as an instru-
ment for remobilizing dormant jihadists and for recruiting new mili-
tants to the cause.11 Second, U.S. and coalition forces that might oth-
erwise be engaged in counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda 
are committed to dampening the Iraqi insurgency (although it may 
have the same eﬀect on jihadists—drawing them into Iraq when they 
could have been employed to attack U.S. and Western targets else-
where). Third, attacks on occupying forces, whether tactically success-
ful or not, can be used in propaganda to convey the familiar trope 
that the United States and its allies are vulnerable and, more impor-
9 Dan Eggan and John Lancaster, “Al Qaeda Showing New Life,” The Washington Post, 
August 14, 2004.
10 “New Al-Qa’ida Online Magazine Features Interview with a ‘Most-Wanted’ Saudi 
Islamist, Calls for Killing of Americans and Non-Muslims,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series 
No. 591, 17 October 2003, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=
jihad&ID=SP59103 (as of February 23, 2006) (bracketed material in original).
11 “French Judge: Iraq Conﬂict Helping al-Qa’ida Recruitment,” Agence France-Presse 
(North American Service), September 9, 2003, FBIS. 
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tant, that insurgents have the means and motivation to confront and 
possibly defeat the world’s mightiest powers.12 Finally, the pattern of 
insurgent attacks suggests a mindset that is very much compatible with 
one of the currents that has contributed to al-Qaeda’s approach to the 
world. Speciﬁcally, what President Bush describes as a terrorist strategy 
designed “to tear Iraq apart with ethnic violence, to undermine Iraqi 
security forces, to demoralize our coalition and to prevent the rise of 
a sovereign, democratic government” hints at a mentality that is very 
much congruent with bin Laden’s own normative conception of the 
“purposeful” use of militant aggression.13
Beginning in the summer of 2003, Saudi names began appearing 
among those of “martyrs” killed in Iraq. In November 2003, the Saudi 
opposition Web site arabianews.org, which had chronicled the deaths 
of various Saudi jihad ﬁghters in Iraq, reported the death of Adel al-
Naser from Riyadh in Bagobah, a city near Baghdad. The Web site 
observed that the number of Saudis ﬁghting in Iraq had been rising 
and that these ﬁghters were still heading to Iraq, with little scrutiny by 
Saudi authorities. American government sources have estimated that 
as many as 2,000 foreign militants may have entered the country.14
These jihadis come primarily from Saudi Arabia, other Arab coun-
tries in Iraq’s vicinity, North Africa, and Europe. Some appear to be 
well trained. Others are simply young men who left their lives in their 
respective countries and who have sought to wage a holy war against 
12 This potentially contributes to al-Qaeda’s fundraising, recruitment eﬀorts, and internal 
morale-building by suggesting that armed resistance to a force as strong as America’s is not 
an exercise in futility and that victory is possible.
13 White House, transcript of presidential radio address, February 21, 2004, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/print/20040221.html (as of February 17, 2006). For 
more on the nihilism undergirding al-Qaeda and other contemporary terrorist movements, see 
“Bin Laden, Dostoevsky and the Reality Principle: An Interview with André Glucksmann,” 
March 31, 2003, http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-2-95-1111.jsp# (as of Febru-
ary 17, 2006).
14 Richard C. Paddock, Alissa J. Rubin, and Greg Miller, “Iraq Seen as Al Qaeda’s Top 
Battleﬁeld,” The Los Angeles Times, November 9, 2003. 
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the U.S., coalition, and Iraqi government forces.15 A March 2005 study 
by Reuven Paz looks at 154 jihadists—primarily members of the al-
Zarqawi group—killed in Iraq in the previous six months. Table 5.1 
shows the breakdown, sorted by country of origin. 
Of the 154 jihadists killed, 33 carried out suicide bombings. 
Twenty-three of the suicide bombers (70 percent) were Saudis.16
Recruitment networks in Europe have been routing aspiring jihadis to 
Iraq. Milan and Florence, Italy, are two of the European nodes forre-
cruitment of these ﬁghters. In late 2003, German police acting on an 
Italian warrant arrested Abderrazak Mahdjoub, an Algerian known as 
“the Sheikh,” whom Italian prosecutors charged with running a clan-
destine network that provided money and false papers to recruits from 
Europe who wanted to go to Iraq to ﬁght. Italian police simultaneously 
arrested two men in Milan who they said belonged to the same ring.17
15 These individuals came in through a number of routes—Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan 
via Baluchistan and the Iranian cities of Zabol and Zahedan; Damascus is a hub for ﬁghters 
coming from Eurasia. Hamas and its oﬀshoot, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), provided 
shelter, food, and training. From Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Saudi Sunni tribes on the Syrian-
Iraqi border assisted the movement of ﬁghters. See Steven Stalinsky, “Arab and Muslim 
Jihad Fighters in Iraq,” MEMRI Special Report No. 19, July 27, 2003, www.memri.org/bin/
articles.cgi?Area=sr&ID=SR1903 (as of April 3, 2006).
16 Paz (2005a).
17 See Carlotta De Ciutiis, “There Are Two Al-Qa’ida Cells in Florence,” Il Giornale
(Milan, Tuscany supplement) January 20, 2004. Signiﬁcantly, the city is also home to part 
of al-Qaeda’s European network. See Sisty and Beelman (2001); Reeve (1999), p. 209; Tom 
Hundley, “Mosque Denies Link as Terror Incubator,” Chicago Tribune, Internet Edition, 
October 25, 2001.
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Table 5.1
Jihadists Killed in Iraq, October 2004–March 2005
Country Number 





Lebanon 3 (1.9%) (one was living in
   Denmark) 
Libya 2
Algeria 2











Since September 11, al-Qaeda is no longer the same organization it 
once was—a tight-knit band of extremists who had sworn bayat (alle-
giance) to bin Laden and who were operating at the behest of a small 
hard-core group of lieutenants directing attacks from the remote foot-
hills of Afghanistan. Islamic terrorism is no longer dominated by dis-
crete groups but now operates on a much more cellular level, with many 
attacks planned by terrorist operatives who have either a very loose con-
nection to al-Qaeda leaders or none at all. As a result, few groups can 
be deﬁned as “lying at the center of al-Qaeda’s universe.” Moreover, 
it is no longer exactly apparent how much beneﬁt is derived from 
making that connection, particularly since we do not have an accurate 
idea of how much command and control bin Laden possesses or how 
many resources he actually controls. What is clear, however, is that the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Algerian Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and 
Combat, and Saudi Islamic extremists have clearly and openly allied 
themselves with a worldview that the United States is seeking to dis-
credit; they are committed to conducting violent attacks against U.S. 
citizens and institutions under the auspices of that ideology.
These groups are distinct from other al-Qaeda aﬃliates in that 
they have publicly sworn allegiance to bin Laden and profess to be 
taking orders directly from al-Qaeda leaders. Extremists currently oper-
ating against U.S. and Western targets in Saudi Arabia also have clear-
cut ties to al-Qaeda but do not appear to be operating as an organized 
group at this point. Thus, they have stopped short of openly declaring 
their collective loyalty to the organization. However, individual Saudi 
extremists may have sworn bayat to bin Laden and are operating at 
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al-Qaeda’s behest. All these al-Qaeda aﬃliates are also waging local 
jihads to establish Islamic governments in their respective countries, 
although the EIJ has not been as active in this regard in recent years. 
The EIJ’s relationship with al-Qaeda perhaps paved the way for 
how other terrorist groups sought to coalesce with bin Laden’s organi-
zation. The group’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has been characterized 
by some analysts as a strategic thinker who forged a friendship with 
bin Laden while they were both in Sudan in the mid-1990s. Some 
have even said that Zawahiri radicalized bin Laden and that, in Sudan 
and later in Afghanistan, the two collaborated on a common vision of 
pursuing global jihad against “the Jews and Crusaders.”1 Al-Zawahiri 
ﬁrst announced that his group had tied its fortunes to al-Qaeda when 
bin Laden released his Khost fatwa against the United States in 1998. 
Al-Zawahiri and a handful of other Islamic terrorist groups signed the 
fatwa conﬁrming their participation in the “World Islamic Front for 
Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.”2 Al-Zawahiri continued to 
deepen his relationship with al-Qaeda over the next several years, oﬀer-
ing operatives to bin Laden not only for use in terrorist attacks, but also 
to train other jihadists in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The EIJ was 
involved in the 1998 bombings in East Africa and was responsible for 
planning a thwarted attack against the U.S. embassy in Albania that 
same year. 
Although the EIJ’s operational networks were signiﬁcantly dam-
aged by arrests following the 1998 bombings, al-Zawahiri continued 
to push for a closer relationship with al-Qaeda. This internationalist 
emphasis generated considerable opposition within the EIJ, resulting 
in al-Zawahiri’s subsequent ouster as the group’s chief in 2000.3 Al-
Zawahiri went on to become al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, although 
after a year he was once again asked to assume the helm of the EIJ. He 
1 Wright (2002).
2 Wright (2002).
3 Prominent elements within EIJ believed that formalizing links with al-Qaeda would 
result in heightened international pressure on the group, as well as dilute the overarching 
aim of overthrowing the Egyptian government and replacing it with an Islamist theocratic 
order.
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accepted the invitation and, as a condition of his return, subsumed the 
EIJ into al-Qaeda’s ranks—resulting in a merger of the two groups and 
a new name: al-Qaedat al-Jihad.4
Al-Zawahiri went on to play a key role in the planning of the 
September 11 attacks and in many ways took up the mantle as inspi-
rational leader of al-Qaeda. Although U.S. counterterrorist operations 
in Afghanistan have restricted his movements, he still routinely issues 
statements to mobilize both existing jihadists and potential recruits 
and serves in the vanguard for al-Qaeda against the United States and 
its allies.5
The Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and Combat is the only other 
organized terrorist group to date that has announced a formal relation-
ship with al-Qaeda. Perhaps modeling itself after the EIJ, the GSPC—
which has only been in existence since 1996—pledged its support for 
al-Qaeda in an oﬃcial statement issued by the group’s then leader Nabil 
Sahraoui in October 2003. The communiqué asserted that the GSPC 
was operating at the behest of and in full accordance with bin Laden 
and Taliban leader Mullah Omar.6
The GSPC maintains a signiﬁcant network of Islamic extrem-
ists in Europe, Africa, and Canada, which al-Qaeda has tapped into 
for logistical support. A case in point was the group’s involvement in a 
plot that Italian police thwarted in February 2002 to conduct a chemi-
cal attack against the U.S. embassy in Rome.7 Although al-Qaeda has 
clearly beneﬁted from its links to the Algerian Islamist network, it is 
unclear to what extent the GSPC has beneﬁted thus far from al-Qaeda, 
at least on a material level. Like many other Islamic terrorists, GSPC 
4 See Blanche (2001).
5 “Al Qaeda Claims Responsibility for September 11,” CNN.com, April 15, 2002, http://
www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/04/15/alzawahiri.transcript/ (as of February 
16, 2006).
6 Sahraoui was killed by Algerian forces in June 2004. He was replaced by Abou Musab 
Abdelouadoud (real name, Abdelmalek Droukdel), the group’s explosives chief. See “Algerian 
Group Backs Al Qaeda” (2003).
7 Mark Phillips, “Italy: Cops Thwart Terror Attack,” CBS News, February 20, 2002, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/20/attack/main329974.shtml (as of April 3, 2006).
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members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. However, the 
group has been largely ﬁnancially self-suﬃcient, deriving most of its 
funds from criminal activities such as credit card and passport fraud.8
Saudis have played a prominent place in al-Qaeda, second only 
to the Egyptians.9 Evidence uncovered in the investigation of terrorist 
activities in the Saudi kingdom, for instance, provides strong support 
for the claim that ideological and operational relationships between 
terrorists operating there and al-Qaeda are both close and continuing. 
Many of the extremists responsible for the wave of attacks in Saudi 
Arabia trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and returned to their 
country disillusioned with their government and increasingly com-
mitted to waging jihad against the Saudi regime and U.S. and other 
Western powers that, in their view, were “occupying” their holy land.10
Many of the jihadist leaders in Saudi Arabia, such as Saleh al-Ouﬁ, 
Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, Yusuf al-Ayiri, and Khalid Haj (all of whom 
were killed in ﬁreﬁghts with Saudi forces) trained in al-Qaeda camps 
in Afghanistan.11 Saudi jihadists are known to have maintained a 
working relationship with al-Qaeda in terms of both strategic and tac-
tical direction and logistical support. The types of attacks that terror-
ists conduct in Saudi Arabia, such as the coordinated suicide car bomb 
attacks that took place in April and May 2004—a hallmark al-Qaeda 
tactic—further conﬁrm this relationship.
Extremists who claim responsibility for these attacks often refer 
to al-Qaeda or bin Laden in their public statements. The terrorists 
who killed an American hostage in June 2004, for instance, justiﬁed 
the murder on the grounds that their demand that all al-Qaeda pris-
8 Courtney C. Walsh, “Italian Police Explore Al Qaeda Links in Cyanide Plot,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 2002.
9 The Saudi connection to al-Qaeda only became apparent quite recently. It thus came as 
a shock to many U.S. commentators and analysts that 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers 
hailed from the Kingdom.
10 Faiza Saleh Ambah, “In Saudi Arabia, Fresh Recruits for Al Qaeda,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, April 16, 2004.
11 Dan Murphy, “All-Out War Between Al Qaeda and House of Saud Under Way,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 2004.
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oners held in the kingdom’s prisons be released had not been met. A 
group that called itself the “al-Qaeda Organization in the Arabian 
Peninsula” beheaded another American hostage, Paul Johnson, later 
that same month.12 Another group calling itself the “al-Haramain 
Brigades” claimed credit for a massive car bombing in the kingdom in 
April 2004 and praised “imam Sheikh bin Laden” as the inspiration 
for the attack.13 Al-Qaeda spokesmen have also announced that as part 
of their “grand strategy” they plan to “exterminate” all non-Muslims 
in the Arabian Peninsula.14
Beyond this core, the terrorist entity that we currently label al-
Qaeda has metastasized into a network of like-minded Islamic radicals 
who are committed to using mass violence to defeat their adversaries. 
This conﬁguration of terrorists can be more accurately described as a 
global jihadist “nebula,” which, though held together by bonds of vary-
ing degrees of intensity, collectively seeks to harm the United States, 
the West, and “apostate” governments in the Muslim world. Despite 
the ambiguity and opaque nature of this movement, it is important 
to understand the relationships that exist among the various cells and 
groups that the movement encompasses and to grasp the mechanisms 
by which new recruits join. This is necessary if we are to continue to 
preempt terrorist attacks; arrest emerging leaders; and develop a more 
comprehensive picture of the ideological, organizational, and opera-
tional elements that drive and sustain the contemporary global jihad-
ist movement. Instituting separate but interrelated programs both to 
understand and then to “unpack” each of these three components 
will be key to our success in making eﬀective inroads against the 
movement. 
The following chapters discuss the speciﬁc terrorist groups that 
are feeding ﬁghters into the global jihadist movement. Since al-Qaeda 
lost its sanctuary in Afghanistan, new groups have been formed and 
new alliances have been made. We will outline in more detail what 
12 “Proﬁle: Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin,” BBC News, June 19, 2004.
13 “A Blow for the Forces of Evil,” The Economist, April 22, 2004.
14 Jeﬀerson Morley, “Is Al Qaeda Winning in Saudi Arabia?” The Washington Post, June 18, 
2004.
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these groups are, the nature of their links to what is left of the al-Qaeda 
leadership, and how their relationship might alter or change in the near 
future. The major groups in this “al-Qaeda nebula” and their degree 
of association with al-Qaeda, based on twelve key criteria, are shown 
in Table 6.1. The values are as follows: (0) not established; (1) possible; 
(2) probable; (3) conﬁrmed; and (4) conﬁrmed and continuing. These 
values are based on the analysts’ evaluation of the groups, based on the 
criteria in the table.
These jihadist groups exhibit a duality. Their preoccupation with 
both local and regional jihads gives them a threat potential that goes 
beyond their immediate tactical environment. The hybrid ideological 
and operational nature of these organizations stems from their interac-
tion with the international jihadist movement as currently constituted 
under the existing umbrella of al-Qaeda’s global network. This study 
considers only organized or semistructured Islamic entities, concen-
trating its analysis on the following ﬁve regions:
South Asia, with the focus on groups in Kashmir, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh (Chapter Seven)
the Caucasus and Central Asia, with the focus on groups in 
Chechnya and Uzbekistan (Chapter Eight) 
North and East Africa, with the focus on groups in Morocco, 
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Somalia (Chapter Nine) 
the Middle East, with the focus on groups and networks in 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq (Chapter Ten)
Southeast Asia, with the focus on the trans-regional Jemaah 
Islamiyah network (Chapter Eleven). 
In each chapter, the analysis considers the extent to which contacts 
between local groups and al-Qaeda have deﬁned ideological agendas 
and operational tempos and examines future threat trajectories over 
the short to medium term. 
This terrorist nebula and its regional clusters are represented 
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Figure 6.1





Laskar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen 
Dozens of jihadist groups have been identiﬁed in Kashmir,1 many of 
which have a signiﬁcant nonindigenous component.2 The bulk of these 
external ﬁghters are organized under the auspices of seven main groups: 
al-Badr, Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Harakat-
ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Harakat-ul-Jihad-Islami (HuJI), Jamaat-ul-
Mujahideen (JuM), and the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF) 
(see Figure 7.1). Of these seven, three—LeT, JeM, and HuM—have 
been directly linked to bin Laden’s transnational terror network.3
Laskar-e-Taiba (literally “Army of the Pure”) dates back to 1993 
when it was established as the military wing of the Markaz-ad-Da’awa-
1 For a breakdown of the groups that have been identiﬁed in Kashmir by various sources 
see Marks (2005).
2 The one exception is Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), which is composed mostly of indigenous 
Kashmiris. Chalk interviews, Indian intelligence, Delhi, February 2001 and September 
2002. 
3 LeT, JeM, and HuM were banned by the Pakistani government in January 2002, ostensi-
bly due to a combination of pressure and economic incentives from the United States. Since 
then the three groups have operated under various front names, including Tehrik-ul-Furqan 
(JeM), Pasban-e-Ahle Hadith, Al Mansooren (JeM), Khuddam-ul-Islam (JeM), Jamatud 
Dawah (LeT), and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen al-Aalami (HuM). For the purposes of clarity, 
however, the original designations for each of the organizations will be used throughout this 
chapter.
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Figure 7.1
South and Central Asian Clusters










































Wal-Irshad (MDI) madrassa (although it did not rise to prominence in 
terms of militant activity until 1997). The group, which is led by Haﬁz 
Sayeed,4 has an estimated 1,500 cadres on the ground in Kashmir and 
operates primarily in the Srinigar Valley from bases in Gujranwala in 
Pakistani Punjab. 5 LeT deﬁnes its objectives in both local and regional 
terms, pursuing a twofold ideological and operational agenda that is 
both pan-Islamic and state-centric. Speciﬁcally, the organization seeks 
4 Sayeed was placed under house arrest in 2002 as part of a general crackdown on Islamic 
militants in Pakistan. He was released in January 2003, however, on the orders of the Lahore 
High Court. “The Other Armies,” The Economist, January 18, 2003.
5 LeT sources claim to have at least 6,000 cadres deployed in Jammu and Kashmir, from an 
overall trained mujahideen base of 10,000. Mohammad Amir Rana, “Jihad-e-Kashmir and 
Afghanistan,” December 2003, p. 252. See http://www.hvk.org/articles/0403/32.htm (as of 
April 3, 2006).
South Asian Clusters    83
to institute a fundamentalist theocratic order in Pakistan while exploit-
ing ethno-religious tension in Kashmir to trigger a wider religious rev-
olution across the Indian state.6
Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (literally the “Movement of Holy 
Warriors”) was originally formed in 1985 to participate in the anti-
Soviet Afghan campaign. The group is currently under the charge of 
Farooq Kashmiri, who took over the mantle from long-time leader 
Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil in February 2000. It retains signiﬁ-
cant strongholds in India’s southern Kashmir region, although it has 
lost large numbers of its armed members in defections to the JeM since 
2000. HuM is closely associated with the radical Deobandi teachings 
of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, advocating a strong pan-Islamic ideol-
ogy that deﬁnes the violent secession of Jammu and Kashmir as the 
ﬁrst step in a wider religious war against India.7 The group has also 
been linked to wider transnational imperatives and was allegedly rep-
resented at the signing of bin Laden’s 1998 Khost fatwa in the person 
of Khalil.8
Jaish-e-Muhammad (literally “Soldiers of Muhammad”) is a rel-
atively recent group that was launched in February 2000 by former 
members of HuM. The group is led by Maulana Masood Azhar9 and is 
currently estimated to have at least 600 dedicated cadres in Jammu and 
Kashmir; since 2003, the bulk of these militants have been split into 
two main factional fronts: Khuddam ul-Islam and Jamaat ul-Furqan.10
Like its predecessor HuM, JeM is driven by a strong pan-Islamic inter-
6 Yoginder Sikaand, “Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of Lashkar-I-Tayyeba,” 
paper supplied to author, Asia Paciﬁc Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, August 2002, 
p. 2; “Backgrounder on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),” Institute for Conﬂict Management, http://
www/Seagreen\maind\Web\India\J&K\Terrorist_Outﬁts.htm (as of September 2005). 
7 “Backgrounder: Harakat-ul-Mujahideen,” Institute for Conﬂict Management, http://
www/Seagreen\maind\Web\India\J&K\TerroristOutﬁts.htm (as of September 2005); U.S. 
Department of State (2002b), pp. 93–94.
8 Watson and Zaidi, “Militant Flourishes.”
9 Azhar, like Sayeed, was placed under house arrest in 2002 but released a year later. “The 
Other Armies,” The Economist, January 18, 2003; Watson and Zaidi, “Militant Flour-
ishes . . .” (2004).
10 U.S. Department of State (2004), p. 123.
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nationalism that appears to go well beyond the “liberation” of Jammu 
and Kashmir. The organization carries pictures of burning American 
eﬃgies on its calendars and posters, and Azhar himself has repeatedly 
aﬃrmed that no Muslim should rest in peace until the United States 
and Israel are annihilated.11
Although these groups remain organizationally distinct and 
exhibit subtle ideological and theological diﬀerences,12 they are charac-
terized by an overlapping membership that variously reﬂects personal 
ties, a common anti-Indian agenda, and shared experiences in overseas 
militant training camps.13 The three groups are also thought to have 
established links with Islamist radicals based in Bangladesh as well as 
Sunni sectarian extremists in Pakistan.
According to Indian government and intelligence sources, the 
historical basis of al-Qaeda’s links to LeT, HuM, and JeM stem from 
deliberate operational decisions taken within Pakistan’s Inter-Service 
Intelligence (ISI) agency. The long-term aim of the Pakistani state in 
the view of these oﬃcials is to gradually step up the tempo of the con-
ﬂict in Kashmir, both to create a strategic bulwark along Pakistan’s 
vulnerable northeastern ﬂank and to oﬀset existing power symmetries 
with India through a prolonged “war of a thousand cuts.”14 While these 
11 Masood Azhar, quoted in “Militant Freed in Hijacking Vows to Destroy U.S., India,” The 
Seattle Times, January 5, 2000. See also “Backgrounder: Jaish-e-Muhammad.” 
12 The LeT, for instance, is aﬃliated to the Ahl-e-Hadith sect of Wahhabism (which empha-
sizes statements attributed to the Prophet Mohammad); JeM and HuM follow the funda-
mentalist Deobandi school of Islam. Laskar also advocates a stronger and wider justiﬁcation 
for jihad than Jaish, legitimating holy war against all nonbelievers (whereas JeM limits the 
focus of its violence to oppressors of Islam). Chalk interview, Washington, D.C., December 
2003. See also Howard (2000), pp. 36–39.
13 Chalk interviews, Indian intelligence, Delhi and Srinigar, September 2002.
14 Chalk interviews, Indian intelligence and police, Delhi and Srinigar, September 2002. It 
is acknowledged that Indian claims pertaining to the existence of links between Kashmiri 
groups and al-Qaeda need to be carefully weighed in light of Delhi’s historically tumultuous 
relationship with Pakistan. That said, both the Research and Analysis Wing (Delhi’s external 
intelligence wing) and the Intelligence Bureau (responsible for domestic security) have a sub-
stantial presence in Kashmir and each works in conjunction with the Jammu and Kashmir 
police, who are recognized as having a comprehensive picture of the militant situation in the 
region.
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assertions almost certainly reﬂect an opportunistic attempt to mobilize 
international opinion in favor of Delhi’s position on Kashmir, several 
indicators do exist that the three groups have established some sort of 
tactical relationship with bin Laden’s global terror network.
The ﬁrst real sign of those ties emerged in August 1998 follow-
ing the U.S. cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan that were launched 
in retaliation for the attacks against Washington’s embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania. Twenty-one militants who were killed in two al-Qaeda 
camps—Khalid bin Waleed and Muwavia—were subsequently identi-
ﬁed as aﬃliates of HuM and LeT.15 The existence of these activists has 
been generally recognized as evidence of at least wider ideological and, 
possibly, tactical solidarity between the two groups and bin Laden—a 
sense of Islamist fraternity that appears to have been carried over to 
JeM. Indeed, Masood Azhar is known to have written an 802-page 
manual, The Virtues of the Jihad, in which he explicitly praises the al-
Qaeda founder as jihad ki shole ko dobara jilanewala (“the great reig-
niter of the sprit of the jihad”) and the inspiration for helping to wrest 
Islam from the grip of a morally corrupt secular culture.16
A sizable proportion of the LeT militants killed or captured 
have similarly been linked to radicals who received training in former 
Afghan militant centers run by either al-Qaeda or the Taliban, includ-
ing camps Tayyaba and Aqsa.17 According to Indian sources, captured 
militants describe largely similar experiences at these facilities, provid-
ing a degree of authentication to depictions of courses that are typically 
claimed to run for three weeks and that cover basic weapons-handling 
of everything from anti-aircraft missiles and rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPGs) to AK-47 riﬂes and pistols. A number of detained militants 
have also made common reference to so-called al-Qaeda “graduate 
15 Bergen (2001), p. 8; Rana (unpublished), p. 172; “Over a Dozen Harakat Members 
Missing Since US Attacks,” The News (Pakistan), August 26, 1998; “Pakistani Intelligence 
Had Ties to Al Qaeda, US Oﬃcials Say,” The New York Times, October 29, 2001; “Pak Cries 
Foul Over US Revenge Attacks,” The Indian Express, August 22, 1998. 
16 Chalk interview with Pakistani expert, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), 
Washington, D.C., December 2003. See also Haqqani (2002), pp. 72–74.
17 Rana (unpublished), p. 252.
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programs” that were allegedly run in cooperation with the ISI and 
that focused on developing skills in such areas as escape and evasion, 
ambush preparation, long-range reconnaissance, the construction and 
placement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), intelligence/coun-
terintelligence, ﬁeld communications, and suicide tactics.18
Apart from training, Indian sources have consistently claimed 
that al-Qaeda has supplied LeT, HuM, and JeM with money—both 
directly and through intermediaries in Pakistan—to purchase arms, 
ammunition, and other battle-related materiel.19 Although the veracity 
of these charges must be taken in the politically interested context in 
which they are made, arms seizures registered by the security forces do 
show the three groups have enjoyed access to a wide-ranging and exten-
sive assortment of sophisticated weaponry.20 The extent to which these 
munitions have emanated from the ISI and the Pakistani military, as 
opposed to outside jihadist sources, is impossible to tell. That said, one 
cannot fully discount Delhi’s claim that at least some JeM, HuM, and 
LeT weaponry may have been acquired with al-Qaeda’s support.
It is also worth bearing in mind that certain Pakistani commen-
tators allude to the existence of ﬁnancial ﬂows between al-Qaeda and 
Kashmiri groups. One source alleges that bin Laden personally inter-
ceded to prevent the emergence of JeM from triggering an interfac-
tional war with HuM and provided qisi (blood money) to ensure that 
the two groups would not work at cross-purposes.21
Finally, the March 2002 arrest of Abu Zubaydah, along with sev-
eral other suspected jihadists from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria in 
the Punjabi town of Faisalabad, attests to the possible availability of 
18 Chalk interviews, Indian military and intelligence oﬃcials, Srinigar and Delhi, September 
2002.
19 Chalk interview, Pakistan expert, USIP, Washington, D.C., October 2003. 
20 Chalk brieﬁng, Army 15 Corps Headquarters, Srinigar, September 2002. In the Kashmir 
Valley region alone, 16,047 assault riﬂes, 738 RPGs, 223 sniper riﬂes, 57 mortars, 4,813 
pistols, and 839 general purpose machine guns were recovered between 1990 and 2002, in 
addition to numerous quantities of night vision devices, advanced radio sets (complete with 
solar charges), and ﬁeld binoculars.
21 Chalk interview, Pakistan expert, USIP, Washington, D.C., December 2003.
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safe havens well inside Pakistan’s borders. The fact that Zubaydah was 
captured in a house reputedly belonging to LeT has been interpreted 
by several commentators in the West as strongly suggestive that mem-
bers of the group have actively cooperated with al-Qaeda and possibly 
assisted with the movement of cadres throughout Pakistan.22
Although there is as yet no conclusive evidence to verify the exis-
tence of concerted Kashmiri–al-Qaeda ties, there are several reasons 
to suggest that links may be pertinent today. Ideologically, the radical 
internationalism and anti-Westernism of LeT, HuM, and JeM has grown 
markedly over the past year. Several of the LeT’s current writings stress 
the idea of a trans-regional jihad stretching from Afghanistan to India, 
a concept that was strongly supported by Abdullah Azam—an ideo-
logical source for al-Qaeda.23 Equally as indicative is the group’s annual 
three-day ijtimah (convention), which over the past three years (from 
2002) has been noteworthy for the virulently anti-Western tone that 
has formed the basis of many of the speakers’ proclamations, including 
speciﬁc exhortations of holy war against the United States.24
Similarly, JeM and HuM diatribes are increasingly focused on 
issues that have little, if anything, to do with the struggle in Kashmir. 
The former group’s main media mouthpiece, Dharbi-i-Mumin (liter-
ally, “Blow of the Believer”), frequently carries stories that denounce 
Zionism or America and other alleged oppressors of Muslims—includ-
ing the Pakistani government on account of its support for the Bush 
administration’s global war on terrorism. Moreover, Masood Azhar’s 
22 See U.S. Department of State (2003); Kronsdat and Vaughn (2004), p. 5; Raman (2002); 
“The Terrorists Next Door; al Qaeda Suspects Posed as Traders Before Capture in Pakistan,” 
The Washington Post, April 4, 2002.
23 These writings include “Hum Jihad kyon kar rahen hain” (“Why Are We Waging Jihad?”); 
“Yeh zagiri kaun torega” (“Who Will Break This Chain?”); “Ryaz ul mujahidebb” (“Training 
for Mujahideen”); “Difai-e-jihad” (“Defense of Jihad”); “Sadai-e-jihad” (“Voice of Jihad”); 
and “Chalo jihad ko chalen” (“Go and Wage Jihad”). Chalk interview, USIP, Washington, 
D.C., December 2003.
24 Arif Jamal, News on Sunday, November 10, 2002; Chalk and Fair (2002).
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preaching now gives greater emphasis to the general problems of the 
Muslim world and the related need to restore eﬀective Muslim military 
power everywhere from the southern Philippines to Chechnya.25
These changes in ideological tenor are important in the sense that 
they appear to reﬂect a perceptible change in the strategic agenda of 
Kashmiri groups—or elements therein. Speciﬁcally, these organiza-
tions now routinely profess concerns and aspirations that, at least rhe-
torically, accord closely with the open-ended aims of the broader al-
Qaeda network. As such, they may be indicative of a growing sense of 
Islamist solidarity that now sees its primary mission in terms of propa-
gating global, as opposed to local (or even regional) holy war.
On a tactical level, LeT, JeM, and HuM operational activities 
have additionally taken on a wider slant that, in many ways, seems to 
be predicated on explicit opposition to the United States and govern-
ments that support the global war on terrorism—that is, the same mix 
of enemies repeatedly denigrated by bin Laden. LeT is alleged to have 
been instrumental in recruiting jihadists to ﬁght coalition forces in 
Iraq (something that even the ISI does not fully discount),26 as well 
as executing terrorist strikes in Europe. Indeed, according to British 
intelligence, several of those responsible for the July 2005 bombings in 
London or in some way tied to the incidents may have sought militant 
training in the group’s camps in Pakistan.27
Organizationally, there are also signs of greater coordination and 
cooperation between JeM, HuM, and LeT to facilitate attacks against 
Western targets and perceived American collaborators in Pakistan.28
Although the three groups have long been characterized by overlapping 
25 Chalk interview, USIP, Washington, D.C., December 2003. See also Haqqani (2002), 
pp. 72–74.
26 Chalk interview, ISI, Rawalpindi, January 2005. It should be noted, however, that 
Pakistani intelligence tends to take the view that LeT recruitment for the war in Iraq is more 
the result of ad hoc actions by individual members of the group than a sanctioned directive 
from Lashkar’s central leadership.
27 See, for instance, Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta, “2004 British Raid Sounded Alert 
on Pakistani Militants,” The New York Times, July 14, 2005; and Elaine Sciolino and Don 
Van Natta, “Searching for Footprints,” The New York Times, July 25, 2005.
28 RAND interview with Pakistani journalist, Islamabad, January 2003.
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membership, they have traditionally tended to act as distinct entities, 
only occasionally coming together for combined, large-scale missions 
such as the strikes on the Srinigar state legislature in October 2001 and 
the Indian national parliament three months later.29
This trait has reportedly changed in the sense that logistical 
and operational ties are now being institutionalized on a semiformal 
basis through the creation of umbrella organizations that incorporate 
members of all three Kashmiri groups in addition to Sunni sectar-
ian militants associated with Laskar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ, see below). One 
such group, known as Brigade 313, has been tied to several incidents 
since mid-2002, including assassination attempts against President 
Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, and the Karachi Corps 
Commander General Ahsan Saleem Hyat; the murder of Wall Street 
Journal reporter Daniel Pearl; the mailing of parcel bombs to detec-
tives working in the police antiterrorist branch; and two prominent 
attacks on the U.S. consulate and the Sheraton hotel in Karachi during 
2002.30 Indian and Pakistani commentators allege al-Qaeda and ren-
egade elements within the security forces, disillusioned with the pro-
Western leanings of the current Islamabad government, have fostered 
these ties with the former, further asserting that many of the joint 
29 Chalk interview, Indian intelligence, Delhi, September 2002. See also “New Delhi Lays 
Blame,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2001; “Kashmir Suicide Bombing Group Linked 
to Osama Bin Laden: India,” Agence France-Presse, October 2, 2001; and “Delhi Tracks Al 
Qaida, Jaish Links,” Gulf News, October 11, 2001. The attack on the Indian parliament rep-
resents the most audacious attack carried out to date by Kashmiri militants. Involving a joint 
LeT-JeM squad, the strike demonstrated careful planning, surveillance, and execution and 
brought Delhi and Islamabad to the brink of war.
30 See Amir Mir, “Target Musharraf,” The Herald Magazine (Pakistan), January 2004, 
pp. 38–42; “Friends Turned to Foes,” The Herald Magazine (Pakistan), January 2004, pp. 
40–41; “Terror’s Allies,” The Herald Magazine (Pakistan), August 2004, pp. 58–61. 
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operations were developed in conformity with the designs of senior al-
Qaeda planner Khaled Sheikh Mohammad before the latter’s arrest in 
March 2003.31
With Pakistan coming under increased pressure to curtail all overt 
physical support for militant extremism on its soil, it is conceivable 
that LeT, HuM, and JeM could move to consolidate links with out-
side jihadists, including those associated with al-Qaeda. Certainly this 
would be of concern to the United States, not least given the numbers 
of foreign jihadists who are known to have ﬂed to Pakistan’s remote 
northern border regions following the collapse of the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan.32
Assessment and Future Outlook
For the most part, LeT, JeM, and HuM have conﬁned their terror-
ist activities to Jammu and Kashmir. However, all three groups have 
exhibited a disposition to act outside this theater. As noted above, the 
three groups have reportedly collaborated in striking targets located in 
Pakistan under semiformalized umbrella groups. Intelligence oﬃcials 
in India’s Research and Analysis Wing insist that this growing reach is 
31 Brieﬁng given to Chalk by India’s National Security Advisory Council, Delhi, September 
2002. See also Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda Origins, Threat and its Likely Future,” presen-
tation at Workshop on Emerging Terrorist Threats in Africa and Southeast Asia, Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., August 19, 2005; 
“Investigation of Attacks on Musharraf Points to Pakistani Group,” The Washington Post,
January 13, 2004; Juliette Terzieﬀ, “Assassination Tries Linked to al Qaeda,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, January 16, 2004; “After Pakistan Raid, 3 Mysterious Suicides,” The New York 
Times, August 7, 2002; “Two Years Later: The Islamic Ally,” The New York Times,  September 
9, 2003. It should be noted that LeT’s involvement in Laskar-e-Omar is not universally 
acknowledged in Pakistan and that the umbrella group itself is not necessarily seen to be the 
main perpetrator behind the Karachi attacks.
32 Chalk interview, U.S. Department of State, November 2004. Pakistani military incur-
sions into South Waziristan during 2004—which represented the ﬁrst time that Islamabad 
had directly intervened in the semiautonomous tribal areas—provided an indication of the 
extent of outside Islamist penetration along the country’s northern border areas over the last 
three years. During the sweeps, 302 militants were killed and 656 arrested. Some 80 percent 
of these ﬁghters were foreign, mostly comprising Afghan Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens, as 
well as a smaller number of Uighurs from China. Chalk interview, ISI, Rawalpindi, January 
2005. Similar ﬁgures were cited during a conference on “The Tribal Areas of Pakistan: A 
Haven for Terrorists?” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, January 19, 2005.
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a direct result of external assistance and coordination provided by al-
Qaeda (and hard-line, extremist members of the Pakistani military and 
intelligence apparatus).33 That said, there is as yet little direct evidence 
that Kashmiri jihadists have been decisively integrated into the wider 
al-Qaeda nebula and are now carrying out strikes at the sole behest of 
outside militants. In this sense, it would be incorrect to evaluate con-
tacts between al-Qaeda and LeT, JeM, and HuM (to the extent that 
they have occurred) in the same manner as those that have emerged 
with largely or fully co-opted networks such as those in Egypt, Algeria, 
and Saudi Arabia.
In sum, JeM, HuM, and LeT connections to al-Qaeda would 
seem to be indicative of a mutuality of interest that is more a reﬂec-
tion of growing Islamist solidarity than an attempt to establish a true 
operational partnership that is not connected to the Kashmiri struggle 
(which would threaten the very basis of the groups’ mandates). As one 
Pakistani commentator put it, Kashmiri militants and al-Qaeda are 
like two ﬁghters in the same trench: engaged on diﬀerent missions but 
increasingly aware of a common enemy.34
Pakistan
Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Laskar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
In Pakistan, the main domestic militant threat emanates from rival 
Shi’a and Sunni groups that have been engaged in a long-standing and 
bloody sectarian conﬂict since the mid-1980s.35 The principal protago-
nists involved in this internal religious struggle are the SSP and its 
33 Chalk interview, Indian intelligence, Delhi, September 2002. See also “New Delhi 
Lays Blame,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2001; “Kashmir Suicide Bombing Group 
Linked to Osama Bin Laden: India,” Agence France-Presse, October 2, 2001; and “Delhi 
Tracks Al Qaida, Jaish Links,” Gulf News, October 11, 2001.
34 Chalk interview with Pakistan expert, USIP, Washington, D.C., December 2003.
35 Sectarianism in the Pakistani context refers essentially to organized and militant religious 
activism, the speciﬁc aim of which is to safeguard the interests of particular Sunni and Shi’a 
communities (Nasr, 2000), pp. 171–172. For more on the general mobilization of ethnic and 
sectarian identity, see Horowitz (1985).
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terrorist oﬀshoot LeJ on the Sunni side; and the Tahrik-i-Jafaria 
Pakistan (TJP) and its militant wing Sipah-i-Muhammad (SM) on the 
Shi’a side.36 In terms of aﬃnity with al-Qaeda and threat contingencies 
to U.S. and Western interests, the ﬁrst two entities have engendered 
most concern.
Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi established the SSP in 1984 in 
reaction to the growing assertiveness of Pakistan’s Shi’ite minority fol-
lowing the 1979 Iranian revolution.37 The group, which was led by 
Azam Tariq until his assassination in October 2003, espouses a three-
track agenda: (1) to combat the Shi’ites at all levels; (2) to strive to have 
this community declared a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan; and (3) 
to institute Sunni Islam as the oﬃcial religion of the state. For the 
SSP, the ideal polity is one that emulates the “rightly guided” caliphs 
of early Islam; it is this model that the group’s founding father, Nawa 
Jhangvi, sought to emulate in modern-day Pakistan.38
LeJ was founded in 1996 by a breakaway group of radical Sunni 
extremists reputed to feel that the SSP was deviating from the original 
principles of Nawaz Jhangvi (from whom the group derives its name).39
Muhammad Ajmal (also known as Akram Lahori) reportedly acts as 
the group’s current leader (although he has been in police custody since 
2002). He believes that the only way to eﬀectively transform Pakistan 
into a Sunni state is through violent means. LeJ has an estimated mili-
36 All of these organizations have been proscribed in Pakistan—the LeJ and SM in August 
2001 and the SSP and TJP in January 2002.
37 The scale of sectarian extremism in Pakistan escalated markedly following the Iranian 
revolution and the establishment of the TJP. Dedicated to the explicit promotion of Shi’ite 
interests, the TJP soon came to be viewed as a direct challenge to Pakistan’s dominant Sunni 
establishment as well as a potential Iranian proxy. The SSP was established in 1984 with the 
backing of the Zia ul-Haq regime to contain and ultimately eliminate this perceived threat. 
For further details see Nasr (2000); Zaman (1998), p. 704; Waslekar et al. (2002), pp. 59–
63; and “Pakistan’s Growing Crisis: In the Shadow of Afghanistan” (1998), pp. 1–2.
38 Zaman (1998), pp. 701–702; Rana (unpublished), pp. 112–122; “Sipah-e-Sahaba 
Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutﬁts/ssp.htm (as of February 21, 2006).
39 Several other militant Sunni SSP oﬀshoots exist, including the Jhangvi Tigers, al-Haq 
Tigers, al-Farooq, the al-Badr Foundation, Allahu Akbar, and Tanzeemul Haq. Of these, the 
Jhangvi Tigers, al-Haq Tigers, and Allahu Akbar are known to have merged with LeJ.
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tant base of 300 cadres organized into semiautonomous cells of ﬁve 
to eight members and retains most of its hard-core strength in the 
Punjab.40
Both the SSP and LeJ maintain they are in no way organization-
ally linked. Few analysts in India and Pakistan believe this to be the 
case, however. The two groups’ cadres come from the same Deobandi 
madrassas and share the same sectarian belief system, worldview, and 
charter of demands. In addition, the SSP leadership has never criticized 
the terrorist actions of LeJ, and it is suspected that the latter merely 
acts as a deniable conduit through which the former can direct attacks 
against Shi’ites.41
Although the SSP and LeJ are primarily focused on the sectarian 
conﬂict in Pakistan, each is widely suspected of having established links 
with al-Qaeda. Both groups sent recruits to train at terrorist camps 
in Afghanistan, many of whom subsequently participated in attacks 
against the Northern Alliance as well as massacres of Afghan Shi’ites 
that were carried out in such areas as Bamiyan and Mazar-e-Sharif. 
On returning home, these cadres further militarized already extreme 
Sunni ideological stances, supplementing established anti-Shi’a agen-
das with a more Talibanized slant.42
Other than training, the SSP is thought to have beneﬁted from 
ﬁnancing distributed by wealthy Gulf patrons with known sympathies 
for bin Laden. The desert town of Rahimayar Khan in southern Punjab 
appears to have played a prominent role in facilitating the transfer 
of monies from the Middle East to the Sipah leadership. Each year, 
thousands of Arabs come to the region, spending a month and several 
40 Rana (unpublished), pp. 123–124; “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutﬁts/lej.htm, (as of February 21,
2006).
41 Chalk interview with Pakistani expert, USIP, Washington, D.C, December 2003. See 
also “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi” and Howard (2000), p. 38. 
42 Chalk’s e-mail correspondence with Pakistani commentator, December 3, 2003, and 
interview with Pakistani-based journalist, Islamabad, January 2005. See also “Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi”; Mir, “Terror’s Allies” (2004), pp. 58–59; Azizullah Khan, interview with Jam 
Mohammad Yousuf, Chief Minister of Baluchistan, reproduced in “Clueless in Quetta,” The 
Herald Magazine (Pakistan), April 2004, p. 32.
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million dollars hunting local wildlife. Western commentators believe 
that over the years a signiﬁcant proportion of these “tourist dollars” 
were transferred to the SSP (as well as other local Islamist protégés) to 
sustain anti-Shi’a activities in Pakistan.43
Assertions have also been made that contacts with al-Qaeda 
emerged in the context of LeJ links with Kashmiri extremists. As noted 
above, the group’s membership overlaps with that of JeM, LeT, and 
HuM, which several commentators believe is indicative of an outside 
hand. Moreover, Indian sources have claimed that front-ranking LeJ ter-
rorists consistently beneﬁted from access to HuM’s Khalid bin Waleed 
camp in Afghanistan, securing training from al-Qaeda instructors in 
everything from small arms handling to the preparation of IEDs and 
hit-and-run tactics.44
Finally there are strong indications that ties to al-Qaeda have 
developed through the conduit of transnational criminal networks. 
Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan was engulfed by a range of illicit enter-
prises that proliferated after the collapse of the formal state structures 
in Afghanistan resulted in increased heroin production throughout the 
so-called Golden Crescent45 and the emergence of a thriving, unregu-
lated light arms industry in the remote North-West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) and Baluchistan regions. Narcotics smuggling developed 
as a particularly serious problem with dealers and subcontractors in 
Karachi and Quetta playing a key role in the movement of Afghan opi-
ates through Central Asia to markets in Russia and Europe.46 Many 
of these narcotic syndicates operated out of the port city of Karachi, 
43 See, for instance, Howard (2000), p. 37.
44 “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.”
45 By 1996, the Golden Crescent, which connects Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, had sup-
planted Southeast Asia’s infamous Golden Triangle as the world’s main source of reﬁned opi-
ates. The vast majority of these drugs is produced in and traﬃcked from Afghanistan. By the 
end of 2002, the country’s overall opium yield was in the range of 3,656 metric tons, which 
equates to an approximate heroin output of 365 metric tons (Chalk, 2000, pp. 38–39).
46 By the end of 2001, Pakistan had an estimated drug-using population of four million—
including 1.5 million heroin addicts—who were helping to fuel an underground economy 
that some analysts believe was worth as much as US $1.4 billion. See Blood (2002) and U.S. 
Department of State (2002a), p. VII-24. 
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which bin Laden was keen to establish as a regional center to support 
his own transnational terrorist agenda.47 As both Indian and Pakistani 
sources point out, it is certainly conceivable that al-Qaeda exploited 
the growing interaction between drug traﬃcking and sectarian groups 
in this part of the country to recruit hard-line and increasingly crimi-
nalized SSP-LeJ elements for both attack and logistical purposes.48
Although both the SSP and LeJ are believed to have developed 
links with al-Qaeda, LeJ has allegedly established the closest con-
tacts. The SSP has been more circumspect in order to protect its mem-
bers from government arrest and surveillance.49 Maulana Tariq, for 
instance, is on record as aﬃrming that he considers it a sin to utter 
“even a single word against peace and tranquility in Pakistan” and that 
he would strive to ensure members of his organization “observe the best 
norms, speak [and act] with responsibility,” and refrain from any acts 
of violence in the country.50 Obviously, any outward association with 
bin Laden or his aﬃliates would run counter to a pragmatic stance of 
this sort. 
LeJ, on the other hand, remains committed to violence and has 
become increasingly anti-Western, targeting its aggression as much 
toward the present Pakistani government for its collusion with the 
U.S.-led war on terror as against the country’s Shi’ite minority. At the 
time of this writing, three major assassination attempts had been made 
on the life of President Musharraf, all of which have been variously 
47 Karachi’s attractiveness as an al-Qaeda logistical center is due to a number of factors, 
including the city’s endemic lawlessness, its well-established Arab population, and the exis-
tence of trade, cultural, and ﬁnancial ties with important Islamic hubs in the Middle East 
and the Horn of Africa. 
48 Chalk interview with Pakistan expert, USIP, Washington, D.C., December 2003, and 
Indian intelligence, Delhi, September 2002.
49 In what was hailed as a landmark address to the nation on January 12, 2002, President 
Musharraf announced a policy of zero tolerance for Islamic extremism, specifying that sec-
tarian militants (including those connected to the SSP) would be the target of especially 
close government scrutiny and countermeasures. For excerpts of his speech, see “Musharraf ’s 
New Pakistan. What the People Think,” The Herald, February 2002, pp. 44b–45b.
50 Rana (unpublished), pp. 130–131. It should be noted that several Pakistani commenta-
tors believe the SSP continues to actively endorse and engage in violence and now merely acts 
through the conduit of LeJ in order to pursue its militant agenda.
96    Beyond al-Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement
connected to LeJ—either directly or through Kashmiri front organiza-
tions.51 Indian, Western, and Pakistani intelligence oﬃcials assert that 
these and other acts of violence, including the murder of Daniel Pearl 
and the 2002 bombings in Karachi, underscore the continuing salience 
of LeJ–al-Qaeda ties, reﬂecting a commonality of purpose that is both 
ideological and operational in character.52 According to one high-
ranking oﬃcial in Islamabad, LeJ is now acting as an ostensible al-
Qaeda strike force that is being used to eliminate high-ranking mem-
bers of the country’s national leadership.53
Further (albeit nondeﬁnitive) evidence of an al-Qaeda–LeJ link 
has emerged in testimony from Akram Lahori. By his own admission, 
the incarcerated LeJ leader has conﬁrmed that members of his own 
group, together with other organizations such as HuM, have sworn 
an oath on the Quran to physically eliminate Pervez Musharraf at any 
cost. The basis for this commitment is apparently a conviction that the 
Pakistani president has both damaged and betrayed the true cause of 
jihad and is now working to further the U.S. agenda in Pakistan and 
throughout South Asia.54
Assessment and Future Outlook
As noted above, while LeJ’s existence stems from the history of vio-
lent sectarianism that has plagued Pakistan for most of the past three 
decades, the group has deﬁnitely begun to recalibrate its agenda with a 
51 See, for instance, Raman (2003); Salman Masoud, “Musaharraf Vows Renewed 
Crackdown,” The National Post (Canada), December 26, 2003; John Lancaster and Karman 
Khan, “Investigation of Attacks on Musharraf Points to Pakistani Group,” The Washington 
Post, January 14, 2004; Terzieﬀ, “Assassination Tries Linked to Al Qaeda”; and Salman 
Masood, “Link to Qaeda Cited in Eﬀort to Assassinate Pakistan Chief,” The New York Times, 
March 16, 2004.
52 Chalk interviews: Indian intelligence, Delhi, September 2002 and Washington, D.C., 
December 2003; Pakistan’s ISI Directorate, Rawalpindi, January 2005; and Pakistan Ministry 
of the Interior, Islamabad, January 2005. See also “Investigation of Attacks on Musharraf 
Points to Pakistani Group,” The Washington Post, January 13, 2004; and “Assassination Tries 
Linked to al-Qaeda,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 16, 2004.
53 Mir, “Terror’s Allies,” p. 58.
54 Mir, “Friends Turned Foes,” pp. 40–41.
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more deliberate anti-Western and anti-Musharraf focus. More signiﬁ-
cantly, the LeJ leadership has been prepared to act on and operational-
ize this extended ideological mission by carrying out attacks that have 
been eﬀectively devoid of any anti-Shi’a overtones. It is reasonable to 
assume that at least some of this reorientation is owing to an exter-
nal al-Qaeda inﬂuence, which is arguably stronger than that currently 
exerted on Kashmiri militants (whose main preoccupation remains 
with Kashmir). The importance of common stomping grounds in 
Karachi should not be underestimated in this regard, particularly in 
terms of connecting outside and local Islamist interests through the 
common medium of organized crime.55
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that LeJ’s ideological and 
operational agenda is being driven solely by externally deﬁned impera-
tives. Not only has the group been abandoned by the same institutional 
system that during the 1980s and 1990s was clearly prepared to pro-
mote Sunni extremism as part of an active Shi’a containment policy, it 
has also been subjected to an increasingly draconian crackdown by the 
authorities since 2001. There is little question that these developments 
have inﬂuenced LeJ perceptions of the “enemy,” and it is reasonable to 
assume that they have played an important role in turning the group 
against the current regime in Islamabad.
Although al-Qaeda may well have attempted to exploit LeJ’s 
growing anti-Musharraf focus for its own purposes, there is little evi-
dence that it has been instrumental in transforming LeJ’s operational 
and ideological character. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) 
concludes:
The objectives and goals of Pakistani sectarian terrorists in the 
post–11 September world might be closer to those of transna-
tional jihadis but the internal enemy still takes priority over the 
enemy without. “It is a two-track jihad,” says a [former] member 
of a banned [sectarian] group. “The external enemy is known, his 
55 See, for instance, Waslekar et al. (2002), pp. 51–63.
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intentions against Islam and Muslims are no secret. But the inter-
nal enemy posing as Muslim . . . is more dangerous. Stopping 
internal enemies is our priority.56
Bangladesh
Harakat-ul-Jihad-Islami Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the principal group that has been linked to al-Qaeda is 
Harakat-ul-Jihad-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI B), which aims to establish a 
system of Islamic hukumat (rule) across the country. The organization’s 
roots date back to 1992, although it has emerged as a prominent mili-
tant entity only since 2000. Shauqat Osman (also known as Maulana 
or Sheikh Farid) leads the group, overseeing an operational cadre that 
is believed to number 15,000, of whom 2,000 are described as hard-
core. Most of these militants are based in cells scattered along a stretch 
of coastline that runs from the port city of Chittagong, south through 
Cox’s Bazar to the Burmese border.57 Indian intelligence sources allege 
that HuJI B’s long-term goal speciﬁcally calls for an Islamic revolution 
in India’s northeast and that, with the help of the ISI and Bangladesh’s 
Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI), the group has 
actively sought to cultivate links with radicals in Kashmir and Assam—
56 ICG (2005b), p. 5.
57 U.S. Department of State (2003), pp. 133–134; Lintner (2002); Lintner (2003), p. 3; 
“Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI),” Terrorist Outﬁts, Bangladesh, South Asia Terrorism 
Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutﬁts/Huj.htm (as of 
February 21, 2006).
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including HuM, JeM, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), 
and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).58
HuJI B’s links to al-Qaeda allegedly go back to the group’s incep-
tion in 1992, when bin Laden instructed Bangladeshi mujahideen 
returning from Afghanistan to take up arms against the government 
in Dhaka and to replace it with a fundamentalist order committed to 
the creation of a nation of “true believers.”59 Although it is diﬃcult to 
establish the veracity of this claim, al-Qaeda is known to have dissemi-
nated at least some funds to the country throughout the 1990s, much 
of which appears to have been channeled through the Saudi-based al-
Haramain Foundation60 and the “Servants of Suﬀering and Humanity 
International” charity in Dhaka.61
Together with donations from Pakistan, Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Oman, these ﬁnancial contributions were 
used to underwrite a proliferating web of radical unlicensed madras-
sas (known as Dars-e-Nizami) throughout Bangladesh that have been 
linked to some of the country’s most fundamentalist religious enti-
ties and parties, including the Muslim League, the Tablighi Jama’at, 
the Jammat-e-Tulba, the Jamaat-ul-Muderessin, Islamic Oikya, and 
Jamaat-e-Islami. Indian and U.S. sources both maintain that the 
58 Jaideep Saikia, “Triangle of New Concern: North East India,” unclassiﬁed brieﬁng, 
RAND, Alexandria, Virginia, n.d. ULFA was established in 1979 and seeks the creation of an 
independent Assam state in India’s northeast; the group has an estimated strength of 2,000 
cadres. The NDFB emerged in 1988 (then under the name of the Bodo Security Force/BSF) 
and is committed to carving out a separate “Bodoland” north of the Brahmaputra River for 
the region’s mostly Christian tribal groups who number around 13 percent of Assam’s total 
population; it is reportedly able to ﬁeld some 1,500 ﬁghters. For an interesting account of 
these groups and their links with militants in Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Burma, see Davis 
and Bedi (2004).
59 “Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI),” Terrorist Outﬁts, Bangladesh, South Asia Terrorism 
Portal, http://wwwsatp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutﬁts/Huj.htm (as of 
February 21, 2006); Alex Perry, “Deadly Cargo,” Time Asia, October 21, 2002.
60 The al-Haramain Foundation is widely believed to be one of the principal ﬁnancial con-
duits for the dissemination of funds from the Middle East to terrorist groups. 
61 Ajai Sahni, “Al Qaeda’s Strategic Reach in South Asia,” paper presented before “The 
Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia-Paciﬁc: Linkages to Global 
Terrorism” Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 19–21, 2002, p. 7.
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madrassas—which number between 15,000 and 20,000, of which at 
least 40 are known to be run by Afghan war veterans—have consti-
tuted an important source of recruits for extremists.62
HuJI B is also thought to have established contacts with al-Qaeda 
through the Taliban. Between 1996 and 2001, several hundred Harakat 
activists received training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.63 The 
precise number of recruits who were sent to these camps is unknown; 
however, given that several facilities were reserved only for Bengali 
speakers, it would appear that the overall Bangladeshi component was 
quite substantial.
A more concrete tie to al-Qaeda has been identiﬁed in the 
person of Sheikh Abdur Rahman, the leader of the “Jihad Movement 
in Bangladesh”—to which HuJI B belongs—and one of the original 
signatories of the 1998 Khost “Declaration of Jihad against Jews and 
Crusaders.” Apart from bin Laden and Rahman, other parties to the 
joint statement included Ayman al-Zawahiri, Rifa’i Ahmad Taha (also 
known as Abu Yasir) of the EIJ, and Sheikh Mir Hamzah, secretary of 
the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan.64 In June 2001, a 25-member joint al-
Qaeda–Taliban team was reportedly dispatched from Afghanistan to 
train HuJI B cadres in Bangladesh.65
It appears that this initial foray into Bangladeshi territory pro-
vided the impetus for a further expansion of logistical and operational 
ties between al-Qaeda and the HuJI B throughout 2002. It is known, 
for instance, that al-Zawahiri was in Dhaka during the ﬁrst part of the 
year, using his time in the Bangladeshi capital to explore the feasibil-
62 Saikia, “Triangle of New Concern”; Datta (2003), p. 8; Perry, “Deadly Cargo.” Overall, it 
is estimated that the total number of madrassas in Bangladesh is in the vicinity of 64,000.
63 Recruits were taken mainly via Nepal to Pakistan before making the ﬁnal trip to 
Afghanistan. On arrival, they were reportedly paid 30,000 Bangladeshi taka (approxi-
mately US $525) and then oﬀered an additional “stipend” of 10,000 taka (approximately US 
$175) to ﬁght alongside Taliban and al-Qaeda forces against the Northern Alliance. Lintner 
(2002).
64 Saikia, “Triangle of New Concern”; Datta (2003), p. 8; Lintner (2002); Abuza (2005a), p. 
53. For the complete text of the Khost fatwa see Alexander and Swetnam (2001), Appendix 
1B, pp. 1–3.
65 Sahni, “Al Qaeda’s Strategic Reach in South Asia,” p. 7.
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ity of establishing a new beachhead for regional Islamic extremism in 
areas around the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In July that same year, Indian 
intelligence sources veriﬁed that a ﬁshing vessel—later identiﬁed as the 
MV Mecca—had been covertly ferrying al-Qaeda operatives and weap-
ons into Bangladesh for several months and that unlicensed madras-
sas funded by al-Haramain were providing training and arms to Arab 
and North African militants from Yemen, Algeria, Libya, and Sudan. 
This was followed three months later by the arrest of Fazle Karim (also 
known as Abu Fuzi), a known Harakat activist and reported veteran 
of bin Laden’s camps in eastern Afghanistan, who admitted he was 
part of an al-Qaeda–Taliban team that had been secretly established 
in Bangladesh.66
Commenting on these developments, one Western diplomat in 
Dhaka remarked that by the year’s end Bangladesh had emerged as 
a viable haven for foreign jihadists: “If . . . militants want to come in 
here and buy themselves new passports and new identities, stock up on 
any weapons they might want and maybe do a little refresher training 
before heading oﬀ again, there’s nothing to stop them.”67
As in the case of the extremist groups in Kashmir, the HuJI B’s 
rhetoric has become steadily anti-Western in the wake of the global 
war on terrorism, gravitating toward an ideological agenda that now, 
arguably, gives precedence to internationalist over local objectives. 
Many of the fundamentalist religious institutions to which HuJI B has 
been linked are open about their support of al-Qaeda’s war against the 
West. Indeed, Mullah Obaidul Haque, head of the national mosque in 
Dhaka and a known sympathizer of Harakat, is on record for pledg-
ing that “America and Bush must be destroyed,” while HuJI B, itself, 
now explicitly exhorts the dual refrain of Ambra Sobai Hobo Taliban, 
Bangla Hobe Afghanistan: “We will all be Taliban and Bangladesh will 
be Afghanistan.”68
66 Datta (2003), p. 9; Perry, “Deadly Cargo”; Lintner (2002); Lintner (2003), pp. 19–21; 
Abuza (2005a), pp. 53–54.
67 Cited in Perry, “Deadly Cargo.”
68 Perry, “Deadly Cargo”; Sahni, “Al Qaeda’s Strategic ” (2002), p. 7; Datta (2003), p. 8; 
Abuza (2005a), p. 53.
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Regional commentators believe that the increasingly pan-Islamic 
orientation of HuJI B is being fostered by al-Qaeda ideological “perches” 
that have been set up in Bangladesh over the last three years. At least 
six dedicated transnational training camps are thought to operate in 
Bangladesh. These camps were reportedly set up with the direct back-
ing of renegade elements in the ISI and DGFI to oﬀset the terrorists’ 
reduced operational and political space in Pakistan after September 
11.69 According to one former Burmese guerrilla, three facilities located 
just outside the town of Cox’s Bazar have a combined capacity of at 
least 2,500 cadres, with the largest comprising a complex of 26 inter-
connected bunkers built under a three-meter-high false forest ﬂoor. The 
camps are allegedly complete with kitchens, lecture halls, telephones, 
and televisions, and all have access to a wide range of weapons, includ-
ing AK-47s, heavy machine guns, pistols, RPGs, mortars, mantraps, 
and mines.70
A further possible indication of links between al-Qaeda and 
Harakat militants is manifest in the so-called Islamic Manch (IM, lit-
erally Islamic Association), which was formed in mid-2002 at Ukhia, 
near Cox’s Bazar. Coming under the leadership of HuJI B and repre-
senting nine other radical Islamic interests in Bangladesh, this umbrella 
group advocates an extremist jihadist rhetoric that closely resonates with 
bin Laden’s line. The movement seeks the creation of a transnational 
caliphate that will eventually take in all of Bangladesh, Assam, north 
Bengal, and Burma’s Arakan province, and has been identiﬁed as a key 
propaganda and logistical conduit for al-Qaeda in South Asia. Indian 
and Western intelligence sources fear that many of the al-Qaeda and 
Taliban members who entered the country between 2001 and 2002 
are now training the IM and may be seeking to establish the group as 
69 An internal HuJI B document lists no less than 19 training camps across Bangladesh, 
but it is uncertain how many of these actually oﬀered dedicated militant instruction. Indian 
intelligence sources believe that, overall, the country hosts a total of 194 militant camps for 
various insurgent movements opposed to the Delhi government.
70 Saikia, “Triangle of New Concern”; Perry, “Deadly Cargo.”
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a concerted operational wing for cross-regional attacks in South Asia 
(in essence, a version of the Jemaah Islamiyah network in Southeast 
Asia).71
Assessment and Future Outlook
HuJI B actions have been directed against Bangladesh’s Hindu minor-
ity as well as the country’s moderate Muslims. For the most part these 
attacks have been small-scale and opportunistic, which would seem to 
suggest that al-Qaeda has not had a signiﬁcant bearing on the group’s 
operational agenda. That said, HuJI B cadres have exhibited at least a 
rhetorical willingness to act beyond the Bangladesh theater; in this con-
text, connections to bin Laden and his global terror network begin to 
take on greater relevance. Indian intelligence sources have long insisted 
that the HuJI B has made logistical and operational arrangements with 
groups in Jammu and Kashmir—claims that are now being further 
supplemented by the assertions of independent regional observers who 
believe similar ties may have been instituted with militants based in 
Assam and Burma.72
Although there is no conclusive, publicly available evidence to 
verify these allegations or back the associated claim that outside con-
tacts have been made at the behest of external extremist forces, the 
presence of a Harakat leader at the signing of the 1998 Khost fatwa, the 
group’s reported hosting of an al-Qaeda–Taliban training team, and its 
central role in the (explicitly transnational) IM do seem to reﬂect a 
broad jihadist outlook. According to one commentator, members of the 
Rohingya Solidarity Organization and the Muslim Liberation Tigers 
71 Perry, “Deadly Cargo”; Saikia, “Triangle of New Concern”; Datta (2003), p. 9; Lintner 
(2002).
72 See, for instance, Perry “Deadly Cargo”; Lintner (2002); Lintner (2003), pp. 19–21; 
Abuza (2005a), pp. 53–54; “Dhaka Police Look for Al-Qaeda Link,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, October 10, 2002. The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported several border 
incidents during 2004 that Indian sources claimed were connected to Bangladeshi ties with 
northeastern separatists (ICG, 2004, p. 5).
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of Assam have been training in HuJI B camps since at least June 2002, 
while Harakat activists have traveled to Kashmir and even Chechnya 
to join forces with Islamist militants ﬁghting there.73
More recently, a 2003 report by the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) expressed speciﬁc concern over the growing extrem-
ist activism exhibited by HuJI B, hinting that this was being fostered 
by al-Qaeda as part of a wider policy to drive Western aid agencies 
out of Bangladesh.74 In February 2005, suspected Islamist extremists 
ﬁrebombed several such organizations, which could represent the ﬁrst 
stages of a heightened, externally directed operational agenda of this 
sort.75 If Harakat militants are, in fact, moving in this direction and 
beginning to hire themselves out as “subcontractors” for al-Qaeda, it 
would represent a fundamentally new development in HuJI B target-
ing and mission objectives that must be factored into assessments of the 
organization’s future threat potential. 
73 Lintner (2002).
74 Jim Bronskill, “CSIS Wary of Bangladesh,” CNEWS, December 12, 2003; Raman 
(2004); Hussain (2004). 




The Caucasus and Central Asia
Al-Qaeda has channeled its activities in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia through two groups: the Basayev faction of Chechen jihadists 
ﬁghting against the Russian Federation and the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU).
Chechnya
Chechen Jihadists (Basayev Faction)
The jihadist struggle in Chechnya has its roots in the history of the 
Chechen resistance to the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, dating 
back to the nineteenth century. In 1944, Stalin deported almost the 
entire Chechen population—roughly 400,000 people—to Central 
Asia, where many subsequently perished. This legacy of repression helps 
to explain the basis of contemporary Chechen nationalism, which has 
tended to be more radical and anti-Russian than that of other Muslim 
communities within the Russian Federation.
When the USSR collapsed in 1991, Chechens led by former 
Soviet General Dzhokhar Dudayev deposed the old Soviet leadership 
of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. However, these rebels 
were unable to consolidate any real degree of authority, leaving crimi-
nal groups (the so-called Chechen Maﬁa) and armed radicals to domi-
nate. The resulting anarchy, combined with a Russian fear of territo-
rial fragmentation, resulted in Russia’s refusing to recognize Chechnya 
as a separate republic. In 1994, then President Boris Yeltsin moved 
to bring the area back under Moscow’s control, launching a full-scale 
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military intervention that triggered a bloody two-year civil war.1 Despite 
an agreement in 1996 that gave Chechnya semiautonomous status, a 
renewed wave of violence broke out in 1998, the main impetus for which 
came from Islamists committed to driving Russia from Chechnya and 
neighboring Dagestan through the force of arms. Numbering approxi-
mately 2,000 ﬁghters, this semistructured network of jihadists, led by 
Shamil Basayev, forms the crux of the present terrorist-insurgency in 
this part of the Caucasus.2 The aim of these radicals is to destroy what 
they regard as a Russian colonial empire and to create a single Muslim 
state on the territory of Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and 
Tatarstan based on Wahhabist ideological precepts. 
Chechen jihadists have engaged in a plethora of violent and illicit 
activity, ranging from organized crime and kidnapping to guerrilla 
warfare and, increasingly, terrorist strikes perpetrated in the heart of 
the Russian Federation. These include
a series of four apartment building bombings during September 
1999, which collectively killed 293 and injured 370
the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October 2002, 
which ultimately led to the deaths of 129 hostages following a 
raid by Russian special forces
plots to assassinate President Putin in 2001 and 2002
a 2002 hijacking of a Russian airliner in Saudi Arabia
the Kaspiik bombing during a parade held on Great Patriotic Day, 
which killed dozens and injured hundreds of others
1 Dudayev was killed in a rocket attack that zeroed in on his satellite phone signal.
2 For more background on the Chechnya conﬂict, see De Waal and Carlotta (1998); Lieven 
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a string of suicide attacks throughout 2000–2004 that, combined, 
took the lives of over 200 people (see Table 8.1)3
the downing of two civilian aircraft by female suicide bombers 
and the horriﬁc massacre of schoolchildren and teachers at Beslan 
in September 2004.4
A little-known terrorist group calling itself the Islambuli Brigades 
(named after the Egyptian soldier who assassinated Egyptian president 
Anwar Sadat) has claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks 
in August 2004: the simultaneous downing of two passenger jets on 
August 24 that killed 89 people, and an August 31 attack by female 
suicide bombers outside a Moscow metro station that killed nine and 
injured scores. The group reportedly posted a statement on the Internet 
saying the attacks were carried out “in support of the Muslims of 
Chechnya.” It turns out that the Islambuli Brigades is a subsidiary of 
the Basayev faction. 
Although it does not enjoy the prominence of the Palestinian issue, 
the Chechen cause does have a high proﬁle in the Islamic world. This 
recognition has been apparent both in the widespread coverage that the 
Qatar-based al-Jazeera television network has given to such events as 
the 2002 Moscow theater hostage seizure and in the ties that Chechens 
have established with al-Qaeda. These contacts go back to the early 
1990s when the former autonomous republic ﬁrst began its struggle to 
3 See, for example, U.S. Department of State (2003), pp. 31–32; “Fourth Blast in Russia 
Kills 17,” The Washington Post, September 17, 1999; “History of Hijackings in Chechen 
Conﬂict,” BBC News, July 31, 2001; Adnan Malik, “Chechens Hijack Plane to Saudi 
Arabia,” Portsmouth Herald, March 16, 2001; “Russia Conﬁrms West’s Suspicions About 
Deadly Gas,” The Washington Post, October 31, 2002; “A Cult of Reluctant Killers,” The 
Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2004; and “Russia Says Subway Blast a Suicide Bomber,” 
Associated Press, February 17, 2004.
4 David Holley, “2 Russian Airliners Crash Nearly at the Same Time,” The Los Angeles 
Times, August 25, 2004; Kim Murphy, “A Violent Reminder That a War Lives,” The Los 
Angeles Times, August 27, 2004; Stefan Wagstyl and Tom Warner, “Rebels Grind Away 
Putin’s Popularity,” The Financial Times, September 2, 2004; “Russian Seige Ends in 
Bloodshed,” The Straits Times (Singapore), September 4, 2004; “Al Qaeda Connection to 
Beslan Attack,” The Straits Times, September 7, 2004.
•
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secede from the Russian Federation. Mullah Omar’s Taliban was one 
of the ﬁrst to endorse the legitimacy of Chechen independence and to 
oﬀer training and haven to Islamic ﬁghters committed to this end.5
Table 8.1
Major Suicide Attacks Carried Out by Chechen Militants, 2000–2004
Date Event Deaths Injuries
June 7, 2000 Suicide car-bomb attack in the village 
of Alkhan-Yurt (southwest of Grozny)
2 5
November 29, 2001 Suicide bombing in Urus-Martan 1 3
May 12, 2003 Suicide truck bombing at the 
government administration and 
security complex in Znamenskoye
59
May 14, 2003 Suicide bomb attack during a 
religious festival in the town of 
Ilaskhan-Yurt (east of Grozny)
16 145
June 5, 2003 Suicide bombing of bus carrying 
Russian air force pilots
16
July 5, 2003 Two suicide bombers blow 
themselves up at an open-air rock 
concert at a Moscow airﬁeld
14 60
July 10, 2003 A female suicide bomber is arrested 
before she can blow herself up in 
central Moscow; a Russian security 
ofﬁcer is killed while examining her 
explosive device
1
July 27, 2003 A female suicide bomber blows 
herself up after being stopped from 
entering a security base southeast of 
Grozny
1
December 5, 2003 Suicide bombing of a commuter train 
in the southern region of Stavropol
44 150
December 9, 2003 Suicide bombing outside the National 
Hotel in Central Moscow
6 14
February 7, 2004 Suicide bombing of Moscow subway 
train
41 100
SOURCE: “A Cult of Reluctant Killers,” The Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2004.
5 “Bin Laden’s Man in Chechnya,” The Sunday Herald (Edinburgh, UK), October 26, 
2002.
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This initial recognition laid the groundwork for the development 
of subsequent ties between Chechen mujahideen and the international 
jihadist movement based in Afghanistan. According to Russian sources, 
Ibn-ul-Khattab (real name, Samir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailem), the 
Saudi leader of the Arab ﬁghters in Chechnya, struck up a personal 
relationship with bin Laden during his time in Afghanistan.6 Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s second-in-command, is alleged to have made a 
exploratory trip to the Caucasus. Although the trip failed (al-Zawahiri 
was detained by Russian police before reaching his intended destina-
tion), it did set into motion a number of events that built further ties 
between Chechen jihadists and al-Qaeda through the International 
Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders. Al-Zawahiri later 
told his lieutenants that Chechnya oﬀered an ideal logistical base for 
al-Qaeda in Central Asia—Muslim, chaotic, and then eﬀectively 
independent.7
The most concerted Chechen–al-Qaeda link appears to have been 
established in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, which until 2003 was a law-
less haven for drug traﬃckers, crime syndicates, and kidnappers. (In 
2003, the Georgian government instituted a major crackdown against 
criminal elements based in the Pankisi Gorge, which has been rela-
tively successful in establishing a semblance of normalcy throughout 
the region.) One of bin Laden’s main lieutenants in this region was a 
Jordanian known as Abu Atiyya. In addition to overseeing the deploy-
ment of recruited cadres to militant camps, he is thought to have 
played a key role in reassigning trained personnel to operational terror 
networks and cells in such places as Azerbaijan, Turkey, and (according 
to Western sources) Europe.8
More serious are Georgian claims that the Pankisi area was 
used as a specialized zone for the training of Chechens in the use of 
chemical weapons. According to local intelligence sources, al-Qaeda 
6 The Russians assassinated Khattab with a poisoned letter in 2002.
7 For further details see “Saga of Dr. Zawahiri Sheds Light on the Roots of al-Qai’da 
Terror,” The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2002. 
8 See, for instance, “Al-Qai’da Terror Plot Foiled, Say French Police,” The Guardian (UK), 
January 12, 2004.
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operatives in the region included Middle Eastern chemists skilled in the 
manufacture of poisons who had been deployed to the Pankisi Gorge 
to help with preparations for unconventional attacks against American 
citizens and installations in Chechnya as well as other parts of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.9
Links to bin Laden’s global network have also been apparent in 
terms of training and ﬁnancial and ideological support. The inter-
nationalization of the Chechen terrorist network is illustrated by the 
presence of Chechen training camps in Georgia and the Pakistani 
tribal area of Waziristan.10 Considerable money has been transferred 
to Chechnya from the Gulf states (the bulk of these money transfers 
was allegedly coordinated by an Islamic spiritual leader known as Abu 
Omar Sief).11 Saudi missionaries are known to have been active in pro-
moting Wahhabist and Salaﬁst tendencies throughout the region.12
Al-Qaeda’s inﬂuence on the Chechen jihadists can be detected in 
the recent surge of suicide attacks, which prior to the late 1990s were 
essentially absent from the Chechen struggle. Women known as “Black 
Widows,” so named because many have suﬀered the loss of husbands 
at the hands of Russian security forces, have conducted the bulk of 
these attacks. Intelligence sources in Moscow assert that the interna-
tional jihadist movement coordinates training and indoctrination for 
9 “Al-Qai’da Terror Plot Foiled.”
10 See discussion of the South Asian parameters of the Chechen conﬂict in Peters, Dickens, 
Eaton, et al. (2005).
11 “A Cult of Reluctant Killers.”
12 It is important to note that while religion has been a signiﬁcant motivating factor for most 
outsiders to become involved in the Chechen conﬂict, ethnic and national considerations 
have been more important for the Diaspora Chechen community.
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these female suicide bombers (acting through a local recruiter known 
as “Black Fatima”) and that a dedicated wing of 50 bombers has been 
assembled to carry out suicide attacks.13
Exactly why the Chechens seem to have embraced al-Qaeda is 
an open question. On the one hand, Islam is not as deeply rooted 
in Chechnya as in other regions of the former Soviet Union, such as 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and the target is not so much the West at 
large as Russia. That said, informed commentators assert that Chechen 
jihadists do interpret any attack on Muslims anywhere as an assault on 
the Muslim world and are therefore predisposed to the global vision of 
bin Laden. Reﬂecting this, Chechens have been active in jihads not only 
in Chechnya, but also in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Uzbekistan.14
Assessment and Future Outlook
In many ways, al-Qaeda sees the conﬂict in Chechnya as a labora-
tory for terrorist and guerrilla warfare against a conventional military 
power. Training and logistical support provided to Basayev’s forces have 
been tailored to develop operational and organizational lessons that 
can be applied to Islamists ﬁghting across the general Central Asian 
region. Al-Qaeda’s calculation appears to be that this type of operation 
will destabilize a broad swath of enemy states across the Caucasus and 
Central Asia—from Azerbaijan to Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and India.
In 2002 a cell that the French have called the “Chechen net-
work”—although the members were actually North Africans, most of 
them relatives of Menad Benchellali, the son of a radical imam in the 
Lyon suburb of Venisseux—was found to be developing chemical and 
13 “A Cult of Reluctant Killers.” Abu Wahid, a Saudi national who is believed to be the com-
mander of the Chechen rebels’ eastern front explained the ideological rationale of the Black 
Widows during a 2004 interview with Al-Jazeera: “These women, particularly the wives of 
the moujahideen who are martyred, are being threatened in their homes. Their honor and 
everything are being threatened. They do not accept being humiliated and living under 
occupation. They say they want to serve the cause of almighty God and avenge the deaths of 
their husbands and persecuted [Muslim] peoples.”
14 During the 1999 ﬁghting in Kosovo many mercenaries with the Kosovar Liberation Front 
(KLF) were Chechens funded and trained by al-Qaeda. See “FSB: Chechen Rebels Hiding 
in Kosovo,” St. Petersburg Times (Russia), February 25, 2000.
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biological weapons. Members of this cell had trained with Chechens 
in the Pankisi Gorge camps. This incident underscored the potential 
of Basayev’s movement as an operational conduit for attacks against 
Western targets outside Chechnya.15 More worrying, the attempted 
development of unconventional weapons might suggest an intention to 
use Chechen militants to carry out a future al-Qaeda “spectacular.” 
From Moscow’s perspective, there is no doubt that the Chechen 
movement is now working in full conjunction with al-Qaeda. According 
to the Russian Interior Ministry’s Directorate for Combating Organized 
Crime (GUBOP), terrorist attacks in Russia rose by a full 38 percent 
between 2002 and 2003, from 407 to 561. The overwhelming majority 
of these attacks was carried out in the Southern Federal District, which 
covers the wider North Caucasus region.16 This rise in tempo has been 
attributed directly to growing linkages between Chechen rebels and 
the international jihadist movement. Commenting on this develop-
ment, Yuri Demidov, head of GUBOP’s Counterterrorism Section 
(sometimes referred to as T Center), observed that “[Chechen groups 
have] given up the struggle for an independent [state] and are now just 
carrying out the plans of international terrorists.”17
Uzbekistan
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) represents a coalition of 
Islamic militants drawn mainly from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who 
are opposed to the authoritarian secular regime of Uzbek president 
15 Benchellali, a chemist who had been trained in poison-making skills in Afghanistan, was 
actively attempting to produce a botulism toxin as well as ricin. He had tested his chemicals 
on animals and was believed to have been planning suicide bomb attacks on prominent tar-
gets in Paris, including the Russian embassy. “Benchellali and His Close Relatives Before the 
Antiterrorist Judges,” Le Figaro, January 13, 2004. See also Vidino (2005).
16 Galeotti (2004), p. 6.
17 Yuri Demidov, cited in Galeotti (2004).
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Islam Karimov.18 Although the immediate focus of the IMU has been 
on Uzbekistan, its long-term aim is the establishment of a transna-
tional caliphate that would embrace, at a minimum, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, extending eventually to the outer perimeters of Central 
Asia’s Muslim regions.19 According to U.S. government estimates, the 
IMU’s current strength amounts to no more than 700 militants,20 the 
main concentrations of whom are located in the Ferghana Valley and 
the Surkhandarya and Kashkadarya regions of Uzbekistan. Although 
the movement as a whole comes under the combined leadership of Tahir 
Yuldashev and Juma Khodjiev (otherwise known as Juma Namangani), 
who are the original founders,21 it tends to operate as a loosely struc-
tured collection of semiautonomous groups, each of which answers to 
individual, regionally based hujras (command councils). Although the 
aims of these subcommands are deﬁned in terms of a wider Islamist 
agenda, most are also characterized by speciﬁc local designs that reﬂect 
the interests of their respective constituencies.22
Most IMU links to al-Qaeda date back to 1996, when bin Laden 
relocated to Afghanistan and set up a secure base of operations in 
areas under the control of the Taliban. In common with groups from 
other regions of the Muslim world, Uzbek militants were exposed to 
al-Qaeda’s doctrine of global jihad and were able to gain access to cru-
18 In addition to the IMU, governments in both Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic 
have claimed that another Islamist group, the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT), has links to outside 
Islamic extremists and that its organizational structure provides a channel for recruitment of 
terrorists. 
19 U.S. Department of State (2003); Rotar (2003).
20 U.S. Department of State (2004), p. 122. Determining an accurate ﬁgure for IMU mem-
bership is diﬃcult (some estimates run as high as 15,000–20,000) as the movement operates 
on the basis of an extremely secretive cellular structure. Some cells may number no more 
than four to ﬁve people.
21 In November 2001, anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan alleged that Namangani had 
been killed in a U.S. air strike while commanding al-Qaeda forces around Mazar-e-Sharif. 
However, reports that have since circulated suggest that the Uzbek leader may not, in fact, 
have been killed.
22 “Renewed Concerns That Terrorists Are Regrouping,” RFE/RL Central Asia Report, July 
25, 2002.
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cial operational and logistical support—including weapons, training, 
leadership planning, and ﬁnances.23 Informed commentators argue 
that, of all the militant organizations present in Afghanistan prior to 
2001, IMU received by far the most generous support, allowing the 
group to eﬀectively increase the tempo, range, scope, and sophistica-
tion of its attacks both in Uzbekistan and more generally throughout 
Central Asia.24
Indicative of this potential were a number of signiﬁcant IMU 
strikes between 1998 and 2001, including ﬁve simultaneous car bomb-
ings in Tashkent on February 16, 1999 (one of which almost killed 
President Karimov), a full-scale assault on several villages located along 
the Tajik border in early August 2000,25 and subsequent high-proﬁle 
kidnappings of German, Japanese, American, Russian, and Ukrainian 
nationals in Kyrgyzstan that same month.26 The audacity of these 
attacks is noteworthy, not least because of the restricted operational 
space available to the IMU as a result of the increasingly draconian 
internal security measures being adopted by the Central Asian repub-
lics at that time. 
The IMU has also been connected to al-Qaeda through groups 
in bin Laden’s wider terror network. The movement has long been 
accused of working in collaboration with Chechen rebels in Russia 
and Dagestan as well as with Uighur separatists in China’s Xinjiang 
province.27 According to Uzbek oﬃcials, the primary purpose of these 
23 “Renewed Concerns That Terrorists Are Regrouping.”
24 In an interview with the Kyrgyz newspaper Slovo Kyrgyzstana, an Afghan ﬁeld com-
mander revealed that Yuldashev had jointly worked on his plan for establishing a Ferghana 
emirate with Mullah Omar and that of all the parties in Afghanistan, only the IMU directly 
beneﬁted from Taliban assistance. See Rotar (2003).
25 As a direct result of this latter operation, Tashkent instituted the Southern Group of 
Forces, comprising some 6,000 troops from various branches of the military, to defend 
against renewed IMU oﬀensives. Informed commentators believe the size of the detachment 
bears witness to the perceived threat the group is seen to pose to Uzbek frontier regions.
26 Katzman (2002), pp. 19–20; “Renewed Concerns That Terrorists Are Regrouping”; 
“Islamic Militants with Japanese Hostages Hold Kyrgyz at Bay,” The New York Times, 
October 18, 1999.
27 Rotar (2003).
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ties has been to facilitate the export of Islamic radicalism to the outer 
fringes of Central Asia as well as to establish networks that have played 
an indispensable role in the traﬃcking of Afghan heroin.28 U.S. author-
ities now believe that the income derived from these drug running 
operations was essential to the development and expansion of terrorist 
infrastructure that bin Laden set up in northern Afghanistan during 
the latter half of the 1990s.29
IMU ties with al-Qaeda do not appear to have atrophied in the 
wake of Operation Enduring Freedom and may in fact have been 
strengthened. Following the bombing campaign in October 2001, the 
IMU suspended much of its Uzbek-focused activity, committing itself 
largely to the war against the U.S.-led coalition. Although many of the 
group’s members were killed or captured, Western observers believe 
that the experience helped to solidify what were already strong per-
sonal and group ties between al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the IMU 
and to strengthen a sense of shared, internationally oriented Islamic 
identity.
U.S. oﬃcials believe that the IMU leadership is now working to 
rebuild the organization and widening its target base to include all 
those perceived as opposed to its vision of Islam.30 They also point 
to signs of increased activity following a long period of dormancy:
bombings in Bishkent and Osh between December 2002 and May 
2003;31 the discovery of a plot to attack an American airbase close to 
the Kyrgyz capital in November 2003; a series of bloody assaults in 
28 Chalk interviews, Washington, D.C., and New Delhi, February 2001. See also Rashid 
(2002), ch. 6. 
29 See, for instance, “Osama bin Laden a ‘Narco-Terrorist,’” The Washington Times, January 
22, 2004; and “The Iceberg Beneath the Charity,” The Economist, March 15, 2003.
30 Katzman (2002), pp. 19–20; “Renewed Concerns That Terrorists Are Regrouping.”
31 One of those arrested in the bombings was Azizbek Karimov, a former chief of the IMU’s 
“security service” who testiﬁed that he had been directly ordered to plant the bombs by the 
group’s central leadership in consultation with al-Qaeda. See Rotar (2003) and “Renewed 
Concerns That Terrorists Are Regrouping.”
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the Uzbek capital between March 28 and April 1, 2004; 32 and suicide 
strikes against the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent on July 30, 
2004.33 The United States believes these developments are indicative 
of a regrouping of the IMU in Central Asia that is being deliberately 
fostered by al-Qaeda.34
Assessment and Future Outlook
U.S. oﬃcials and analysts believe that there is an active working rela-
tionship between the IMU and the al-Qaeda network and that this 
is directly fueling the overall threat potential of the group in Central 
Asia. The suicide bombings in Uzbekistan came after violence that 
left at least 47 dead, mostly alleged militants, who Uzbek authorities 
claim traveled from southern Kazakhstan through Azerbaijan and 
Iran to terror camps in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas in Waziristan, 
where they were trained by Arab al-Qaeda instructors. Although these 
attacks were not carried out by the IMU per se, the IMU may, in fact, 
have morphed into a broader, regional violent Islamic group capable of 
launching attacks against governments, police, and foreigners. Other 
regional commentators remain somewhat less convinced, however. The 
head of the International Crisis Group’s eﬀort in Central Asia, David 
Lewis, asserts that while some regrouping of the IMU in Uzbekistan 
32 A group calling itself the Jihad Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the attacks. 
The strikes included a suicide bombing on a police station, the ﬁrst ever to be carried out 
in Uzbekistan, which outside commentators believe is a further indication that the IMU’s 
revival is possibly being fomented by outside inﬂuences. For further details see McConnell 
(2004), pp. 14–17; “Islamic Group Takes Credit for Uzbek Clashes,” The Los Angeles Times,
April 12, 2004; and David Holley, “Islam’s Distant Battle,” The Los Angeles Times, April 17, 
2004. 
33 “Blast Hits U.S., Israeli Embassies in Uzbekistan,” MSNBC News Services, July 30, 
2004; “Uzbek President Points to Islamic Extremists in Attacks,” The Los Angeles Times,
August 1, 2004.
34 According to the U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, there has been a noticeable spike in 
threats to Western interests across Central Asia over the past two years, the main trigger for 
which appears to be an al-Qaeda–sustained IMU “which despite being dealt a heavy blow in 
Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, has reemerged as an active organization in Central Asia.” Cited 
in “Central Asia: Focus on Security Threat from Radical Islamic Groups,” IRINnews.org,
January 14, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=38916&SelectRegion=
Central_Asia (as of February 27, 2006). 
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and Kyrgyzstan may have taken place, the movement at most poses 
only a residual threat to regional security, and its operational eﬀective-
ness is almost certainly not as high as some other analysts suggest.35
This assessment is shared by a number of Central Asian observers, who 
maintain that there is little ongoing support for the IMU from al-
Qaeda or the Taliban and that the movement has been eﬀectively van-
quished as a viable insurgency.36
Thus, the future threat trajectory of the IMU remains uncertain. 
If, in fact, the group is being sustained as a component of the inter-
national jihadist front, one can expect to see attacks against Western 
and allied interests in Central Asia, some of which may be coordinated 
with other regional entities. If, on the other hand, the IMU is now 
devoid of outside assistance, its operational focus will probably amount 
to no more than small-scale localized attacks, with the group shift-
ing its activities to political agitation through its existing network of 
underground supporters.37
35 “Central Asia: Focus on Security Threat.”
36 “Central Asia: Focus on Security Threat.”




The North and East African Clusters
North Africa
North African terrorism is shadowy and diﬃcult to deﬁne. Groups 
operating in this region frequently share membership, pursue similar 
goals, and often participate in the same attacks. That being said, it is 
possible to delineate certain organizations that are generally acknowl-
edged to have established some sort of ideological, logistical, or opera-
tional relationship with al-Qaeda. This section analyzes these organi-
zations, focusing its attention on entities existing in Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Libya. A map showing the countries where the main 
North African groups operate is shown in Figure 9.1.
Morocco: The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group and 
Salaﬁya Jihadia 
Two groups that can be considered part of the international jihadist 
movement operate in Morocco: the Moroccan Islamic Combatant 
Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain [GICM]) and Salaﬁya 
Jihadia (SJ)—which might be no more than a label for a constellation 
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of diﬀerent groups.1 Although there may be no correlation, the emer-
gence of the GICM and SJ coincided with the rise of al-Qaeda and the 
international jihadist movement in the late 1990s. The exact details of 
the emergence of GICM and SJ are unclear. Certain commentators 
believe the former group was established outside Morocco in London 
around 1999 or 2000, where its members reportedly operated in the 
same circles as London-based al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Qatada. Others, 
1 Pargeter (2005). The GICM has been proscribed as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) 
by the United States government and is currently subject to a range of ﬁnancial and politi-
cal sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13224; the group has also been penalized by the 
United Nations Sanctions Committee under Security Council Resolution 1267. SJ has yet 
to be designated an FTO, possibly because U.S. authorities have only become aware of it 
relatively recently.
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however, contend that the GICM manifesto was written as early as 
1998 and that the group had already established European bases, which 
were used for gunrunning and document forgery purposes.
With regard to SJ, the United States only became aware of the 
group’s existence following the Casablanca bombings in May 2003. 
Moroccan authorities, however, claim that the group was formed in 
the 1990s and had become particularly infamous for conducting brutal 
attacks against women and other “inﬁdel” targets well before the attacks 
of 2003. Both organizations advocate a hard-line Wahhabist ideology 
and seek to replace the current secular Rabat regime with a theocracy 
that adheres to shari’a law in all aspects of life. According to the U.S. 
State Department, both the GICM and SJ identify with the broader 
aim of reestablishing a transnational caliphate across the Maghreb and 
are part of a wider network of North African extremists who are pre-
pared to work with the international jihadist movement.2
Ties between the GICM and SJ and al-Qaeda, as in the case of 
many other North African terrorist groups, appear to have originated 
primarily through personal contacts that senior group leaders estab-
lished during the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad in the 1980s. It is unclear, 
however, whether the more senior operatives were directly integrated 
into the al-Qaeda network or were merely exposed to and inﬂuenced by 
the movement’s transnational jihadist ideas as a result of their common 
experience as Afghan “alumni.”3
Both the GICM and SJ have been connected to attacks and plots 
in Morocco, but their connections to al-Qaeda remain ambiguous. 
Further investigation has revealed that although links exist between 
the leader of the Casablanca operation, Pierre Robert, and al-Qaeda, 
the group that conducted the attacks appears to have functioned more 
as a “franchise” of al-Qaeda, than as a group operationally linked to al-
Qaeda.4 The near-simultaneous attacks in Riyadh four days before the 
Casablanca attacks, bearing similar hallmarks, lend further credence 
2 U.S. Department of State (2003), p. 140; Ulph (2004a).
3 Moncef Sellimi, “Report Cites Moroccan Security Sources on New Arrests Among Salaﬁ 
Jihdist Group,” Al-Sharq al-Aswat, FBIS GMP20030531000120, May 31, 2003.
4 Kalpakian (2005), p. 113.
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to this possibility. In May 2003, both the SJ and GICM conducted 
a series of multiple car bombings that struck several foreign interests 
in Casablanca—including a Spanish social club, a Jewish community 
center, and a hotel and restaurant frequented by Israeli tourists. The 
attacks left over 40 persons dead and 65 injured.5 According to one 
source, the attacks were legitimized by a fatwa from Taliban leader 
Mullah Omar, ﬁnanced by bin Laden, and executed with the assis-
tance of “professional” externally based specialists, although this claim 
cannot be veriﬁed.6
Soon after the attacks, a prominent GICM leader, Abdelaziz 
Benyaich, was arrested in Spain as one of the ringleaders behind the 
bombings. He was subsequently connected to an additional al-Qaeda 
plot against U.S. naval vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar, which was alleg-
edly to have taken place in coordination with strikes on tourist buses 
en route from Rabat to Casablanca and on a café in Marrakech popu-
lar with foreign nationals. Moroccan authorities believe that Benyaich 
was acting under the orders of a senior Yemeni al-Qaeda commander, 
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.7
More recently, Moroccan extremists8 were tied to the March 11, 
2004, simultaneous bombings of commuter trains in Madrid, which 
left 191 people dead. That attack remains one of the most destructive 
acts of terrorism ever carried out in Europe. The arrest of a key con-
spirator, Amer Azizi, a Moroccan tied to the GICM, has lent further 
credence to the charge that Moroccan extremists are now playing a key 
role in the strategic operations of the international Islamist movement 
5 “Bomb Carnage Shocks Morocco,” BBC News, May 17, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/3037157.stm (as of February 27, 2006). 
6 Francois Soudan, “Paris Magazine Reports on Terrorist Networks Responsible for 16 
May Attacks,” Paris Jeune Afrique-L’Intelligent, FBIS GMP20030712000005, July 6, 2003.
7 Nashiri was believed to be al-Qaeda’s operations chief in the Persian Gulf and the mas-
termind behind the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. He was captured in October 
2002.
8 We use the term “Moroccan extremists” in this context to refer to known members of the 
SJ or GICM or extremists of Moroccan descent known to local law enforcement or intel-
ligence services. 
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and that some of the most destructive operations alleged to have been 
carried out in the name of the organization are intimately tied to the 
North African networks.9
Certainly the Rabat government has long claimed that links have 
been established among GICM, SJ, and al-Qaeda. Moroccan authori-
ties assert that all three groups have been working together since at least 
early 2003 and that each has agreed to fully coordinate their respective 
ideological and operational agendas for the purposes of launching con-
certed attacks against Western and allied interests in the Maghreb and 
Europe.10 However, there is still no evidence that SJ and GICM took 
orders from bin Laden or other senior al-Qaeda leaders to conduct the 
May 2003 attacks. 
GICM and SJ: Assessment and Future Outlook
While the GICM and SJ remain primarily focused on fomenting an 
Islamist revolution in Morocco, both groups clearly fall into the cat-
egory of “willing supporter” of al-Qaeda—prepared to act on behalf 
of or otherwise support al-Qaeda when called to do so. Both organiza-
tions have undoubtedly viewed such tactical cooperation as helpful to 
their own objectives, not least because it appears to have enabled them 
to secure ﬁnancial and logistical support. Acting in this manner, the 
GICM and SJ have been able to progressively extend the range and 
scope of their activities in Morocco. This, in turn, has allowed the two 
groups to attract new recruits and suicide cadres in Morocco and, just 
as importantly, to focus worldwide attention on their cause.
The actual extent to which the GICM and SJ rely on al-Qaeda 
backing is somewhat more diﬃcult to discern. While both organi-
zations have deﬁnitely beneﬁted from the provision of outside assis-
tance, several commentators believe the two groups are able to draw on 
9 See “Madrid Suspect Charged in 9/11,” The Los Angeles Times, April 29, 2004; Tracy 
Wilkinson, “Train Bombings Kill Nearly 200 in Spain,” The Los Angeles Times, March 12, 
2004; Sebastian Rotella and Tracy Wilkinson, “Al Qaeda Now Focus of Spain’s Bombing 
Probe,” The Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2004; Elaine Sciolino and Emma Daly, “Blast 
Suspects in Madrid Had New Plot, Oﬃcials Say,” The New York Times, April 9, 2004.
10 Djamel Boukrine, “Al Qa’ida Related Organization Seen Helping Moroccan Islamists,” 
Le Mat, FBIS GMP20020812000004, August 12, 2002.
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additional sources of logistical and ﬁnancial support from organized 
crime. Indeed, the investigation into the Casablanca bombings revealed 
that the attacks were carried out with SJ’s own resources and that the 
group had already planned and carried out a series of robberies and 
attacks against private citizens and property in Morocco to raise money 
for this and future operations.11
It is also worth bearing in mind that working with al-Qaeda may 
very well have medium- to long-term eﬀects that outweigh any short-
term gains that the GICM and SJ have so far achieved. The Casablanca 
bombings, for instance, triggered a major government crackdown 
against entities identifying with radical ideologies that has since resulted 
in widespread arrests and detentions throughout the country. While 
these actions do appear to have energized increased Islamist fervor and 
support for the GICM-SJ cause, they have also depleted the two groups 
of experienced and trained operatives, creating a critical “middle-man-
agement” personnel void that could prove diﬃcult to ﬁll.12
More to the point, the Rabat government is now fully aware of 
the potential threat of militant extremism in its own backyard, and 
while it has been a strong partner in the U.S.-led war on terrorism, it 
now appears to more fully appreciate the need for concerted (rather 
than ad hoc) domestic security responses and initiatives.13 If followed 
through in a consistent and thorough manner, these measures are 
likely to severely restrict the operational space available to GICM and 
SJ militants, possibly permanently depriving them of the disinterested 
or passive internal environment that had facilitated their activities prior 
to May 2002.
11 Muhammed Wamusa, “Arab Magazine Views Growing Power of Moroccan Islamist 
Groups,” Al Watan al-Arabi, FBIS GMP20020822000073, August 23, 2002.
12 Ulph (2004a).
13 See, for instance, “Le Monde Cites Moroccan Expert on Reasons for Terrorist Attacks,” 
Le Monde, FBIS EUP20030520000072, May 20, 2003.
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Algeria: The Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and Combat and the 
Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salaﬁa
Most of the existing terrorist groups that hail from Algeria are splinters 
of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which declined largely as a result 
of popular alienation from its campaign of brutal massacres of civil-
ians during the mid-1990s. Two prominent terrorist groups have since 
emerged, both of which have been identiﬁed as having links with al-
Qaeda: the GSPC (discussed in Chapter Six) and the Dhamat Houmet 
Daawa Salaﬁa (DHDS).14
The DHDS, or Protectors of the Salaﬁst Call, also known as the 
Group of Supporters of the Salaﬁst Trend, led by Mohammad Benslim, 
split from the GIA in 2001 (before which it was known as Katibat el-
Ahoual, literally the “Horror Squadron”). Like the GSPC, the group 
is opposed to the secular orientation of the current Algiers regime and 
seeks to institute a fundamentalist Islamic order in its place. The group 
is well organized, has acquired a relatively advanced military arsenal, 
concentrates the bulk of its attacks in Algeria against government and 
security personnel, and has allegedly participated in the planning of 
terrorist operations abroad.15
Like the GSPC, the DHDS traces its ties to al-Qaeda through 
the group’s common ancestry in the GIA and the extensive role that 
Algerians in general played in the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad during the 
1980s.16 Bin Laden had always taken a special interest in the Islamist 
struggle in this part of North Africa and, following the outbreak of 
the Islamist insurgency in 1992, quickly moved to establish ties with 
the Algerian jihadists. However, the GIA’s role in the massacres of 
14 For more information on the GSPC’s relationship with al-Qaeda, see “Algerian Group 
Backs Al Qaeda” (2003). 
15 “Designation of Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salaﬁya Under Executive Order 13224,” 
Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 202, October 20, 2003, http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/
2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003/03-26524.htm (as of April 3, 2006).
16 According to one source, Algerians made up one-third of all combatants during the anti-
Soviet Afghan jihad and were among the ﬁrst recruits to train in bin Laden’s camps in the 
Sudan during the early 1990s. See Fanney (2003).
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civilians, which were creating great consternation in the Muslim world, 
caused al-Qaeda to gradually distance itself from the GIA by the late 
1990s.
The emergence of splinter factions in the form of the DHDS 
and GSPC provided an ideal opportunity for bin Laden to reestab-
lish operational and logistical ties in Algeria, which was not only the 
theater of an ongoing armed Islamist struggle, but was well placed to 
facilitate the planning and execution of attacks in the Mediterranean as 
well as across Europe.17 For example, one Algerian member of DHDS, 
Mohammad Meguerba, revealed to his Algerian interrogators that bin 
Laden tasked him just before 9/11 to carry out attacks in Europe.18
In contrast to the GSPC, there is little speciﬁc information concern-
ing the nature and scope of the partnership between the DHDS and 
al-Qaeda.19 While there are reports that logistical, intelligence, and 
ﬁnancial ties between the two groups have been instituted to facilitate 
international attacks,20 most accounts concur that the bulk of DHDS 
activity, at least at this stage, centers on civilian and military targets in 
western Algeria.21
DHDS: Assessment and Future Outlook
As suggested above, the extent of DHDS links to al-Qaeda remains 
uncertain, and it is therefore diﬃcult to ascertain what eﬀect reputed 
outside connections might have had on the group. However, should 
more explicit ties emerge in the future, it is reasonable to assume that 
the DHDS will be able to avail itself of added ﬁnancial and logisti-
17 See, for instance, Knights (2003); Fanney (2003); Schanzer (2002).
18 Jenny Booth and Sean O’Neill, “The Missing Witness Who Revealed the Ricin Plot,” 
Times Online, April 13, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1568044,00.html 
(as of April 3, 2006).
19 “Designation of Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salaﬁya Under Executive Order 13224.”
20 See, for instance, “Islamist Suspects Arrested in Spain Named,” MADRID EFE, FBIS 
EUP20030124000473, January 24, 2003. According to this report, DHDS operatives were 
providing al-Qaeda operatives in Spain with both “intelligence and infrastructure.”
21 “Algiers Daily Security Analyst Views Terrorism Picture in Western Part of Country,” 
Algiers Le Mat, FBIS GMP2002060000010, June 9, 2002.
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cal resources. This support will necessarily be contingent on how far 
the DHDS is prepared to go in terms of facilitating al-Qaeda’s opera-
tional agenda, particularly its willingness to provide frontline cadres 
for attacks on U.S. and Western targets.
Libya: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in 1995 with 
the dual intent of overthrowing the regime of Muammar al-Qadhaﬁ 
and establishing an Islamic state through armed struggle. From the 
outset, the group was composed mostly of Libyans who had fought 
and trained in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war in the 1980s. 
Little is known about the organization’s structure other than that it 
appears to operate under a joint command.22 The group has a base of 
several hundred ﬁghters and has moved to set up an overseas logistical 
infrastructure to compensate for losses suﬀered in Libya over the last 
several years.23
The LIFG has claimed responsibility for two failed assassination 
attempts against Qadhaﬁ (1996 and 1998)24 and has threatened to 
conduct suicide attacks against Libyan interests abroad. To date, how-
ever, the group has not carried out any attacks outside Libya (although 
it has participated in the planning of al-Qaeda operations). The bulk 
of its activity is directed against local security forces in and around 
Benghazi.25
The LIFG is thought to have enjoyed links with the al-Qaeda 
network since 1995. In the group’s deﬁning manifesto issued that 
year, LIFG leaders speciﬁcally asserted that one of their objectives was 
22 One of the group’s leaders was alleged to be Abu Anas al-Libi. Some sources report that 
Abu Anas was killed in Afghanistan prior to September 11; others maintain he is in the cus-
tody of a foreign security service.
23 U.S. Department of State (2003), p. 138.
24 Press reports maintain that LIFG’s assassination attempt against Qadhaﬁ in 1996 was 
carried out by a Libyan oppositionist living in the United Kingdom, although this cannot be 
conﬁrmed.
25 U.S. Department of State (2003), p. 138; Kamil al-Tawil, “Second Libyan Group Claims 
al-Qadhaﬁ Bid,” Al-Hayah, London, FBIS FTS19980619000684, June 19, 1998.
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“standing in support and allegiance of all other Jihad group[s] in any 
spot of the world.”26 Three years later this rhetorical pledge was trans-
lated into action. According to British security sources, members of 
the LIFG played a role in the planning of the bombings of the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, operating through the conduit of 
Abu Anas, who was reputedly recruited by bin Laden speciﬁcally for 
this purpose.27
Further indication of links between Libyan extremists and al-
Qaeda emerged in the wake of the subsequent U.S. retaliatory missile 
strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan. Denouncing these actions as illegiti-
mate and unjustiﬁed, the LIFG issued a vehemently anti-U.S. commu-
niqué that called for the “uniﬁcation of stances vis-à-vis the ferocious 
oﬀensive now that the American Administration has chosen the road 
of hostility to the Islamic nation.”28
LIFG: Assessment and Future Outlook
LIFG cadres currently appear to be ideologically split over whether 
to maintain ties to al-Qaeda. Although the group still appears to be 
organizationally intact, there are signs that a divide may be emerging 
between those who want to keep the movement focused on achieving 
local goals (overthrowing Qadhaﬁ) and those that are actively seeking 
to align the LIFG with the international jihadist movement. The true 
nature and extent of this organizational ﬁssure are unknown, however, 
and the balance of opinion in the central leadership remains unclear. 
That said, it seems likely that even if the LIFG moves decisively 
to distance itself from al-Qaeda, residual links with bin Laden’s move-
ment will persist through personal ties and contacts. Moreover, Tripoli’s 
increasingly close relationship with the United States, particularly in 
26 “New Group Urges Jihad Against al-Qadhaﬁ,” soc.culture.Algeria newsgroup, FBIS 
FTS19951022000038, October 22, 1995.
27 “‘Abu Anas al-Libi’ Killed in Afghanistan Before 11 September,” London al-Hayah, FBIS 
GMP200203222000078, March 22, 2002.
28 “UK-Based Islamists Deny Bin Laden Link,” London al-Sharq al-Aswat, FBIS 
FTS19980827000837, August 26, 1998.
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matters pertaining to counterterrorism,29 could well cause those who 
wish to maintain a discrete local focus to at least acquiesce in strikes 
against a more broadly deﬁned set of Western targets. In other words, 
there will be a continuing danger of Libyan extremists helping plan (if 
not carry out) attacks against American and allied interests across the 
Maghreb and, leveraging the LIFG’s existing overseas network, even 
farther aﬁeld in East Africa and southern Europe.30
Tunisia: Tunisian Combatant Group
Islamist extremists have lacked the political space to develop a signiﬁ-
cant following in Tunisia, where manifestations of political Islam are 
tightly monitored by the state. As a result, Tunisia has not confronted 
the type of civil unrest and insurgency found in other Maghreb polities. 
That said, Tunisian extremists are known to operate as an organized 
entity, the Jama’a Combattante Tunisienne or Tunisian Combatant 
Group (TCG). This group has not only worked in conjunction with 
the wider North African jihadist network but is independently active 
in European locations such as the United Kingdom and Italy.
The TCG emerged sometime in early 2000 and, in common with 
many other Muslim extremists in North Africa, seeks to establish a 
fundamentalist Islamic state in Tunisia. While primarily advocating 
local goals, the organization also expresses an ideological aﬃnity with 
the wider jihadist movement. Little is known about the structure of the 
TCG. However, as noted above, the group is not believed to enjoy an 
overt popular following in Tunisia and it reportedly suﬀers from a lack 
of weapons, ﬁnances, and resources.31
29 At the time of writing, Qadhaﬁ had agreed to pay compensation to the victims of the 
1988 Pan Am bombing and for the downing of an Air France jet over Niger the following 
year. The Libyan leader had also given his full commitment to cracking down on Islamic 
extremists in North Africa and to working with the international community in allowing 
unhindered access to verify the credentials of the country’s supposed nuclear facilities.
30 While neither British nor U.S. intelligence sources report any concrete evidence of a 
LIFG operational presence in East Africa at present, both remain cognizant of such a poten-
tial threat in the future. Chalk interviews, U.S. Embassy and British High Commission, 
Nairobi, February 2004.
31 U.S. Department of State (2003), p. 144. 
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According to the U.S. State Department, the TCG established 
ties with al-Qaeda and the broader North African jihadist movement 
immediately after its founding in 2000. As was the case with groups 
in Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt, these links developed through 
personal relationships forged in the crucible of the anti-Soviet Afghan 
campaign during the 1980s. Between 2000 and 2003, the TCG was 
connected to al-Qaeda both ideologically and operationally. British 
and U.S. intelligence sources believe the group acted as a local recruiter 
for bin Laden, coordinating its endeavors with other regional Islamists 
such as the GSPC. Tunisian extremists are thought to have played a 
role in facilitating the movement of al-Qaeda operatives and material 
across Europe, providing false documents, ﬁnances, intelligence and 
other logistical support.32 The TCG has also been connected to several 
high-proﬁle attacks and plots attributed to international extremist ele-
ments. These include the April 2002 suicide truck bombing of a syna-
gogue in Djerba that killed 22 people33 as well as a 2001 plan to target 
the U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome.34
TCG: Assessment and Future Outlook
As with many other North African Islamists, the TCG has a predomi-
nantly domestic agenda but is ready and willing to carry out attacks 
against U.S. and Western interests. The group’s small domestic con-
stituency creates an incentive to cooperate with the global jihadist net-
work to secure outside support for its activities. This disposition to act 
on behalf of the international jihadist cause, or at least in conjunc-
tion with it, could potentially make the organization as threatening 
as other, stronger “willing supporters” of al-Qaeda, such as the SJ and 
GICM.
32 By Tunisian extremists we mean known members of the TCG or individuals of Tunisian 
descent known to be involved in, or suspected of involvement in, terrorist activity.
33 The 2002 attack, which employed liqueﬁed petroleum gas, was claimed by al-Qaeda, 
which acknowledged that the operation was carried out by a Tunisian martyr who left a pre-
recorded videotape stating his willingness to die for the wider jihadist cause. See “Al-Qaeda-
Linked Group Claims Tunisia Blast,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, 
April 17, 2002, http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=768 (as of February 27, 2006).
34 U.S. Department of State (2003), p. 144.
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East Africa
Somalia: Al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI) and the “New” Somali Jihadi 
Network
Initially, jihadism in Somalia was synonymous with al-Itihaad al-Islami 
(AIAI, commonly shortened to al-Itihaad), a Wahhabist organization 
dedicated to the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia. 
According to local sources, veterans of the Afghan war founded the 
group during the 1980s. Al-Itihaad gained strength after the collapse 
of the Said Barre regime in the early 1990s (predominantly by oﬀering 
employment and social services in a country bereft of any real gov-
ernment) and is alleged to have played some role in the “Black Hawk 
Down” incident in Mogadishu.35 AIAI managed to further strengthen 
its position by establishing links with successful Somali businesses and 
creating its own enterprises in the areas of banking, telecommunica-
tions, export-import, and religious instruction.36 By the middle of the 
decade, the group was thought to have built up a militia of at least 
1,000 ﬁghters, the funding for which was primarily channeled through 
Islamist charities based in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.37
Following a series of high-proﬁle attacks in Ethiopia between 
1995 and 1996,38 AIAI was subjected to a sustained military onslaught 
at the hands of the Addis Ababa government. This withering oﬀen-
sive precipitated the gradual dismantling of al-Itihaad’s political and 
35 Shinn (2002); U.S. Department of State (2003), p. 127. It should be noted that informed 
commentators have cast doubt on these claims, not least because they were made a full three 
years after Somali warlord Mohammed Farid Aideed clashed with U.S. forces (although this 
does not, in itself, discount the possibility that Al-Itihaad members could be implicated in 
attacks on U.S. forces).
36 Shinn (2002); Kansteiner (2002); Dagne (2002). AIAI was placed on the United States’ 
Terrorism Exclusion List (TEL) in December 2001.
37 ICG (2005c), p. 1.
38 These included the assassination of General Hayelom Araya, head of operations in 
Ethiopia’s Ministry of Defense, and the attempted assassination of Transport Minister 
Abdul-Mejid Hussein (now Ambassador to the United Nations) during 1995; the bombing 
of the Ethiopian government-owned Ghion Hotel in Addis Ababa in January 1996; and the 
bombing of the Ras Hotel in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia’s second largest city, a month later. 
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operational architecture, which had largely collapsed by 1998.39
However, various members of the group remained active and are since 
thought to have ﬁltered into a more, nebulous jihadist movement that 
does not appear to have a clear (or at least announced) political agenda 
and that seems inclined to conduct urban insurgency and terrorism. 
According to Western intelligence services, militants associated with 
the network were involved in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the November 2002 suicide strike 
against the Paradise Hotel in Mombassa and the attempted downing of 
an Israeli charter jet en-route to Tel Aviv, both in November 2002.40
Since about 2002, one particularly violent faction has emerged 
in Mogadishu. Led by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro, this group has been impli-
cated in the killings of foreign aid workers as well as the assassinations 
of former police and military personnel in the Barre government.41
Western sources also allege that the cell has helped al-Qaeda operatives 
based in Somalia with logistics, jobs, identities, and the protection of 
training sites in the Lower Shabelle and Banaadir regions and is possi-
bly cooperating to consolidate an extended jihadist beachhead stretch-
ing from Somalia to Tanzania.42
It should be noted that informed local commentators have taken 
a somewhat more skeptical view of the alleged link between Somali 
jihadists and al-Qaeda, noting both the lack of detailed information 
about supposed militant camps and the generally opaque nature of 
39 It should be noted that the United States government continued to view the AIAI as 
the main Islamist protagonist in Somalia well beyond 1998, formally placing the group on 
Washington’s Terrorism Exclusion List (TEL) in December 2001. See U.S. Department of 
State (2002c). 
40 Chalk interview, Control Risks Group (CRG), London, February 2004. See also 
“Intelligence Sources Believe Al-Qaeda, Somali-Based Group May Be Behind Mombassa 
Attacks; Islamist Group Planning Attacks Against US Interests, Beach Resorts May CIA 
Report Warned,” Newsweek, December 1, 2002; “Usama’s Allies,” Africa Conﬁdential, Vol. 
42, No. 24 (November 9, 2001), http://www.africa-conﬁdential.com/country.asp?ID=44 (as 
of April 3, 2006); and ICG (2005c), pp. 8–9.
41 ICG (2005c), p. 4.
42 Chalk interviews, Western oﬃcials, Nairobi, February 2004. See also ICG (2005c), p. 4; 
and Gunaratna (2004), pp. 21–22.
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external Islamist penetration into East Africa.43 According to journal-
ists in Nairobi, there is no deﬁnitive evidence to suggest that Somali 
jihadists have had a decisive inﬂuence on radical Islamist activity in 
Kenya44 or Tanzania. These journalists believe that the main exter-
nal presence in this part of the country stems from the Persian Gulf 
states, although there is extremist activity in the coastal region around 
Mombassa.45
The Somali Jihadist Network: Assessment and Future Outlook
It remains unclear to what extent the Somali jihadists have played a role 
in facilitating al-Qaeda operations and planning. On the one hand, the 
country’s very chaos, dysfunctionality, and anarchy would seem to pre-
clude any group from being able to oﬀer external militants a reliable 
conduit through which to develop a viable logistical presence. In addi-
tion, Somali Muslim tendencies—while strong and anti-Western in 
focus—are heavily driven along ethnic and tribal lines and tradition-
ally have not provided a ﬁrm ideological framework for the fostering of 
a concerted transnational militant jihadist identity.46
That said, Somalia constitutes an extremely active and dangerous 
transshipment point for drugs, guns, and people that has been studi-
ously exploited by internal extremists (as well as other armed groups). 
It is certainly conceivable that at least some of these criminal links may 
43 Comments made during the United States Department of State Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research Workshop on “Emerging Terrorist Threats in Africa and Southeast Asia,” 
Washington, D.C., August 19, 2005. See also Dagne (2002).
44 It should be noted that local journalists do acknowledge a heavy Somali inﬂuence among 
Kenyan Muslims in the northeast of the country, but they do not consider this area a main 
theater for radical Islamic activity, largely because it is too poor for most people to care about 
anything more than getting by on a day-to-day basis.
45 Chalk interview, Associated Press, Nairobi, February 2004. Indeed, local journalists 
assert that the Somali Islamic community is deeply divided between those in the northeast 
of the country and those on the coast, with the latter tending to view the Somali-inﬂuenced 
Muslims as backward and unprogressive.
46 Chalk interviews, CRG, London, February 2004, and Associated Press representatives, 
Nairobi, February 2004. Notably, there is no tradition of martyrdom in Somalia, nor has 
the country’s Islamist community been instrumental in sending ﬁghters to participate in 
overseas jihadist struggles such as those that have occurred in Afghanistan and Bosnia.
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have been made available to outside radicals, including elements associ-
ated with the global jihadist movement. More seriously, the ‘Ayro fac-
tion that has emerged in Mogadishu is known to have established ties 
with business circles in Dubai that have historically acted as a ﬁnan-
cial and communications conduit for bin Laden’s ﬁnancial interests. 
Western oﬃcials fear that al-Qaeda has already moved to exploit these 
ties in order to extend its own penetration into Mogadishu. If Somalia 
attains some semblance of stability in the future, the main concern is 
that Arab jihadists will seek to extend their operational presence across 
East Africa from these “urban perches.”47
47 Chalk interview, British and U.S. security oﬃcials, London and Washington, D.C., 
January and August 2005.
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CHAPTER TEN
The al-Zarqawi Network: Jordanian and 
Iraqi Jihadis
Jordan
Jordan does not appear to have any organized terrorist groups operating 
on its soil. Rather, it has a network of loosely aﬃliated extremists who 
work in small units and who share the common objective of attack-
ing U.S., Western, and in some cases Jordanian targets. Members of 
this cell-based movement are mostly thought to have fought in the 
anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, where they established per-
sonal relationships and forged a common commitment to carry out 
the Islamic revolution in their homelands through violent means.1 The 
leading member of the ad hoc movement was the notorious terrorist 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (real name Ahmed Fadhil Nazzar Khalailah), 
a Jordanian who directed the jihadist terrorist campaign in Iraq and 
who had pledged allegiance to bin Laden. (As this report was going to 
print, word was received that al-Zarqawi and several of his associates 
had been killed in a U.S. Air strike on their hideout on June 7, 2006.)
Al-Zarqawi took his nom de guerre from his birthplace, the town 
of Zarqa, northeast of Amman. As a young man, he entered a life of 
crime and was jailed for drug possession and sexual assault. At some 
point in his criminal career, al-Zarqawi came under the inﬂuence of 
radical Salaﬁst preachers, gave up drugs and alcohol, and married one 
1 Gambill (2004). Nicolas Pelham, “Jordan Foils Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack US,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0701/p01s03-
wome.htm (as of February 27, 2006).
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of his cousins. In 1989, he left his family to ﬁght in Afghanistan. After 
participating in the Afghan war, al-Zarqawi returned to Jordan, where 
he ran afoul of the authorities. In 1994, he was sentenced to 15 years 
of hard labor on charges of membership in an illegal organization 
and weapons possession. In prison, al-Zarqawi established a following 
among the prisoners, on whom he enforced strict dress and behavior 
rules. Upon his release from prison as part of an amnesty following the 
accession of King Abdullah II, al-Zarqawi resumed his terrorist activi-
ties. When his involvement in the so-called “millennium” plot to bomb 
tourist sites in Jordan during the 2000 millennium celebrations was 
discovered, al-Zarqawi ﬂed to Pakistan.2
The Jordanian jihadist network has been tied to several attacks 
and plots in that country. In October 2002, a militant acting under 
the direct orders of al-Zarqawi assassinated U.S. diplomat Lawrence 
Foley.3 Three months earlier, authorities in Amman thwarted a plan to 
bomb the American and Israeli embassies as well as leisure centers used 
by Western military personnel based in Jordan—attacks that, again, 
were alleged to have been coordinated by al-Zarqawi.4
The links between the Jordanian jihadist network and al-Qaeda 
have yet to be fully understood. As noted above, members of the move-
2 Gambill (2004); Levitt (2003a); “Fugitive Cast in Role of Super-Villain,” The Los Angeles 
Times, March 7, 2004; “Terrorists Grabbed in Border Raids,” The Australian, February 
26, 2004; “Ansar al-Islam Eyed in Iraq Bombings,” NBC News, March 2, 2004, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4428430/ (as of February 27, 2006); “Proﬁle: Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi,” BBC News, February 12, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/
middle_east/3483089.stm (as of February 27, 2006). There are some discrepancies in the 
accounts of al-Zarqawi’s early life and of his activities after his release from prison in Jordan 
in 1999. Gambill says that he is not of Palestinian descent, as alleged by some Western media 
reports, but a member of a branch of the Bani Hassan, a large Bedouin tribe loyal to the 
Hashemites. 
3 Levitt (2003b); “Fugitive Cast in Role as Super-Villain,” The Los Angeles Times, March 
7, 2004; BBC News, “Proﬁle: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” Bin Sewid, who was captured by 
Jordanian authorities soon after the assassination, has confessed that al-Zarqawi provided 
funding and weapons for the murder. 
4 Levitt (2004), p. 27; Burgess (2002). The Jordanian prime minister, Abu Ragheb Ali, has 
asserted that al-Zarqawi was dispatched to the country to select eleven recruits to carry out 
these attacks, all of whom were provided with weapons (including machine guns, silencers, 
and tear gas) and US $60,000.
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ment have been willing to undertake action against U.S. and Western 
targets in Jordan. Although this does not provide deﬁnitive evidence 
of a link to al-Qaeda, the choice of targets appears to have been inﬂu-
enced by bin Laden’s ideological outlook. Indeed, a videotape report-
edly aired by bin Laden in November 2002 made speciﬁc reference 
both to the planned attacks against the American and Israeli embassies 
and to Foley’s assassination. 
Al-Zarqawi himself was not formally part of the al-Qaeda net-
work until his organization swore allegiance  to bin Laden in October 
2004. Nevertheless, even before the organization pledged allegiance, he 
was believed to be actively cooperating with al-Qaeda in fomenting a 
transnational jihadist front in Iraq (see the section below on Iraq). The 
United States believes that al-Zarqawi was not only training members 
of Ansar al-Islam in the use of chemical weapons but was also the likely 
mastermind behind a series of anti-Shi’a sectarian attacks and suicide 
bombings in Iraq that killed well over 500 people (mostly Iraqis) in 
2003 and 2004. A reward of $10 million was oﬀered for information 
leading to the terrorist’s capture, underscoring Washington’s concern 
over the inﬂuence that he was seen to wield among wider Islamic mili-
tant elements in the Middle East and Europe.5
Jordanian Network: Assessment and Future Outlook
There has been a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment in Jordan 
since the onset of the global war on terrorism and the war in Iraq, 
particularly within the Arab-Afghan expatriate community that was 
forced to return to the country after Operation Enduring Freedom in 
October 2001. Western authorities remain actively concerned that this 
internal environment is fostering al-Qaeda loyalties and operational 
linkages, which could transform what is presently a loosely based net-
work to a more structured movement complete with its own com-
5 Levitt (2003a); Levitt (2004), pp. 7–28; “Terrorist Grabbed in Border Raids,” The 
Australian, February 26, 2004; “Fugitive Cast in Role as Super-Villain,” The Los Angeles 
Times, March 7, 2004; BBC News, “Proﬁle: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” At the time of writing, 
in the summer of 2004, 116 terrorists linked to the Jordanian militant had been arrested 
in Europe and the Middle East, with arrests having taken place in the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. 
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mand and control system. The prospect of higher intensity and more 
sophisticated attacks could be expected to increase under prevailing 
conditions in the Middle East.
Iraq
Ansar al-Islam, al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad–Tanzim Qai’dat al-Jihad ﬁ Bilad 
al-Raﬁdayn, and the Mujahideen Shura Council
Al-Qaeda’s links to Islamist militants in Iraq are becoming clearer. 
An undetermined number of individual jihadists, whether freelance 
or pledging allegiance to bin Laden, have entered the country and 
have teamed up with Sunni insurgents of varying stripes to perpetrate 
attacks against U.S., coalition, and Iraqi government forces, and inter-
national and Iraqi civilian targets. Indeed, some of the most horriﬁc 
bombings that have taken place in the country since Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) have a deﬁnite al-Qaeda signature. These include the 
suicide bombings of the Jordanian embassy on August 7, 2003, the UN 
headquarters in Baghdad on August 29, 2003, and the simultaneous 
bombing of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan headquarters in Irbil on February 1, 2004. In all of these 
cases, the terrorists appear to have worked through an Iraqi organiza-
tion, Ansar al-Islam (AaI), sometimes known as Ansar al-Sabah.6
6 See, for example, “Al-Qaeda’s Advice for Mujahideen in Iraq: Lessons Learned from 
Afghanistan,” v1.0, IntelCenter, April 14, 2003, http://www.intelcenter.com/Qaeda-
Guerrilla-Iraq-v1-0.pdf (as of April 3, 2006); Abu-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 
Al-Battar Camp, January 3, 2004; “Death Toll Climbs in Irbil Attacks,” The Los Angeles 
Times, February 3, 2004.
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AaI was founded in September 2001 by Mullah Krekar (who 
is presently based in Norway),7 with the goal of transforming Iraqi 
Kurdistan into an Islamic state. The group has between 500 and 700 
cadres at its disposal, most of whom are based in Iraq’s mountainous 
northern regions along the border with Iran. Despite suﬀering the loss 
of an estimated 200 members during allied bombing raids in March 
2003, Ansar retains a high operational potential in Iraq due to an 
intensive (and largely successful) recruitment drive that has embraced a 
broad cross-section of sympathetic foreign jihadists from North Africa, 
the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. In 2003, AaI was orga-
nized into two ﬁghting units, Jund al-Allah (“Soldiers of Allah”) and 
al-Usad (“The Lions”).
AaI militants have been connected to several high-proﬁle bomb-
ings in Iraq. In addition to the bombings of the Jordanian embassy, 
the UN headquarters, and the Kurdish party headquarters, mentioned 
above, the group is also believed responsible for the bombing of the 
coalition headquarters in Baghdad on January 18, 2004; the car bomb-
ing in Najaf on August 29, 2003, that killed 82 people (including the 
principal target, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim) and wounded 
hundreds; the bombing of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross headquarters in Baghdad on October 9, 2003, and the Italian 
paramilitary police command and control post in the southern city of 
7 Krekar, born Najm al-Din Faraj Ahmad, was initially arrested at Schiphol airport in 
Amsterdam on September 12, 2002, after being denied entry to Iran. He was subsequently 
deported to Norway where he has held refugee status for more than a decade. Although the 
Ansar leader was brieﬂy detained for three months on terrorism-related charges, these were 
dropped in April following a court decision that there were insuﬃcient grounds to hold him 
in prison. Since then, Krekar has lived freely in Norway, where he has repeatedly refuted any 
connection to bin Laden or terrorist attacks in Iraq. For further details see “Ansar al-Islam 
Leader Arrested in Norway,” Associated Press, January 2, 2004; “Italian Public Prosecutors 
Interrogate Krekar,” La Repubblica, December 19, 2003, FBIS EUP2003122000181; and 
“Mullah Krekar Charged with Assisting Suicide Attack,” Verdens Gang, January 2, 2004, 
FBIS EUP20040102000169.
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Nasiriyah on November 12, 2003; and the simultaneous bombings of 
Shi’ite shrines in Baghdad and Karbala on March 3, 2004, the day of 
the Shi’ite holy day of Ashura, that killed at least 143 worshippers.8
Arab diplomatic sources claim that al-Qaeda started sending top 
operatives to Iraq as early as October 2002. Many of these jihadists 
were immediately put in touch with AaI because of the latter’s stance 
against Kurdish parties aligned with the United States, its links with 
echelons of the Baghdad government, and the fact that many Ansar 
ﬁghters had already trained in Afghan camps under the direct control 
of al-Qaeda.9
After Saddam fell, Ansar al-Islam began to mutate and fragment 
into diﬀerent groups whose composition became less Kurdish and more 
Arab, including Sunni ﬁghters and former regime supporters. A cluster 
of these Sunni Arab groups, led by al-Zarqawi, has been referred to as 
al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), the Iraqi version of the 
regional extremist  group of the same name. Al-Tawhid is a Palestinian 
Sunni movement with its roots in Jordan, where it is waging a cam-
paign against the Jordanian monarchy, which it rejects as “un-Islamic.” 
The al-Tawhid movement promotes and supports the jihad of all believ-
ers worldwide; in particular, the struggle against “Jews and Crusaders” 
led by al-Qaeda. It is important to point out that in Iraq, al-Tawhid 
as an organization only appeared after the May 2004 beheading of 
Nicholas Berg.10 After al-Zarqawi’s group pledged allegiance to bin 
Laden, al-Zarqawi renamed al-Tawhid as Tanzim Qai’dat al-Jihad ﬁ 
Bilad al-Raﬁdayn (Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers).  More 
8 See BBC News, “Proﬁle: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi”; “US Defends Security Setup in Iraq,” 
The Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2004; “Death Toll in Twin Strikes on Iraqi Shiites Rises to 
143,” The Los Angeles Times, March 3, 2004.
9 Mullah Krekar has speciﬁcally acknowledged that he met bin Laden in the late 1980s 
and that many members of his group continue to have close links and sympathies with 
al-Qaeda.
10 “Jamaat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad / Unity and Jihad Group,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/para/zarqawi.htm (as of February 23, 2006).
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recently, in 2006, al-Zarqawi and his organization lowered their public 
proﬁle in favor of an Iraqi-led umbrella organization of jihadist groups, 
the Mujahideen Shura Council.11
Despite the absence of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from a leadership 
position within the Mujahideen Shura Council, he remained a central 
ﬁgure in the jihadist enterprise in Iraq. He appeared to function as 
a coordinator between several Islamist networks and, according to a 
February 2004 Time report, had been given responsibility for rotat-
ing al-Qaeda militants between South and Central Asia and north-
ern Iraq.12 According to U.S. and European intelligence sources, al-
Zarqawi trained members of his group in the use of unconventional 
weapons, including nine cadres implicated in a ricin terrorist plot in 
the United Kingdom, France, and Italy in early January 2003.13
Al-Zarqawi’s prominent role in the Islamist terror campaign in 
Iraq was displayed in a letter he allegedly wrote to the al-Qaeda lead-
ership claiming responsibility for 25 “martyrdom” operations (which 
would account for almost all such attacks from the fall of Saddam until 
early 2004) and laying out a blueprint for triggering sectarian conﬂict 
between Sunnis and Shi’ites. Divided into several sections, the docu-
ment makes speciﬁc reference to the “two honorable brothers”(believed 
to be a reference to bin Laden and al-Zawahiri) and describes Operation 
Iraqi Freedom as a contractual agreement reached between Israel and 
the United States as part of a wider Zionist ploy to carve out a greater 
11 The Mujahideen Shura Council was established in January 2006 to unify the jihad-
ist groups in Iraq and presumably to give the jihadist movement an Iraqi face. It is com-
posed of al-Zarqawi’s group, al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Victorious Army 
Group; the Army of al-Sunnah wal-Jama’a; Jama’a al-Murabiteen; Ansar al-Tawhid Brigades; 
the Strangers Brigade; and the Horrors Brigade. SITE Institute, “Chatter Concerning the 
Establishment of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and 
Uniﬁcation with Other Insurgency Groups,” http://www.siteinstitute.org (as of March 27, 
2006). 
12 Levitt (2004), p. 27. 
13 For further details on the alleged plots, see “Bioterror Plot,” ABC Interactive News, 
January 9, 2003; “French Tip Led Police to Poison Gang,” The Australian, January 10, 
2003; “FBI Issues Bulletin About Deadly Ricin Poison,” Reuters, January 10, 2003; and 
“British Oﬃcer Slain, 4 Hurt as Terror Suspects Are Seized,” The New York Times, January 
14, 2003. 
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Jewish state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. Although the 
letter is unsigned, American, British, and Iraqi oﬃcials say there is no 
doubt that al-Zarqawi wrote it. 
Despite al-Zarqawi’s reputed hostility to Shi’ites, U.S. authorities 
believe he had been coordinating operations in Iraq from unidentiﬁed 
parts of Iran or Syria. Even before September 11, Iran played an impor-
tant role in al-Zarqawi’s movements and operations. Under the Taliban, 
al-Zarqawi established himself in Herat, in western Afghanistan, and 
ferried operatives between Afghanistan and Europe through the Iranian 
city of Mashhad. Upon the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi moved to Iran, where the deputy leader of his 
al-Tawhid organization, known as Abu Harun, had already relocated. 
According to published reports, in March 2002 al-Zarqawi was escorted 
to the Iraqi border and expelled into the area controlled by Ansar al-
Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan. When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, 
al-Zarqawi moved back to Iran. There he met with al-Qaeda’s security 
chief, Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi, who asked him to coordinate the 
movement of al-Qaeda militants into Iraq.14
The ability to use Iran, and later Syria, as a strategic launch pad 
and rest area would add a further layer of complexity to the nature of 
al-Qaeda links in Iraq, perhaps vindicating the view that Sunni and 
Shi’ite extremists are capable of bridging the sectarian divide when 
their geopolitical interests dictate. It also illustrates the historical and 
perennial nature of transborder linkages, trade among tribes, and 
smuggling that allows groups like Ansar and al-Zarqawi’s group to 
move with impunity across international borders.
Deﬁnitive evidence of al-Qaeda–Ansar links in Iraq emerged 
with several arrests of leading militants during 2004. Among those 
captured were Husam al-Yemeni and Hasan Ghul, both known al-
Qaeda operatives suspected of having worked with Ansar in terrorist 
recruitment. Western sources regard the capture of these two individu-
14 Gambill (2004); Mark Hosenball, “Terrorism: Following Zarqawi’s Footsteps in Iran,” 
Newsweek, October 25, 2004; Barsky (2004). According to another version provided by a 
U.S. counterterrorism expert, al Qaeda ﬁrst tried to set up its own operation in Iraq but 
failed. Al-Zarqawi became the banner carrier of the jihadists there. Al-Zarqawi turned to al 
Qaeda for support much later when he was under severe pressure from the coalition forces.
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als as particularly important given their operational role in Iraq: al-
Yemeni was widely believed to be al-Zarqawi’s right-hand man; Ghul 
(who is known as the “Gatekeeper” in terrorist circles) is thought to be 
a principal conduit through which al-Qaeda moves money and people 
around the Middle East, East Africa, and possibly beyond.15
Other prominent al-Qaeda members who are alleged to be work-
ing in conjunction with Ansar16 include Othman Suleiman Daoud, 
an Afghan national believed to be based in the Sunni triangle north 
of Baghdad—the focus of much of the present insurgency against the 
U.S. military—and Faraj Shaabi, a Libyan who allegedly spent most 
of the 1990s in Sudan before he was ordered to Iraq by bin Laden 
in 2003. Overall estimates of foreign jihadists in Iraq vary, ranging 
from fewer than 1,00017 to around 3,000, according to informed dip-
lomatic sources. Most are volunteers from Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, 
Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.18 Many of the sui-
cide bombers deployed in Iraq are foreign nationals lured by the cause 
of jihad against U.S. and pro-U.S. forces and representatives.
Jihadist Groups in Iraq: Assessment and Outlook
Al-Qaeda’s inﬂuence over Ansar is manifested in the nature of the 
latter’s operational proﬁle, which has increasingly come to focus on 
well-timed, planned, and precision attacks designed to kill indiscrimi-
nately with maximum exposure. High-proﬁle suicide car and truck 
15 Coalition Joint Task Force 7 Brieﬁng, January 29, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/2004/tr20040129-0381.html (as of February 27, 2006); “Suspected al-Qaeda 
Operative Nabbed in Iraq,” Associated Press, January 23, 2004. Ghul is alleged to have 
played some role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
although oﬃcials stress that these reputed links are still being probed.
16 Al-Qaeda is also thought to have worked with operatives from other organizations in 
Iraq, including, notably, its co-opted satellite GSPC. At least two senior commanders from 
the group are currently believed to be in the country, helping to recruit and train suicide 
bombers. They are Amin Hadad (also known as Baba Al Nada) and Mohammed Talahi (also 
known as Zakariya). See “Iraq Has Been Al-Qaida’s Top Priority Since October 2002,” http://
www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-direct/secure/2004/2_10/1.asp (as of October 
2004).
17 See, for instance, the ﬁgures in Hoﬀman (2004), p. 13.
18 “Iraq Has Been Al-Qaeda’s Top Priority Since October 2002.” 
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bombings against international and Iraqi targets have become 
common.19 Variants on the traditional suicide car bombing also seem 
to be emerging: attacks using disguises similar to those employed by 
Palestinian terror groups, and the development of sophisticated ambush 
bombings with improvised explosive devices, which originated among 
the Kurdish Islamic rebels in Iraq’s north.20 Ansar militants have 
increasingly resorted to the use of female suicide bombers; in February 
2004, the group successfully adopted the tactic for the attack on the 
Kurdish party headquarters in Irbil. Attacks by al-Zarqawi’s group also 
focus on Shi’a festivals and ceremonies in the hope of fomenting civil 
war between Shi’a and Sunni sects. 
It can be expected that al-Zarqawi’s group, other groups in the 
Mujahideen Shura Council, and Ansar adherents will continue to 
work together and provide each other with funds, logistical support, 
and expertise to wage a consistent, if not concerted, campaign against 
coalition and Iraqi government forces. The strategic plan by these 
groups is to isolate U.S. forces in Iraq by targeting Arab translators 
and policemen, abducting and assassinating Arab and foreign diplo-
mats, and attacking Shi’ite groups.21 At the same time, the lowering of 
al-Zarqawi’s proﬁle prior to his death reﬂected an awareness that this 
strategy is not likely to succeed without putting an Iraqi face on their 
movement.  The SITE Institute’s director, Rita Katz, postulates that 
19 “US General Says al-Qaeda Iraq Links Growing,” Reuters, January 25, 2004.
20 See, for example, Major Eric O. Estep, “Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
(TTP) and Recommendations,” Support Operations Plans 3rd COSCOM, LSA Anaconda, 
Iraq, undated; Karasik interviews of senior analysts, Oﬃce of the Secretary of Defense, 
February 2005. 
21 A series of messages posted to jihadist forums at the beginning of 2006 detail alleged 
Shi’ite conspiracies against the Sunni. A statement issued by Ansar al-Sunnah on February 
28, 2006, concerning the “late happenings” in Iraq over the bombing of the Shi’ite mosque 
in Samarra and the tide of events that ensued, alleges that the Shi’ite government is respon-
sible so that it may “create a state of chaos” and coerce the Americans into granting it the 
sole power in the newly formed Iraqi government. SITE Institute, “A Series of Messages 
on Jihadist Forums Concerning Alleged Shi’ite Conspiracies Against the Sunni Muslims 
in Iraq,” March 6, 2006; and “A Statement from Ansar al-Sunnah Army Headquarters 
Concerning the Latest Happenings in Iraq and Alleged Shi’ite Duplicity in the Mosque 
Bombing,” http://www.siteinstitute.org (as of February 28, 2006).
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al-Zarqawi’s withdrawal from a leadership position in the jihadist com-
ponent of the Iraqi insurgency was spurred by al-Zawahiri’s letter to 
al-Zarqawi of July 2005, which advises that “it does not appear that the 
mujahideen, much less Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, will 
lay claim to governance without the Iraqi people. Not to mention that 
that would be in contravention of the Shura methodology. . . .”22 The 
immediate goal, as the al-Zawahiri letter suggests, continues to be the 
establishment of an Islamic emirate in Iraq as a stepping stone toward 
the establishment of the global caliphate. 
In addition, Ansar’s international network may well be used as 
an additional “medium” through which to conduct al-Qaeda attacks 
wider aﬁeld—a threat that remains particularly pertinent in Europe, 
the Middle East (the failed “chemical” attack in Amman, Jordan, in 
April 2004), as well as in East Africa. The August 2005 attacks in 
Aqaba and Eilat demonstrated that al-Zarqawi’s group can reach out-
side of Iraq to attack both American and Israeli targets. Beyond Iraq, 
the militants may head for other vast ungoverned areas of East Africa 
to plot further attacks as well as open or reinforce fronts across the 
Arabian Peninsula and North Africa.23
22 Rita Katz, “The Coming Wave of Jihad,” The Boston Globe, March 13, 2006. 
23 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Al-Qaeda Will Retreat to Africa,” The Guardian, August 25, 





The Southeast Asian Cluster
Jemaah Islamiyah and Its Offshoots
Long before the appearance of the global jihadist movement, the activ-
ities of a variety of internal ethno-nationalist and religious militant 
groups posed one of the most signiﬁcant threats to the polities of the 
Southeast Asia region. During the 1990s, the residual threat posed 
by substate extremism had risen—both in reaction to the moderniza-
tion pursued vigorously by many Southeast Asian states and as a result 
of radical inﬂuences from the Middle East and South Asia. Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), a network that connects militants in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, today poses the main regional 
terrorist threat in Southeast Asia. JI is considered part of al-Qaeda’s 
international terrorist network, but it is in fact a distinct organization 
with its own objectives and localized goals. The group, which oper-
ates solely within Southeast Asia, seeks to establish a pan-Islamic state 
in that region comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the 
Muslim areas of the Philippines and Southern Thailand.1
After the arrest of militants following the Bali I, Jakarta Marriott 
Hotel, Australian Embassy, and Bali II bombings in Indonesia, there 
appears to be increased dissension within JI, and related terrorist oﬀ-
shoots have newly surfaced. According to documents seized by the 
Indonesian authorities, one of the key JI operatives still at large, the 
Malaysian Noordin M. Top, is named as the leader of a group named 
1 “Asia’s Own Osama,” Time, April 1, 2002; and Wain (2001). 
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Tanzim Qai’dat al-Jihad, or Organization on the Base of Jihad.2 These 
oﬀshoots are probably not new organizations but merely regroupings of 
militants around diﬀerent nuclei within JI. 
JI’s ideological roots date back to the Darul Islam rebellion in 
Indonesia. Lasting from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, the rebellion 
informed the thinking of radical Indonesian Muslims. The cofounders 
of the organization were two Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. In the early 1970s, the two established an Islamic 
boarding school (pesantren) in Ngruki, Central Java, that became one 
of the fountainheads of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia—the so-called 
Ngruki network. From 1978 to 1982 the two were imprisoned by the 
Suharto government. After their release, they moved to Malaysia, 
where they came in contact with an Indonesian al-Qaeda operative 
and veteran of the Afghan war, Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali. 
Hambali (captured in Thailand in August 2003), the only Southeast 
Asian member of the shura or central council of al-Qaeda, provided 
the link between the indigenous Indonesian radicals and al-Qaeda. 
He was also the chief conduit for funds from al-Qaeda to JI.3 Another 
key ﬁgure was Mohammed Iqbal Abdur Rahman (alias Abu Jibril), 
an Indonesian national who, before his arrest in Malaysia in 2002, is 
alleged to have been head of training for al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia.4
A map of the region is shown in Figure 11.1.
2 “Update 1—Indonesia Looks for New Group’s Links to al Qaeda,” Reuters News,
January 31, 2006; “Oﬀshoot of JI Terror Group Emerges,” AAP Bulletins, February 1, 2006. 
According to former JI leaders, there is widespread unhappiness within the group over the 
bombing campaign by the terrorist faction led by Noordin M. Top. “Jakarta to Recruit 
Disgruntled JI Leaders,” The Straits Times (Singapore), December 9, 2005.
3 See, generally, ICG (2002). This analysis is one of the more detailed and in-depth pieces 
of research that has been done on the historical evolution of JI.
4 ICG (2002), pp. 1–2; Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian 
Network,” paper presented before the “Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in 
the Asia-Paciﬁc: Linkages to Global Terrorism” conference, Hawaii, February 19–21, 2002, 
pp. 23–24. 
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Figure 11.1
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Following the collapse of Suharto’s government in 1998, Sungkar 
and Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia. In 1999, Sungkar died and Ba’asyir 
became the emir or spiritual leader of the organization. Ba’asyir estab-
lished the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in Yogyakarta, a reli-
gious organization that analysts within and outside Indonesia believe 
serves as a political cover for JI’s political activities.5 After the Bali 
bombing of October 12, 2002 (see below), Ba’asyir was charged and 
convicted of immigration law violations. He was subsequently released 
5 Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror,” p. 20. Indonesian intelligence claims there is no deﬁnitive 
evidence to link the MMI either to JI or to acts of terrorism. The group, itself, continues to 
insist that it acts as part of “legitimate” civil society, ostensibly committed to the peaceful 
implementation of shari’a law across the archipelago.
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by a judge, but was immediately rearrested on terrorism charges and, 
at the time of writing, remains in police custody. Ba’asyir denies any 
association with JI or its terrorist agenda.6
It is believed that JI began establishing cells across Southeast Asia 
in collaboration with al-Qaeda as early as 1993. Regional intelligence 
sources have identiﬁed two ﬁgures as central to the group’s early recruit-
ment and placement eﬀorts: Hambali, a veteran of the anti-Soviet cam-
paign in Afghanistan who before his capture was thought to have acted 
as bin Laden’s main point of contact in the region; and Abu Jibril who, 
as noted above, is alleged to have been “head of training” for al-Qaeda in 
Southeast Asia.7 Hambali was captured in August 2003 in Ayutthaya, 
Thailand, and is believed to be in U.S. custody. Abu Jibril was arrested 
in Malaysia in June 2001, where he remained in prison until he was 
deported to Indonesia in May 2004. Indonesian prosecutors initially 
accused him of involvement in several bombings in Indonesia but later 
dropped the charges because of lack of evidence. He is currently active 
in the MMI.8 Two key JI operatives responsible for the Bali I bombing, 
Imam Samudra and Mukhlas (alias Ali Gufron), Hambali’s replace-
ment as operational chief, were captured, tried, and sentenced to death. 
Another high-proﬁle terrorist, JI’s top bomb-maker, the Malaysian Dr. 
Azahari Husin, and two subordinates were killed in a police raid on 
their hideout near the East Javan town of Malang in November 2005. 
Still at large are Noordin M. Top; Zulkarnaean, reported to be the cur-
rent JI operational chief; Dulmatin, an electronics specialist known for 
his bomb-making expertise; and Umar Patek, a recruitment and train-
ing expert. (The last two are believed to be hiding out in Mindanao.)9
6 See ICG (2003), p. 37; “Indonesian Cleric Convicted,” The Los Angeles Times, September 
3, 2003; and Devi Asmarani, “Bashir Fails in Lawsuit for Prison Release,” The Straits Times,
September 7, 2004.
7 ICG (2002), pp. 1–2; Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror,” p. 20. 
8 In January 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department blocked Jibril’s assets and accused him 
of being the “primary recruiter and second in command” of Jemaah Islamiyah.
9 According to a December 2005 report in the Philippine press, Dulmatin and Umar Patek 
were on the run with members of the Abu Sayyaf Group. They ﬂed separately from Indonesia 
to the southern Philippines with the goal of establishing a base of operations there. Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, December 2, 2005.
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JI is believed to operate in much the same networked manner as 
al-Qaeda. The organization’s structure comprises the following: (1) a 
central command (qiyadah maraziyah), which is part of a wider gov-
erning council (majlis qiyadah); (2) a hard core of dedicated jihadists 
(numbers vary greatly by source); and (3) a wider associate base that 
is drawn from both established insurgent militant organizations and 
loosely connected radicals scattered across the region.10 According to a 
2003 Singapore Government White Paper, these cadres are organized 
into speciﬁc territorial cells, known as mantiqis,11 that cover the fol-
lowing areas:
M1: Singapore, Malaysia (except Sabah) and southern Thailand
M2: Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan)
M3: Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and the southern Philippines
M4: Australia and the Indonesian province of Papua (Irian 
Jaya).12
JI came to the world’s attention in December 2001, when a 
major international terrorist plot was uncovered in Singapore that 
was to have involved the bombings of U.S. Navy vessels docked at the 
Changi Naval Base, the Ministry of Defense, a shuttle bus serving the 
Sembawang Wharves and Yishun subway, the British and Australian 
High Commissions, the U.S. and Israeli embassies, and commercial 
complexes housing American ﬁrms. The plan came to light when the 
Singaporean intelligence service, which had been monitoring the JI cell, 
arrested the members to disrupt the attacks. Subsequently, a videotape 
10 ICG (2003), p. 11.
11 Each mantiqi, in turn, is thought to be made up of sub-branches, or wakalah, which are 
organized into functional groups that cover responsibilities for fundraising, religious work, 
security, and operations. See Singapore Ministry of Home Aﬀairs (2003), p. 10; and Lesley 
Lopez, “Portrait of a Radical Network in Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2002.
12 Singapore Ministry of Home Aﬀairs (2003), p. 10. See also Evans (2003) and “Singapore 
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and notes detailing reconnaissance of potential targets in Singapore 
were found in the house of al-Qaeda military leader Mohammed Atef 
in Kabul (Atef was killed in a U.S. air strike).13
The actual mechanics of the Singapore operation, which intel-
ligence authorities estimate took two years of planning, fell to the late 
Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi (a senior JI bomb maker closely tied to the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who was killed by Filipino 
forces in 2003 after his escape from a Manila prison) and Mohammed 
Jabara. Working under the respective aliases of “Mike” and “Sammy,” 
the two JI members coordinated a local preestablished cell of militants, 
helping to select appropriate targets and ﬁne-tune the logistics for the 
planned bombings.14
Although the Singapore plot was thwarted, several other terrorist 
attacks have been directly linked to JI since 2000. These include a series 
of near-simultaneous bombings that killed 22 people in the Philippine 
capital in December 2000; 38 church explosions in Indonesia the same 
month; a further string of attacks in Manila in 2002; the October 12, 
2002, Bali bombing—rivaled only by the Madrid train bombing of 
March 11, 2004, as the worst act of international terrorism since the 
September 11 attacks; a suicide attack on the U.S.-owned Marriott 
Hotel in Jakarta on August 5, 2003, that killed 13 people and left 
dozens injured; a car bombing outside the Australian embassy in 
Jakarta on September 9, 2004, that killed 9 people; and the bomb-
ings of three establishments in Bali on October 1, 2005, that killed 23 
people, including the three perpetrators. JI terrorist attacks in Indonesia 
since the ﬁrst Bali bombings are shown in Table 11.1.
13 Gunaratna (2002a), p. 188; “Singapore Announces Arrest of 21 Militants,” The Washington 
Post, September 17, 2002; “Singapore Terror Group Had Plan to Bomb US Warships,” The 
South China Morning Post, January 12, 2002; “A Tale with Many Beginnings,” The Straits 
Times (Singapore), January 11, 2002.
14 Chalk interview, Singapore intelligence, Singapore, March 2004. See also Gunaratna 
(2002b), p. 11; and “US Holding Canadian in Embassy Bomb Plot,” The Washington Post,
August 2, 2002. 
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The sequence of the attacks suggests a one-year cycle for execu-
tion, although the planning might have gone on for a longer period. 
The methods of the ﬁrst three attacks involved car bombs. However, 
the lack of success of the J.W. Marriott and Australian embassy attacks, 
where all the casualties except for one were Indonesians, might explain 
the abandonment of cars as the method of delivery for the explo-
sives in favor of bombs carried in backpacks by suicide bombers. This 
method allows the terrorists to target their attacks more precisely on 
establishments frequented by foreigners and those catering to them.
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JI and Local Islamist Groups in Southeast Asia
An intricate pattern of personal ties has developed among Islamic 
extremists in Southeast Asia. Many of these relationships were ﬁrst 
forged in the crucible of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and have 
since been bolstered by marriages and social networks that frequently 
cut across speciﬁc group aﬃliations.15
On an ideological level, common interpretations of jihad and 
a common international outlook have also been manifest, most of 
which appear to have been fostered by a small circle of pondoks or 
pesantren—Muslim boarding schools in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
According to Southeast Asia terrorism expert Zachary Abuza, the 
Indonesian security services believe that there are 60–100 pesantren 
that are centers of JI recruitment. In this category of terrorist incuba-
tors are Pondok al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Sukohardjo in Solo (Surakarta), 
Mutaqin in Jabarah, Dar us-Syahadah in Boyolali, all in Central Java; 
al-Islam in Lamongan, East Java; and the Hidayatullah network in 
East Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Jaafar Umar Thalib, the leader of the 
now disbanded Laskar Jihad, administers another pesantren, Ihya as-
Sunnah in Yogyakarta.16 The most notorious of these institutions are 
Pondok Ngruki, founded by Ba’asyir and the late Abdullah Sungkar, 
the emirs or spiritual leaders of JI, and Pesantren al-Islam, the institu-
tion associated with the family of Amrozi, one of the plotters of the 
2002 Bali bombings.17 Although these radical pesantren are relatively 
small in number (there are thousands of schools overall), they have had 
a disproportionate inﬂuence in shaping and propagating radical Islam 
in Southeast Asia.
There is evidence that training facilities in Mindanao have been 
used for instructing Indonesian militants, several of whom have been 
15 See, for instance, ICG (2003), pp. 2–7, 26–29; and Abuza (2003a), pp. 136–137.
16 Abuza (2004), p. 31; Shuha (2005).
17 See ICG (2003), pp. 26–27; and generally ICG (2002).
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identiﬁed as prominent JI commanders.18 According to the International 
Crisis Group, several hundred Indonesians passed through Hudaibiyah, 
a small base situated in a remote corner of the sprawling Abu Bakar 
complex that, prior to being overrun by the Philippine military in 
2000, served as the headquarters of the MILF. The camp provided an 
intensive six-month course that included instruction in weapons han-
dling, demolition and bomb making, map reading, guerilla tactics, 
ﬁeld engineering, leadership, and self-defense.19
It also appears that at least some organizational coordination has 
taken place for JI operations in Southeast Asia. A key ﬁgure in helping 
to ﬁne-tune the mechanics for the planned 2001 attacks in Singapore, 
for instance, was the late Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi,20 a close associate 
of Hambali and former senior explosives expert in the MILF.21 Laskar 
Jundullah, a violent Islamist militia active in Sulawesi, has been linked 
to JI through its leader Agus Dwikarna, who was also an oﬃcial in 
Ba’asyir’s MMI. Dwikarna was arrested in the Philippines in 2002 for 
illegally possessing explosives and remains a chief suspect in the series 
of bomb attacks that rocked Manila and Jakarta during December 
2000.22
The above links notwithstanding, the extent of JI’s ties with local 
Southeast Asian groups remains diﬃcult to ascertain. The broad nature 
of Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia is diﬀerent from the extremist 
Wahhabist inﬂuences found in the Middle East, tending in most cases 
to be driven by uniquely deﬁned historical ethno-national grievances.23
Moreover, the dispersed nature of groups such as the MILF and ASG 
18 Zachary Abuza, “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution,” 
paper given before the Workshop on Muslim Issues, George Washington Club, Washington, 
D.C., July 9, 2004, p. 14.
19 ICG (2003), p. 17.
20 Philippine security forces shot al-Ghozi in October 2003 after he apparently walked out 
of a maximum-security prison in Manila.
21 Gunaratna, “The Singapore Connection,” p. 11.
22 ICG (2002), p. 3.
23 Comments made during the Workshop on the New Dimensions of Terrorism, Singapore, 
May 2002. See also Tan (2003b) and Wain (2001).
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makes it diﬃcult to gauge whether relationships are the product of 
ad hoc initiatives stemming from local commanders or whether they 
reﬂect directives emanating from central group leaderships. Equally 
problematic is the question of the permanence of any links that have 
been established and the extent to which these continue to factor into 
overall ideological and operational agendas. Indeed, the MILF leader-
ship, which is currently engaged in peace talks with the Philippine gov-
ernment, is sensitive to the issue of linkages with outside extremists. In 
2003, the MILF’s long-time leader Salamat Hashim renounced terror-
ism as part of the resumption of a peace process. This policy was reaf-
ﬁrmed by Salamat’s successor, Murad Ebrahim. Since then, according 
to Philippine military sources, the MILF has refrained from the use 
of terror tactics and has cooperated with the Philippine armed forces 
against Abu Sayyaf elements operating in Mindanao.24
JI: Assessment and Future Outlook
From its inception, Jemaah Islamiyah developed intimate ties with 
al-Qaeda. Their cadres trained together in Afghanistan. They share 
a common worldview, a preference for mass-casualty attacks on 
Western targets, and—in the person of Hambali—a leadership link. 
Nevertheless, as noted earlier, JI has its own agenda, distinct from that 
of al-Qaeda. The nature of the current ties, in light of the evolution 
of both organizations since September 11 and the onset of the war on 
terror, is an open question. Whether JI acts in full solidarity with al-
Qaeda or continues to operate according to its own agenda is unclear. 
Just as problematic is the nature of JI’s relationship with local violent 
Islamist groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Muslim Thai 
separatists, and Indonesian extremists.
24 Rabasa discussions with Armed Forces of the Philippines oﬃcials, Camp Aguinaldo, 
Quezon City, August 2005. Zachary Abuza believes that there is evidence of continued 
cooperation between the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group, for pragmatic and ideological 
reasons. See Abuza (2005b).
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The ASG was the earliest Southeast Asian jihadist organization 
established with bin Laden’s support.25 However, after the death of the 
group’s founder and leader, Abdurajak Janjalani, in a clash with police 
in December 1998, the group lost much of its ideological impetus and 
degenerated into a criminal enterprise disguised in Islamist ideology. 
The ASG’s links to al-Qaeda were attenuated when bin Laden’s brother-
in-law and agent in Southeast Asia, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, left the 
Philippines in 1994. Nevertheless, the ASG’s kidnapping and behead-
ing of American citizens and its earlier association with al-Qaeda made 
it the principal target of the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Southeast 
Asia after September 11. The campaign against the ASG seriously 
degraded the group’s capabilities. There are indications, however, that 
the Abu Sayyaf leader, Abdurajak’s brother Khaddafy Janjalani, has 
been seeking to reconstitute the group and return it to its original 
Islamist agenda.
Several aspects of the security environment in Southeast Asia 
make the region inherently vulnerable to the type of extremist net-
work embodied in JI and to attempts to use it as a springboard for 
local and wider international terrorist attacks. Not only is the region 
characterized by highly porous land and sea borders well suited to the 
smuggling of arms and personnel, but political and socioeconomic fac-
tors—the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998; the fall of the Suharto 
regime in Indonesia; the subsequent breakdown of order in large 
parts of Indonesia; and persistent armed separatist movements in the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia—produced the conditions that 
facilitated the growth of extremist organizations. Finally, Southeast 
Asia’s status as a global commercial and tourist hub has provided a 
highly developed transport and ﬁnance infrastructure that can be used 
as eﬀectively for illicit as for licit purposes, as years of drug smuggling 
and money laundering have amply shown.26
25 The ASG was founded by a Moro veteran of the war in Afghanistan, Abdurajak Janjalani. 
Abdurajak had developed strong links to radical groups in Afghanistan, including Osama 
bin Laden. Bin Laden’s brother-in-law and his representative in the Philippines, Mohammed 
Jamal Khalifa, helped to fund it in its early years (Abuza, 2005b, pp. 1–7).
26 See, for instance, “Thai Expert Warns of Terrorists Spreading in Southeast Asia,” Xinhua 





New Approaches to Combating the Global Jihadist 
Movement
Countering al-Qaeda Through Political Warfare
The preceding discussion has obvious implications for devising an 
eﬀective strategy to counter al-Qaeda. Such a strategy will necessar-
ily employ a complex mixture of military, intelligence, ﬁnancial, and 
political instruments. This strategy should also include the use of tech-
niques described variously as “public diplomacy,” “information opera-
tions,” and “psychological operations.” No one term is completely sat-
isfactory. However, George Kennan arrived at a useful blanket concept 
in 1947, when he called on U.S. oﬃcials to develop a robust “politi-
cal warfare” capability against the Soviet Union.1 The United States 
and its allies waged a largely successful campaign against Marxism-
Leninism—like al-Qaeda, a global revolutionary creed that served as 
an intellectual, political, and emotional foundation of a worldwide rev-
olutionary movement.2
Western policymakers might usefully draw on this now-
forgotten corpus of Cold War knowledge and experience to develop a 
strategic political warfare campaign against al-Qaeda. As a ﬁrst step, 
policymakers should consider ways of attacking al-Qaeda’s ideology. 
From the analysis in this report, it is clear that ideology is the center of 
gravity of the global jihadist phenomenon. Therefore, it is important to 
1 Kennan and Harlow (1991), pp. 302–309. 
2 For more on this point, see Lord (2004), pp. 220–221.
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watch the rate of dissemination or retreat of the global jihadist ideol-
ogy.3 If the ideology continues to spread and gain greater acceptance 
in the Muslim world, it will produce more terrorists to replenish the 
ranks of al-Qaeda and related groups. If the ideology is countered and 
discredited, al-Qaeda and its universe will wither and die.
A related factor is the extent and strength of the links between 
the global and local jihads. The clusters within the “al-Qaeda nebula” 
show the spread of the jihadist mindset throughout the Muslim world. 
The global jihadist movement gains strength to the extent that it can 
co-opt local struggles. If it cannot, the global movement loses coher-
ence and focus. 
It follows that a comprehensive U.S. strategy needs to move 
beyond the boundaries of conventional counterterrorism theory and 
practice and address these ideological and political factors. The strat-
egy, in broad brush, has four prongs: First, attack the ideological 
underpinnings of global jihadism. Second, seek to sever the links—
ideological and otherwise—between the groups in the clusters of the 
terrorist nebula and the global jihad. Third, deny sanctuaries to terror-
ists. Fourth, strengthen the capabilities of frontline states to counter 
local jihadist threats. 
Attack the Ideology
The war on terror at its most fundamental level goes to the war of ideas. 
The goal is to deny extremists the high ground of Islamic politico-
religious discourse, which has been adroitly exploited by al-Qaeda to 
further the appeal of its own radical and absolutist rhetoric. As we 
have discussed in another RAND study,4 prevailing in the war of ideas 
requires empowering moderate Muslims to counter the inﬂuence of 
the radicals.
The question has been raised whether al-Qaeda and its associates 
have lost critical ground with Muslim public opinion by their attacks 
3 This is diﬃcult, but not impossible to measure. For instance, measures could include 
changes in the number and propinquity of jihadist Web sites, and the frequency of extremist 
propaganda found in mosques. See, for example, Freedom House (2005).
4 Rabasa et al. (2004).
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on Muslims and decapitations—a major determinant on the part of 
moderate Muslims in passing critical and negative judgment on jihad-
ist actions and goals. After the bombing of the Grand Hyatt, Radisson 
SAS, and Days Inn hotels in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, a 
poll in the Jordanian newspaper al-Ghad reported that 86 percent of 
the respondents condemned al-Qaeda.5
Although it is inherently diﬃcult for outsiders to attack an ide-
ology, the ideological approach has weaknesses that are susceptible to 
exploitation. A jihadist mindset places the onus of success on the indi-
vidual; to maintain the motivation of its members, a group needs to 
maintain its tempo of operations, so any interruption to the planning 
cycle weakens the group.
Some analysts also note that the jihadist movement is sensitive 
to religious ideology to the point of vulnerability. Combatants are 
replaceable, but theologically trained sheikhs are not. Decapitation 
strategies should be expanded from operational leaders to ideologues. 
These ideologues are often asked to provide sanction for terrorist opera-
tions and are therefore a key part of terrorists’ decisionmaking process. 
Preventing al-Qaeda’s ideological mentors from continuing to provide 
theological justiﬁcation for terrorism could expedite the movement’s 
ideological deterioration. Prosecution of “spiritual leaders” such as Abu 
Hamza al-Masri in the United Kingdom and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 
Indonesia and the deportation proceedings in the United Kingdom 
against the Jordanian-Palestinian cleric Abu Qatada, regarded as al-
Qaeda’s spiritual leader in Europe, are cases in point.6
Break the Links Between the Global and Local Jihads
The second prong of the strategy is to break the links between the 
global and local jihadist groups. The international nature of al-Qaeda 
5 “Amman Bomb Churned Local Emotions,” The New York Times, November 17, 2005. 
The negative reaction to the bombing may have been a factor behind al-Zarqawi’s lowered 
proﬁle in recent months (see Chapter Ten, “The al-Zarqawi Network”).
6 According to the 2001 Spanish indictment of the Madrid al-Qaeda cell, Abu Qatada was 
appointed as the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda, GIA, GSPC, and the Tunisian Combatant 
Group. Juzgado Central de Instruccion No. 005, Madrid, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 
0000035/2001E.
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is both a source of strength and a potential weakness. Al-Qaeda’s abil-
ity to link local groups with a broader, pan-Islamist campaign is argu-
ably the organization’s signal achievement. Unlike terrorist groups of 
the 1970s, al-Qaeda is not hindered by the geographical constraints 
that limited the scope of terrorist operations. Al-Qaeda, which employs 
a “toolkit” composed of the violent tactics and techniques of traditional 
terrorism, mass-casualty attacks, and propaganda and is able to oper-
ate on multiple fronts in several regions of the world, is the world’s ﬁrst 
truly global terrorist enterprise.7 Indeed, the term “terrorist” is inad-
equate to describe al-Qaeda, which some analysts have more correctly 
characterized as a “global insurgency” that has successfully challenged 
the world’s most powerful nations.8
But internationalization brings costs as well as beneﬁts. As dem-
onstrated by the evolution of the international communist movement 
during the previous century, contradictions inevitably arise between 
the global vision promulgated by a movement’s theoreticians and the 
national agendas that many local cadres naturally pursue.9 Exploiting 
this friction could be part of an eﬀective Western counterstrategy. For 
example, overt and covert information operations in Southeast Asia, 
South Asia, North Africa, and other areas of major terrorist activity 
might highlight the inapplicability of al-Qaeda’s vision to regional and 
local conditions. In non-Arab Muslim countries such as Pakistan, the 
Arab nature of al-Qaeda’s hard core could be stressed, as could al-
Qaeda’s preoccupation with “apostate” regimes in the Middle East. 
Such an approach could complement parallel political warfare themes 
that highlight the materialist, neo-fascist, and upper- and middle-class 
character of al-Qaeda’s hard core—in other words, the fundamentally 
“alien” nature of men like bin Laden and al-Zawahiri.
Achieving this goal hinges on decreasing the utility of local 
groups’ relationship with al-Qaeda. A number of local Muslim rebel 
movements that had maintained some relationship with al-Qaeda and 
its aﬃliates before September 11—for instance, the Philippines’ Moro 
7 Gunaratna (2002a), p. 11.
8 See, for example, Mackinlay (2002), p. 79.
9 Rich (2003), p. 47. 
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Islamic Liberation Front—have distanced themselves from bin Laden 
to avoid being drawn into the wrong side of the war on terrorism. 
To accelerate this trend, the United States will need to tailor the spe-
ciﬁc components of its counterterrorism policy to ensure that they are 
relevant to extant and emerging patterns of local and regional terror-
ism. Addressing group ties that are predicated on logistical support will 
require a policy mix that is somewhat diﬀerent from those involving 
joint planning sessions and coordinated attacks. Mapping and gauging 
the organizational parameters of terrorist connections will be equally 
important in prioritizing threats to U.S. interests.
Finally, the United States must be more proactive in its thinking 
and must accept that the problem of countering terrorism is akin to 
what Bruce Hoﬀman has referred to as a time series of photographs: 
“. . . the image captured on ﬁlm today is not the same as yesterday 
nor will it be the same tomorrow.”10 Neither al-Qaeda nor its aﬃliates 
are likely to be consigned to the annals of history anytime soon. But 
a myriad of factors brought on by future world events could conceiv-
ably have a direct, or indirect yet signiﬁcant, impact on both of them. 
Accordingly, policies will need to be constantly assessed, reassessed, 
and modiﬁed to take account of potential surprises that could emerge 
over the near to medium term.
Deny Sanctuaries
As discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this volume, al-Qaeda’s 
sanctuary in Afghanistan allowed the group’s leaders to concentrate 
all their eﬀorts at growing their organization and planning operations. 
Securing that safe haven substantially increased al-Qaeda’s ﬁnancial 
requirements but lowered overall needs of covertness, eased command 
and control, enabled extensive training and planning, and generally 
allowed it to operate at a far lower marginal cost per attack. The loss 
of its sanctuary has reduced the eﬃciency of the organization, made 
training of cadres more diﬃcult and laborious, and raised the marginal 
costs of operations. 
10 Hoﬀman (2003a), p. 16.
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Sanctuaries are areas and physical facilities where terrorists can 
conduct training, network, and plan operations, but they can also be 
deﬁned in other ways—for example, as ﬁnancial, cyber, and propa-
ganda nodes. Al-Qaeda has perfected the use of information technolo-
gies, particularly the Internet, as a terrorist tool, and has made use 
of the mass media to spread its propaganda. Part of what makes al-
Qaeda and its aﬃliates such a diﬃcult challenge is that they are able 
to “hide in plain view.” Jihadist groups in Western Europe are embed-
ded in the broader Muslim communities and have used the services 
and infrastructure available on the continent for propaganda, indoc-
trination, recruitment, and operations on the scale of the March 2004 
Madrid terrorist attack.11 Preventing the reconstitution of a sanctuary 
anywhere in the Muslim world and dismantling those that exist are 
therefore critical requirements of U.S. counterterrorist strategy. This 
requires proactive security cooperation with and support of countries 
under assault by al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates.
Strengthen the Capabilities of Frontline States to Confront Local 
Jihadist Threats
Aside from the campaign against al-Qaeda, the global war on terror 
can be viewed as the sum of many wars on terror fought in local and 
regional theaters across the world. “Homegrown” groups are provid-
ing a progressively greater amount of terrorist manpower and other 
resources. The resources for such operations are typically derived locally 
(and increasingly from criminal activity) rather than being funded by 
al-Qaeda itself. Further, the weapons are cruder, although still eﬀec-
tive. The operation plans are not as elegant or reﬂect tradecraft as well 
as fully trained al-Qaeda attacks. In other words, al-Qaeda has sub-
11 A case in point is Redouan al-Issar, a Syrian who is inﬂuential in The Hague group, a 
jihadist group that was believed to be planning bombing attacks in the Netherlands and 
that had made contact with like-minded groups in Spain, Morocco, Italy, and Belgium. 
According to published reports, al-Issar arrived in Germany in 1995 seeking political asylum. 
His request was denied, but he spent several years appealing the decision, collecting welfare 
in Germany, and traveling to the Netherlands, where he introduced members of The Hague 
group to extremist teachings. See David Crawford and Keith Johnson, “New Terror Threat 
in EU: Extremists with Passports,” The Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2004.
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stituted operatives who are less than fully trained, use less-eﬀective 
weapons, attack in less-spectacular (and arguably less-strategic) ways, 
and pay higher costs in terms of the number of arrests in the postattack 
sweeps by the relevant governments. 
These local wars have to be fought and won by the local govern-
ments and security forces with the United States in a supporting role. 
Those governments have the most at stake—as well as the local knowl-
edge, access to the population, and, hopefully, the political legitimacy 
to carry these conﬂicts to a successful conclusion.
The United States could help friendly countries achieve their 
counterterrorism objectives by providing assistance to improve the 
technical capabilities of counterterrorism police and military units and 
intelligence services. Although the types of assistance provided would 
depend on the speciﬁc circumstances of individual countries, as a gen-
eral principle this assistance should focus on data collection and ana-
lytical capabilities. 
Since the terrorists justify their operations by branding the govern-
ments under attack as “apostate” governments aligned with the United 
States, the United States has a political need to reduce its footprint in 
counterterrorism as much as possible. This can be done by encourag-
ing cooperative regional arrangements. For instance, in the context of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional coun-
tries have agreed to establish a regionwide intelligence network, have 
taken steps to block terrorist funds and tighten border controls, and 
have established a regional counterterrorism center in Kuala Lumpur. 
Similar cooperative arrangements should be encouraged in other parts 
of the world.
Because many terrorist groups operate in ungoverned areas, the 
capabilities of governments with imperfect control over their territories 
should be strengthened to enable them to assert authority over those 
areas. Terrorists also take advantage of porous and poorly monitored 
borders to move personnel, equipment, and funds, so governments’ 
ability to monitor and control their borders should be strengthened. 
Therefore, U.S. military forces will increasingly have to interact with 
the police, intelligence, and security services of other governments, 
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as well as with their military forces, creating potentially a new set of 
requirements in political-military relationship and interoperability 
issues. 
Implications for the U.S. Air Force
Air and space power have important roles to play in countering al-
Qaeda and the jihadist groups that form its nebula. Most of these mis-
sions are familiar, but the relative mix required for eﬀective prosecu-
tion of a campaign against terrorists is quite diﬀerent from what the 
Air Force is used to providing in more conventional military oper-
ations. In Afghanistan, air and space power, combined with Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), was the key to joint and coalition military 
operations. In Afghanistan, the Air Force took the lead in further 
advancing an American way of air warfare through eﬀects-based oper-
ations (EBO).12 The hallmark of EBO is combining modern Air Force 
capabilities—information superiority, mobility, and precision strike—
with complementary capabilities from the other military services and 
government agencies. Future battleﬁelds most likely will be discontin-
uous, with shadowy hostile forces organized in small, unlinked groups. 
Eliminating these forces will require integration of air and ground 
forces on a scale even greater than today’s.13
SOF, especially Air Force Special Operations Command 
(AFSOC), once considered peripheral to the Air Force’s main mission, 
are now central to antiterrorism missions, which often require “quiet 
operations” with a relatively low proﬁle. These are particularly impor-
tant in countries where overt U.S. military operations against terror-
ist groups might be politically diﬃcult for cooperating governments.14
On the operational side, Air Force SOF have the capability to pinpoint 
and track small groups and individuals, capture them, and search for 
12 See Davis (2001).
13 “Air and Space Power and the Nation at War,” Air Force Magazine, November 2004, 
p. 95.
14 Tirpak and Grier (2004), pp. 70, 75.
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critical intelligence. These capabilities are of paramount importance in 
a murky war against small, elusive groups of enemies who move back 
and forth over borders.15 But training functions are just as important. 
Air Force SOF teach critical skills in night ﬂying, air evacuation, and 
air assault to air forces of cooperating countries. However, there is only 
a single squadron, 6 Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at Hurlburt 
Field, Florida, to carry out this crucial training function. Not only is 
this squadron too small to meet the requirements of the global war on 
terrorism, but throughout its existence it has had diﬃculties obtaining 
even the airframes necessary to perform its mission.16
Air-delivered ﬁrepower has been used successfully in counterter-
rorist operations in a variety of contexts. The continued evolution of 
precision munitions has enabled air power to be used to target spe-
ciﬁc individuals and small groups—by Israel in the West Bank and 
Gaza (see Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe) and by the 
United States against targets associated with the al-Zarqawi network 
in Fallujah, Yemen, and elsewhere. Air Force and Navy jets provided 
the bulk of U.S. combat power in the war in Afghanistan and proved 
instrumental in bringing down the Taliban regime and eliminating al-
Qaeda’s largest and most important sanctuary. 
It is likely that air power will continue to be called upon to pro-
vide lethal punch to U.S. and allied eﬀorts to root out and destroy 
terrorists and their supporting infrastructure. Modern air forces have 
the advantage of being able to reach terrorist and insurgent targets in 
inhospitable or inaccessible terrain while simultaneously being rela-
tively invulnerable to the kinds of defenses that are likely to be found 
in jihadist arsenals.17
An important combat role for U.S. air forces is to work closely 
with non-U.S. ground forces in locating and striking terrorist targets. 
As was the case in Afghanistan, this could mean developing an “on 
the ﬂy” partnership with troops of a very diﬀerent level of sophistica-
15 Hebert (2005), p. 32.
16 This point was made by one of the reviewers of this report, Dr. Thomas Marks.
17 This applies mainly to ﬁxed-wing aircraft; man-portable air defense missiles and light 
anti-aircraft artillery have proven to be dangerous to helicopters.
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tion from those of the United States or its traditional allies. In some 
cases, these ground units may be leavened with U.S. Special Forces or 
advisors, but it should be anticipated that, from time to time, U.S. Air 
Force and Navy pilots would ﬁnd themselves supporting soldiers with 
no or little U.S. training and scant knowledge of how to eﬀectively 
employ air power. In such cases, the USAF will need to have avail-
able air-ground control elements that can be rapidly incorporated into 
friendly ground force formations. In addition to their training in man-
aging air support, these airmen will also beneﬁt from having appropri-
ate language skills and some cultural knowledge. Although it is obvi-
ously impractical to teach the hundreds of languages found around the 
world, the importance of the struggle against jihadist terrorism does 
suggest that the USAF should consider developing cadres of air-ground 
liaisons competent in a handful of key languages, such as Arabic.
Airlift can be the key to counterterrorist or counterinsurgency 
operations in countries with widely dispersed populations and poor 
land transportation infrastructure—conditions that deﬁne almost all 
areas where terrorists and insurgents operate. Only by being able to 
bring forces rapidly to the scene can governments neutralize the terror-
ists’ operational and tactical advantages and quell religious and ethnic 
clashes before they ﬂare into full-scale communal conﬂict. Yet, many 
of the countries confronting terrorist and insurgent movements—
Indonesia and Colombia come to mind—have woefully inadequate air 
transport capabilities. Building the air transport capabilities of countries 
at risk should be a priority in U.S. counterterrorism policy and security 
assistance programs. In addition, the U.S. Air Force—the world’s pre-
mier practitioner of air mobility—will probably ﬁnd itself called upon 
to directly provide transportation under some circumstances.18
18 Previous RAND research has found that battleﬁeld aeromedical evacuation capabilities 
have important psychological eﬀects on the performance of non-U.S. soldiers, who are more 
inclined to risk injury when they feel conﬁdent that they will be promptly treated and taken 
to safety if they are wounded. Since few countries currently ﬁeld these capabilities, the U.S. 
military, including the Air Force, may be called upon to provide them when cooperating 
with a host country in counterterror or counterinsurgency operations. This also represents 
one area where helping friendly countries develop non-combat capabilities could have sub-
stantial payoﬀs in dealing with subnational violence. See Ochmanek (2003). 
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As noted above, local governments and militaries will ultimately 
be called upon to do most of the heavy lifting in bringing down ter-
rorist and insurgent groups operating in and from their territories. 
Consequently, providing training to the armed forces of friendly coun-
tries threatened by jihadist terror groups or insurgents will be another 
important job for the U.S. military, including the Air Force. It seems 
likely that these training missions could be numerous and potentially 
prolonged. Further, given that they will often be conducted in loca-
tions where the threat to U.S. personnel is quite high, they will impose 
force protection burdens. 
Finally, the fundamentally political nature of the battle against 
jihadist groups means that in some cases the training objectives will 
revolve as much around inculcating appropriate norms of behavior, 
such as respect for human rights and civilian lives and property, as 
around transmitting expertise in operational and tactical skills. The 
U.S. military has what might charitably be called a mixed record of 
success in providing such “socialization” training; future failures—or 
events that the capable propaganda machines of jihadist groups could 
present to the Muslim world as failures—could be very costly defeats 
in “political war.”
None of these activities would appear to call for major changes 
in USAF force structure or posture.19 The same may not be true of the 
ﬁnal task that we want to emphasize, which is that of providing timely, 
accurate, and actionable information to commanders and operators at 
all levels. Air and space platforms have shown themselves to be vital 
components of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
architecture for the war on terrorism. However, it is equally true that 
the campaign against al-Qaeda and other jihadist terrorists and insur-
gents has been hindered by shortcomings in existing systems, organiza-
tions, and processes. Improvement is needed, and the USAF will likely 
be called upon to make important contributions. 
19 The one exception might be the proposed procurement of tactical transport aircraft better 
suited than the existing ﬂeet to operate in and out of smaller, less-developed airstrips. As 
this is written, there is some controversy surrounding how many aircraft to buy, if any, and 
whether the Army or Air Force should operate them.
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Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have emerged as very useful 
tools for surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and, at times, strik-
ing terrorist targets. As al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups continue 
to geographically decentralize and disperse, the demand for the kinds 
of capabilities oﬀered by platforms such as the USAF’s Predator and 
Global Hawk UAVs seems almost certain to multiply. If we envision a 
future in which the United States may wish to maintain sustained 24-
hour multiple-source surveillance over multiple and widely separated 
swaths of inhospitable terrain, it is not clear that the USAF plans to 
make suﬃcient investment in UAVs. Certainly, space-based systems 
and manned aircraft will play important roles, but UAVs oﬀer both 
greater eﬀectiveness than satellites and less risk than manned plat-
forms, making them highly appealing to future commanders.20 The 
USAF should assess the likely demand for UAVs and size its future 
force accordingly.
The intelligence demands of countering jihadist terrorism will also 
be a human capital issue, not just for the USAF but for every agency—
civilian and military—engaged on the front line of that battle. All of 
the strategies laid out here for checkmating terrorist groups—waging 
political warfare, attacking radical Islamist ideology, breaking the link-
ages between local and global groups, and so on—depend vitally on 
having an accurate image of how these organizations are structured, 
who is involved with them, and how both individuals and groups relate 
to one another. 
Further, since terrorist and insurgent groups are dynamic enti-
ties and the relationships among individuals and organizations are 
ﬂuid, this picture will need to be continuously reassessed and updated. 
Although sensors can collect terabytes of data and advanced processing 
techniques can help bring some order to those data, properly trained 
personnel will be critical to success. These analysts will need a deep 
20 UAVs oﬀer a ﬂexibility that satellites, governed by orbital mechanics and often controlled 
at the national level, do not. No satellite, for example, could follow a suspected terrorist’s 
auto down the road, collecting the information needed to positively identify the occupants 
and, perhaps, even deliver the weapon that neutralizes them. Also, the UAV’s relative prox-
imity to its targets—thousands of feet rather than hundreds of miles—gives it the edge over 
space systems in employing many diﬀerent kinds of sensors.
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understanding of the region they are observing—its language, geogra-
phy, history, and culture—to be able to interpret rapidly and accurately 
what they are seeing and hearing. Developing this pool of expertise rep-
resents a major challenge. The Air Force alone does not have the capac-
ity to support the large number of analysts that would be required. 
Neither do the armed forces collectively. We may have to develop ways 
of rapidly mobilizing the nation’s expertise on any speciﬁc area.
These analysts will also need to be tightly networked with one 
another, and perhaps with their counterparts in other countries as well, 
so that important information about new or evolving relationships in 
the threat space do not disappear in the gaps between institutional 
stovepipes. Developing and sustaining an adequate number and vari-
ety of these specialized intelligence professionals, as well as creating the 
technical and bureaucratic infrastructures to support them, will be a 
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